# THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER


AT THE HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM

# THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948

**★ OFFICIAL BRIEFING PAPERS ★** 

**TEACHER MANUAL** 





The fundamental purpose of our educational system is to instill a moral code in the rising generation and create a citizenship that will be responsible for the welfare of the nation.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

2 * THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER   THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948					
The Truman Library Institute would like to thank the  Community Legacy Fund of the Jewish Community Foundation of Greater Kansas City					

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## THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER

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**66** Education is our first line of defense. In the conflict of principle and policy which divides the world today, America's hope—our hope the hope of the world, is in education. 99

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

4 \* THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER | THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948

## **★ OVERVIEW**

## **FALL BACK IN TIME.**

The year is 1948. The British government has announced the end of the British Mandate and their exit date from Palestine. Their exit opens a void of power in the region that will affect 1,900,000 Arabs, Jews, and Christians living in Palestine, displaced people fleeing to Palestine, the relationships between Arabs and Jews, the authority of the United Nations, control of strategic oil reserves, and the balance of power in the Cold War. The fate of the world is yours to decide.

Welcome to The White House Decision Center where your students will actively engage in crisis decision making by immersing themselves in historical situations that President Truman faced.



The WHDC curriculum prepares students to be thoughtful about the decisions they make and to better understand decisions made by others. Through participation in The WHDC and our pre-visit modules, students will practice critical historical thinking skills including:

- Literacy
- Primary source selection, reading strategies, and analysis
- · Comparing and contrasting multiple points of view
- Leadership
- Decision making
- Group cooperation and communication
- Speech writing and public speaking
- Crafting evidence-based solutions for complex problems

The WHDC experience will also provide students with unique knowledge of:

- The inner workings of the executive branch, including the relationship between a president and his advisors
- How presidential decisions are made
- · A model for decision making
- The historical perspective of Truman's decisions

Preparation at school enriches students' learning experience and ensures their success at The White House Decision Center. Four pre-visit modules, organizational forms, and optional assessment activities are included in this teacher's manual. Each of the four pre-visit modules can be modified for students of every level. Please do your best to complete all of the modules.

If you have any questions about the curriculum or your upcoming visit, please contact The White House Decision Center staff (TheWhiteHouseDecisionCenter@gmail.com or 816.268.8241).

## MODULE 1: PRESIDENTIAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES



#### **OVERVIEW**

The president wears many "hats" each day. In fact, there are six roles for our country's highest elected official. This module reviews those roles.

#### **LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

Students will analyze and apply the six roles of the president.

## **LENGTH OF LESSON**

25 minutes

#### **MATERIALS**

- 1. Six Roles, One President
- 2. Truman's Daily Schedule, May 21, 1945
- 3. Analysis of Truman's Schedule
- 4. Presidential Power and Influence

## **GUIDING QUESTIONS**

- 1. What are the president's primary roles?
- 2. How are the roles of the presidency applied to various situations?

#### **PROCEDURE**

- 1. Read **Six Roles, One President** (Teacher's Manual, 7-8; Student Manual, 4-5) as a group.
- 2. Examine **Truman's Schedule** (Teacher's Manual, 9; Student Manual, 6).
  - a. Note the crowded schedule and the amount of time allotted to meet with people. Ask students to consider who got the most time and why?
- 3. As a class, determine which presidential roles (if any) are reflected in the first two meetings listed on the **Analysis of Truman's Schedule** worksheet (Teacher's Manual, 10; Student Manual, 7).
- 4. Divide into small groups to complete the rest of the **Analysis of Truman's Schedule** worksheet. Tell students that there could be more than one right answer and not to overthink the schedule. Share the answers as a group and discuss.
- 5. Apply the knowledge by completing one of three scenarios in the **Presidential Power and Influence** section (Teacher's Manual, 11-13; Student Manual, 8-10).
  - a. Working as a large group, complete, "Chief of State" portion.
    - i. Possible answers include making a speech or going on a presidential visit to provide exposure for the problem of starving women and children.
  - b. Have the students complete the rest of the chart in their small groups.
  - c. Share answers as a class.
  - d. Teacher's Note: Consider returning to the unused scenarios in another unit throughout the year or as a follow up to your visit.

## MODULE 1: PRESIDENTIAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES



## **★ SIX ROLES, ONE PRESIDENT**

## 1. CHIEF OF STATE

As the U.S. Chief of State, the president is a living symbol of the nation who stands for the highest values and ideals of the country.

## **Examples of Behavior:**

- Presenting important national awards to citizens
- Congratulating U.S. Olympic gold medal winners
- Making a patriotic speech on the Fourth of July
- Pitching the first ball of the baseball season

## 2. CHIEF EXECUTIVE

As Chief Executive, the president employs millions of government workers in the Executive Branch, decides how to enforce the laws of the U.S., and chooses officials and advisors to help run the Executive Branch.

## **Examples of Behavior:**

- Appointing the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- · Holding a cabinet meeting to discuss government business
- Reading a report and recommendations about problems in the management of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

#### 3. CHIEF DIPLOMAT

With the help of his advisors, the president makes the foreign policy of the United States. He or she also determines what American diplomats and ambassadors should say to foreign governments.

## **Examples of Behavior:**


- Traveling to London to meet with British leaders regarding European issues
- Entertaining Japanese diplomats in the White House to discuss trade issues
- Writing a message or a letter to Russian leaders on arms control
- Trying to bring peace to the Middle East

## 4. COMMANDER IN CHIEF

As commander of the nation's armed services, the president determines the size and deployment of the armed forces and, with Defense Department leaders and the highest military officers he or she appoints, shapes the defense policy. The president shares some military powers with Congress—top appointments, major military expenses, and plans to expand the armed forces require congressional approval; and only Congress can declare war.

## **Examples of Behavior:**

- Inspecting a Navy yard
- Deciding whether to bomb foreign cities in wartime
- Calling troops to stop a riot
- · Deciding on which new weapon systems to request in the budget
- Ordering troops to Afghanistan



Krow something to be a president. You have got to be a jack-of-all-trades and know something about all of them.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

## **5. CHIEF LEGISLATOR**

While only Congress has the power to make laws, the Constitution gives the president power to influence Congress in its lawmaking—a president may urge Congress to pass new laws and may veto bills that he or she does not favor.

## Examples of Behavior:

- Inviting members of Congress to lunch to discuss pending legislation
- Signing a bill passed by Congress
- Making public statements supporting or opposing pending legislation in Congress


## 6. CHIEF OF PARTY

As chief of his or her political party, the president helps members of his or her political party get elected or appointed to office.

## **Examples of Behavior:**

- Choosing leading party members to serve in the Cabinet
- Speaking at a rally for a party nominee to the U.S. Senate
- Attending events to raise funds for his party's congressional candidates

## ★ TRUMAN'S SCHEDULE, MAY 21, 1945



66 Being a president is like riding a tiger.

A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed. ??

– HARRY S. TRUMAN

## **ANSWER KEY**

★ ANALYSIS OF TRUMAN'S SCHEDULE ★				
Time	Meeting With	Likely Topic	Role(s) Reflected	
9:30 am	Congressman Andrew J. May	Discussed the Universal Service Bill.	Chief Legislator Commander-in-Chief	
9:45 am	Congressman Frank Starkey	Talked about the Federal Judge of Minnesota.	Chief Legislator	
10:00 am	Paul Stark	Discussed Victory Garden and the hopes to have one on the White House Lawn.	Chief of State	
10:10 am	Major Herbert C. Van Smith	Served in Battery D with President Truman. Came to share World War I memories.	Chief of State	
10:15 am	Averell Harriman	Discussed the Russian situation and a possible meeting with Stalin, Churchill, and President Truman.	Chief Diplomat	
10:20 am	Paul Dillon, John W. Joynt	Good political friend from St. Louis, MO. Most likely, they discussed politics.	Chief of Party	
10:30 am	Georges Bidault, Foreign Minister of France	Reviewed the French and U.S. relationship because President Truman does not think the French are being cooperative.	Chief Diplomat, Chief of State	
11:00 am	Bryce Smith	Former mayor of Kansas City and old friend.	Chief of State	
11:15 am	Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor	Discussed her resignation.	Chief of State	
11:45 am	Michael D. Konomas	Supreme President of the Order of Aheppa, Kansas City, MO . Came to pay his respect.	Chief of State	
12:00 pm	C.B. Baldwin, Elmer Benson	Former Minnesota governor. Came to discuss appointment of Federal Judge in Minnesota.	Chief of Party, Chief Executive	
12:15 pm	Archbishop Athenagoras, Greek Orthodox Church	Paid his respects, then had his picture taken with President Truman.	Chief of State	
12:30 pm	Dr. John R. Mott	Discussed YMCA program that is in charge of prisoners of war in thirty countries.	Commander-in-Chief	
12:45 pm	Clarence Pickett, Harold Evans, Paul J. Furnas	Discussed American Friends Service Committee.	Chief of State	
1:00 pm	Address to Joint Session of Congress	Presented the hundredth Congressional Medal of Honor to infantryman Sgt. Jake Lindsay.	Chief of State	
2:00 pm	Harold Smith, Bureau of the Budget	Reviewed regular budget issues.	Chief Executive	
3:00 pm	Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court	Discussed the Supreme Court as presently constituted and offered suggestions as to Justices of the Supreme Court.	Chief Legislator	

## PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND INFLUENCE

## **★ ISSUE: REBUILDING EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II**

WWII left millions of European soldiers and civilians dead. Many survivors experienced starvation, poverty, and a sense of hopelessness. Most Western European nations suffered great physical ruin from the war and were weakened. Although the Middle East did not endure the devastating bombing from Allied and Axis forces during WWII, postwar political, social, and economic upheavals left extensive power vacuums throughout the region. Faced with massive debts from WWII, the British government announced in early 1947 that it could not continue to provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman worried that without financial and military assistance, Turkey and Greece would succumb to internal and external communist pressures, giving the Soviets strategic access to the Mediterranean. The U.S. State Department believed that swift action needed to be taken to help rebuild Western European nations and strengthen Eastern European nations before they lost faith in democracy.

Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?
☐ Chief of State	<ul> <li>Making speeches about importance of democracy.</li> <li>Promoting U.S. ideals of democracy/not communism.</li> </ul>
☐ Chief Executive	Holding cabinet meeting to create and discuss Marshall Plan.
☐ Chief Diplomat	Meeting with European leaders about their needs providing money to European countries (aid).
☐ Commander in Chief	<ul> <li>Ordering military to help keep law/order in Europe during rebuild.</li> <li>Provide security.</li> </ul>
☐ Chief Legislator	Get congress to approve funding for Marshall Plan.
☐ Chief of Party	Speak at candidate lunches to ensure his party supports these ideas and they remain in office.

## **★ ISSUE: IRAN**

Allied forces invaded Iran during WWII because of the perceived comradery between Hitler and Reza Khan, the Shah of Iran. The Allies, who sought to overcome Tehran's totalitarian tendencies, removed Reza Khan from power. Iran was then divided into three zones, with Iran, Britain, and the USSR each gaining sovereignty over a zone. Partial occupation of Iran provided a safe route through which the Allies could supply Soviet forces fighting on the Eastern Front.

After WWII, Soviet troops refused to relinquish control of northern Iran, breaking the Allies' promise to extract all forces from Iran within six months of the war's conclusion. The Truman administration feared that continued Soviet control of northern Iran would spur the fall of Turkey to communist rule. Soviet control of Iran's vast oil resources would also give Stalin leverage in the global economic market, a power that could jeopardize Western Europe's recovery from war.

Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?
☐ Chief of State	<ul> <li>Making speeches about importance of democracy.</li> <li>Promoting U.S. ideals of democracy/no communism.</li> </ul>
☐ Chief Executive	<ul> <li>Hold cabinet meetings to discuss with advisors the fear of Soviet control of oil resources.</li> <li>Discuss suspicion of communist rule and ways to keep it from spreading.</li> </ul>
☐ Chief Diplomat	<ul> <li>Meeting with allies and world leaders to discuss how to stop Stalin from gaining global economic power.</li> <li>Share information with other leaders about suspicion of Soviet Union.</li> <li>Discuss ways to stop Soviet control of northern Iran.</li> </ul>
☐ Commander in Chief	Meeting with military advisors and gathering information on way to stop Soviets control.
☐ Chief Legislator	• Inform Congress of the situation and possibilities of needing funds.
☐ Chief of Party	Continue to support his party and ensure his party gets reelected.

CURRENT ISSUE:				
Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?			
☐ Chief of State				
☐ Chief Executive				
☐ Chief Diplomat				
☐ Commander in Chief				
☐ Chief Legislator				
☐ Chief of Party				

## **MODULE 2: PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADVISORS**



## **OVERVIEW**

Presidential advisors play pivotal roles that influence a president's decisions and policies. President Truman called on the best and the brightest to advise him; he expected all of his advisors to be knowledgeable and have excellent strategic, communication, and relationship-building skills.

## **LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

Students will analyze historical issues from the perspective of their advisory role and use communication skills to share their knowledge.

## **LENGTH OF LESSON**

60 minutes

## **MATERIALS**

- 1. Role Assignment Worksheet
- 2. Copies of the Advisory Role Profiles
- 3. Authority, Power, and Influence in the Truman White House: An Organizational Chart
- 4. Copies of the Briefings on Three Scenarios: Palestine History; Jewish History, Displacement, and the Holocaust; and The United Nations and the UN Partition Plan
- 5. Timeline
- 6. Advisory Evaluation Form

## **GUIDING QUESTIONS**

- 1. Who advises the president?
- 2. How do presidential advisors gather information and determine what to share with the president?

## **PROCEDURE**

- 1. Complete the Role Assignment Worksheet in advance (Teacher's Manual, 15).
  - a. Teacher's Note: Assign roles to the students in whatever manner best fits your class. Please make sure that students are distributed evenly in the letter groups.

## 2. HOMEWORK:


- a. Distribute the **Advisory Role Profiles** (Teacher's Manual, 16-23) according to roles assigned. Instruct students to read their Role Profile page as homework. Inform them that you will randomly call on people from each role group to tell the class who they are and what they do for the president.
- b. Have students review the **Timeline** (Teacher's Manual 31-32, Student Manual, 12-13). Ask them to be prepared to discuss who has ruled Palestine, when, and under what justification.
- 3. When they arrive to class, direct students to sit with others in the same role.
- Check for understanding of roles by randomly asking students to share who they are with the class.
- Facilitate a conversation based on the timeline and the assigned prompt: who has ruled Palestine, when, and under what justification?
- 4. Read the **Authority, Power, and Influence in the Truman White House: An Organizational Chart** (Teacher's Manual, 30, Student Manual, 11). Have students highlight their path of communication to the president. As a class, consider the following questions: Who answers only to the president? Who answers to multiple people? Do advisors have to agree with one another?
- 6. Instruct students to read the **Copies of the Briefings on Three Scenarios** from the perspective of their assigned roles (Teacher's Manual 24-29, Student Manual, 14-19). Instruct them to complete the **Advisory Evaluation Forms** (Teacher's Manual, 33-34, Student Manual, 20-21) when they finish reading each briefing.
  - Teacher's Note: If there is not time to read all three briefings in class, consider assigning one or two for homework.
- 7. Acting in their assigned role, have students predict how they will advise the president to respond to the ending of the British Mandate in Palestine.

## **★** ROLE ASSIGNMENT WORKSHEET **★**

## Assign students to equal teams with one president for each letter group used.

	President Truman	Press Secretary Ross
A		A
В		B
C		C
D		D
E		E
F		F
G		G
Н		H
	Secretary of Defense Forrestal	Secretary of State Marshall
A		A
В		B
C		C
D		D
E		E
F		F
G		G
Н		Н
	Special Counsel Clifford	Saudi Arabian Ambassador Al-Faqih
		A
		B
		C
_		D
		E
F		F
		G
Н		H
U	.S. Ambassador to the UN Austin	Eddie Jacobson
A		A
B		B
C		C
D		D
E		E
F		F
G		G
H		H

## **★ PROFILES**



## **PRESIDENT**

## HARRY S. **TRUMAN**

#### **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

Born and raised in Missouri, you helped work the family farm in your youth. Although you loved learning, you could not afford to attend college. After serving as an Army officer during WWI, you briefly operated a clothing store with your former sergeant and friend, Eddie Jacobson. Later you were elected administrator of the government of Jackson County, Missouri.

In 1934, you were elected to the U.S. Senate. Ten years later, you were elected vice president of the United States. In April 1945, President Roosevelt dies in office and you assume the presidency after less than three months as vice president.

An avid reader of history, you have a good grasp on international and domestic politics. Your experience as a county administrator, as an officer in the military, and as a chairman of the Senate committee investigating national defense during World War II provides you with a strong background in decision making.

## HARRY S. **TRUMAN**

- BORN: May 8, 1884 in Lamar, MO
- SPOUSE: Bess Wallace
- CHILDREN: Margaret
- POLITICAL PARTY: Democratic

## LEADERSHIP STYLE

Publicly, you are known as a tough combative character, represented by your nickname, "Give 'Em Hell Harry." Privately, you are patient, sympathetic, modest, considerate, and appreciative. You are not afraid to make difficult decisions. You often draw upon your knowledge of history and Biblical readings, which has convinced you that aggression by totalitarian nations must be checked if peace and democracy are to be preserved. As the "Buck Stops Here" sign on your desk indicates, you accept the responsibility for making decisions. When things go wrong, you take the blame; when things go well, you give your advisors the credit. Your subordinates greatly admire you; you rely heavily on them to give you the best advice. You expect and receive loyalty from those around you.

#### PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You are the highest government official in the United States. You, and your officials, are bound by the Constitution and the laws passed by Congress.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

The Constitution charges you with executing the laws of the United States and presiding over the executive branch of the federal government. Cabinet departments, federal agencies, and your White House staff assist you. You direct U.S. foreign policy and are the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. You also appoint Cabinet officials, heads of federal agencies, U.S. Supreme Court Justices and judges of the lower federal courts, and U.S. ambassadors to foreign nations; the U.S. Senate must confirm your nominations to these offices.

## PRESS SECRETARY

## **CHARLIE G. ROSS**

#### **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

You are a boyhood friend of President Truman. The two of you graduated from Independence High School—you were valedictorian. Like Truman, you love reading. After graduating with honors from the University of Missouri, you worked for the St. Louis Post Dispatch, where you won a Pulitzer Prize for journalism. You helped start the world's first school of journalism at the University of Missouri.

When Truman became president, you were one of the first people for whom he sent; you reluctantly agreed to serve as press secretary. Truman often creates problems for you when he shoots from the hip with the press.

#### LEADERSHIP STYLE

Although you provide background information to White House press correspondents, you see your job as helping the president craft his public image. You are not especially well organized and often do not provide enough press coverage for President Truman. Still, you are a hard worker, taking only five vacation days in four years.


You advocate for restraint and try to intercept President Truman's angry letters before they are sent. Truman listens to your advice, often softening the language of his statements and speeches. You create an atmosphere of moderation throughout the White House.

#### PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

President Truman appointed you; you operate under his authority. You are President Truman's life-long friend. He often calls upon you for "common sense" advice.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

You advise and assist President Truman in presenting himself and his policies to the press and the public.





## **CHARLIE G.** ROSS

- BORN: November 9, 1885 in Independence, MO
- SPOUSE: Florence Griffin
- CHILDREN: Walter and John
- POLITICAL PARTY: Democratic



## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

## **JAMES V. FORRESTAL**

#### BRIEF BIOGRAPHY

You attended Dartmouth and Princeton, but did not receive a degree. You became a successful bond salesman on Wall Street.

When World War II began, you left a \$180,000-a-year job for a \$10,000-a-year job with the U.S. government. You moved up in the Roosevelt administration rapidly. eventually becoming the Secretary of the Navy. In this capacity, you helped create and direct the great naval forces that helped to achieve victory in the war.

In 1947, President Truman appointed you the first Secretary of Defense. As Secretary of Defense you have been an outspoken critic of demobilization after World War II and fear the U.S. is not prepared for military conflict with the Soviet Union.

## **LEADERSHIP STYLE**

You are humorless, intense, and driven. Your critics say that you are not decisive and that you spend too much

time on preparation. Your favorite recreation is tennis, but you are rarely able to relax. President Truman, who appointed you and has previously supported you, has become increasingly upset with your performance. The President now sees you as indecisive and irresolute, and has told others that you have provided him with alibis instead of solutions.

## PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You are appointed by and operate under the authority of President Truman.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

You are the first Secretary of Defense. As Secretary of Defense, you are the principal assistant to President Truman in all matters relating to national security. You are also the civilian head of the National Military Establishment that includes the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. You are a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.

## **JAMES V. FORRESTAL**

- BORN: February 15, 1892 in Matteawan, NY
- SPOUSE: Josephine Ogden
- CHILDREN: Michael and Peter
- POLITICAL PARTY: Democratic

## **SECRETARY OF STATE**

## **GEORGE C. MARSHALL**

#### **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

You graduated from Virginia Military Institute and the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. You were Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II. You retired after the war with the rank of general, but when President Truman asked you to become Secretary of State in 1947, you agreed out of a sense of duty. You are the first career soldier to become Secretary of State. You helped develop the Truman Doctrine, which promised assistance to countries threatened by communism, and the Marshall Plan, which provided economic aid to impoverished European nations.

## LEADERSHIP STYLE


You are good-humored, reserved, and humble with a sense of selflessness. You are quiet, but forceful. You are one of the most respected men in the U.S. Only your family and closest friends call you by your first name, everyone else calls you General Marshall. President Truman greatly admires you; you have his total confidence. Your health is deteriorating and you are relying more on Under Secretary of State Lovett's judgment.

## PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You are appointed by and operate under the authority of President Truman.

## SPECIFIC DUTIES

You head the State Department. You are also the principal advisor to President Truman in the determination and execution of U.S. foreign policy. You are a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council.



## **GEORGE C. MARSHALL**

- BORN: December 31, 1880 in Uniontown, PA
- SPOUSE(S): Elizabeth Carter Coles (d. 1927) Katherine Boyce Tupper Brown
- STEPCHILDREN: Allen, Clifton, and Molly
- POLITICAL PARTY: Nonpartisan

## SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

## CLARK M. CLIFFORD

## **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

You received a law degree from Washington University in St. Louis, where you were a popular student. You began your legal career defending indigent persons in criminal cases and became a highly successful attorney. During World War II, you served as an officer in the U.S. Naval Reserve and were assigned to work in the White House as Assistant Naval Aide to the President. You distinguished yourself and became the Special Counsel to President Truman after the war. You believe that gaining the approval of minority groups is one of the keys for President Truman to win the election of 1948. You are a strong civil rights liberal and support the U.S. recognition of a new Jewish state in Palestine.

## **LEADERSHIP STYLE**

You describe yourself as a pragmatic liberal and are considered to be charming and sophisticated. The press highly regards you.

## PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You were appointed by and operate under the authority of President Truman.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

As one of President Truman's most important political advisors and speechwriters, you are involved in nearly every major issue that comes before the president. You want President Truman to win the next election.

# CLIFFORD

- BORN: December 25, 1906 in Fort Scott, KS
- **SPOUSE:**Margery Pepperell
  Kimball
- CHILDREN: Margery, Joyce, and Randall
- POLITICAL PARTY: Democratic

## U.S. AMBASSADOR **TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

## **WARREN AUSTIN**

## **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

Educated in Vermont, you chose to continue your studies in Quebec specifically for the chance to speak French fluently. You studied law and entered into practice with your father. In 1931, you were elected to the U.S. Senate. You held several local and state offices, including Chairman of the Vermont State Republican Convention and mayor of St. Albans. This prepared you for a run as your state's Republican Senator, which you won in a special election. By 1943 you were selected to be a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. You firmly support the idea of the United Nations. President Truman admires your ability to bring differing views together. He reached across party lines to appoint you as the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

## **LEADERSHIP STYLE**

Because you dislike attention, you prefer not to speak in front of the news media. Instead, you work in the background to bring about compromise between difficult groups.

#### PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You report to the State Department and the Secretary of State.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

Your duty is to report to the State Department on events in the United Nations. You also make suggestions to the State Department and the president as to how the U.S. should proceed with those events.



# WARREN AUSTIN

- BORN: November 12, 1877
- SPOUSE: Mildred M. Lucas
- CHILDREN: Warren Jr. and Edward
- POLITICAL PARTY: Republican



## SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. AND THE UN

## ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH

#### **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

You were born in London in 1909 to Syrian parents. You studied law and hold a degree for the French Law College, Cairo, Egypt. You are a member of the Saudi Arabian delegation to the United Nations, the first Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., and were previously the Saudi Arabian Minister to Iraq.

## LEADERSHIP STYLE

The White House staff does not know much about you. However, Saudi Arabia was important to the previous administration and you are the voice of Saudi Arabia to the Truman administration and the UN. Arab culture emphasizes personal relationships within a clan, therefore, you tend to want to get to know people first to build trust before engaging in business with them. There is an indirectness in your style of communication. It is culturally important not to offend others. You are polite, but vague.

# ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH

- **BORN**: 1909
- SPOUSE: Yacout
- CHILDREN:
  Aida, Selma, Saniya,
  Zuheir, Khaled, Ghida,
  and Hoda

## PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

You represent Saudi Arabia to the U.S. and in the United Nations.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

You attend UN meetings, make speeches, and attend diplomatic functions.

## **EDDIE JACOBSON**

#### **BRIEF BIOGRAPHY**

You were born in New York City's Lower East side to impoverished Jewish Lithuanians. When you were 14, your parents moved you and your siblings to Kansas City, Missouri. That year you met Harry Truman while you both were working downtown at the National Bank of Commerce. Years later you and the future president reconnected during Army basic training at Fort Sill. Then-Lieutenant Truman was selected to run the camp's canteen, and he selected you, his sergeant, as his assistant. You and Truman ran the most businesslike and efficiently managed canteen in the division. Together, you supplied Battery D through the Verdun Valley during World War I.

In 1919, you and Harry opened your haberdashery store. Harry did the bookkeeping and you did the buying; both of you did the selling. You did extremely well until 1922 when the recession began. You both lost everything you

invested in the business and acquired debt. Even though you had to declare bankruptcy, you insisted on reimbursing Truman for his part. You became a traveling salesman, which enabled you to visit your friend Harry while he lived in Washington, D.C.

## LEADERSHIP STYLE

After the reports of the Holocaust were published, you discussed with President Truman the concerns of the Jewish people and their problems of displacement in Europe. Jewish leaders in the U.S. who are aware of your friendship with President Truman communicate constantly with you in hopes of influencing the president's development of a solution for the Jews.

## PLACE IN THE POWER HIERARCHY

President Truman allows you open access to the Oval Office. You are in Truman's inner circle and one of his closest friends since World War I.

## **SPECIFIC DUTIES**

You are not a member of the White House staff, so you do not have specific duties.



## **EDDIE JACOBSON**

- BORN: June 17, 1891 in New York City, NY
- SPOUSE(S): Bluma Rosenbaum
- CHILDREN: Elinor and Gloria
- POLITICAL PARTY: Democrat



Palestine came to be known as the land west of the Jordan River. Jews, Arabs, and Christians living in Palestine under the British Mandate were considered Palestinians.



## **★ PALESTINE HISTORY**

The region known as modern Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the victorious Allies created the League of Nations, which then carved out new states in the Levant, a large area in Southwest Asia. The League of Nations Mandate awarded Syria and Lebanon to France, and awarded Iraq and the entity of Palestine to the British. The League of Nations Mandate placed these new states under either British or French administration until the people were deemed ready for self-government.

The future of the Palestine Mandate was complicated by wartime pledges such as the secret wartime arrangements between the British and the French in the Skyes-Picot Agreement and promises to the inhabitants of the area, including negotiations with the Arabs (e.g., the Hussein-McMahon correspondence) and the Jews (e.g., the Balfour Declaration).\*

No definite borders existed for Palestine until 1922. That year, the area east of the Jordan River was separated from the rest of Palestine and called Transjordan. Palestine came to be known as the land west of the Jordan River. Jews, Arabs, and Christians living in Palestine under the British Mandate were considered Palestinians.

The Middle East economy took a dramatic turn early in the 20th century. From 1908-1925, the discovery of oil encouraged British and American oil companies to invest in these countries, especially after WWI when leaders saw the need for petroleum

in future wars. King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia eventually became wealthy and his country's importance grew in the eyes of the world as did other countries with oil.

Under the Mandate, British leaders in Palestine worked towards a unified government with both the Arabs and the Jews from 1921 to 1929. However, the Arab political leadership, which was led by a few prominent families such as the Husseins, insisted that any legislature should reflect their majority numbers and rejected any form of government that did not give them real power. The British insistence of holding veto power, the ultimate authority, increased Arab frustration in their goal for self-government.

Meanwhile, Jews of Palestine began to organize under the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency was established under the Mandate with the primary objectives of aiding Jewish immigration and buying land for Jews to settle in Palestine. Although Palestinian laws prohibited the selling of land to outsiders, the creation of the Jewish National Fund enabled Jews to legally buy the land. Subsequent land value increases in Palestine enticed many wealthy Arab landowners to sell their property, especially in the plains of Palestine. This displaced Arab sharecroppers and their families, forcing them to relocate to poor villages and to the mountains. As the population of Jews in Palestine during the 1920s and 30s increased from 13% to 31%, especially after the Nazi seizure of power, many Arab Palestinians moved towards nationalist activism and increased their demands for independence and self-government.

Economic contrasts in Palestine increased the pressure between the Palestinian Jews and Arabs. Arabs' small-scale farming reflected their individualism. Even the expansion of Arab industry conformed to the idea of individualism. Educational opportunities were limited. In contrast, the Jewish Agency promoted and financed agricultural settlements, industries, and education. For example, Arab families, not corporations, controlled businesses and industries. As a result, Jewish wages tended to be higher than Arab wages, which, in

## **★** FOR REVIEW:

- \_\_ Truman
- \_\_ Ross
- \_\_ Forrestal
- \_\_ Marshall
- \_\_ Clifford
- $_{--}$  Austin
- \_\_ Al-Faqih
- $_{-\!-\!-}$  Jacobson

turn, impacted housing standards. The disparity in wages and housing made it easier for Arab political leaders to encourage anti-Jewish feelings in the Arab communities. Jewish policies banning the employment of Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and their refusal to use Jewish funds to directly improve the Arab standard of living increased Palestinian Arab feelings of resentment against Palestinian Jews. That resentment grew to anger when the British gave Zionist Pinhas Rutenberg approval for electricity production in 1921, which Palestinian Arabs viewed as proof that the British favored Zionism.

In 1936, tensions and violence escalated in Palestine, and then erupted in the Arab Revolt that lasted three years. Members of the Palestinian Arab nationalist uprising refused to pay British taxes and demanded independence and the elimination of mass Jewish immigration. In reaction to the revolt, the British increased military presence in Palestine. The British also formed the Peel Commission to investigate the problems in Palestine. The Peel Commission reported that the British Mandate was unsuccessful and suggested that Palestine be divided into two countries. Arabs both in Palestine and in neighboring countries were outraged at the suggestion and the revolt intensified. The British declared martial law and dissolved the Arab Higher Committee, forcing many of its leaders to flee. The outcome of the revolt was ruinous for the Arabs: the casualty count was high and many leaders were killed or fled.

At the same time, Palestinian Jews organized to protect themselves. The British had given support to the Haganah, a Jewish defense military organization under the Mandate. Palestinian Jews also created underground militia groups with their own unique goals. They began comprehensive military training and established weapon depots during this period. As a result of this tightening of discipline, there was a general militarization of the Jews in Palestine. Palestinian Jews began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. They began to think that violence, not patience, was needed to achieve justice. Moderates who urged trust in the British Mandate and self-restraint were undermined.

In May 1939, the British released a White Paper in which they announced that Palestine should be one country governed by both Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers of the population and restrict the sale of land to Jews. The British White Paper also proposed limiting Jewish immigration. The Arabs rejected it as it did not grant immediate independence from British rule, eliminate the land sales to Jews, or end Jewish immigration to the region. The Jews also rejected the White Paper because they objected to limits on immigration and land sales. British leaders could not find a compromise.

When World War II began four months later, some Arab leaders saw a chance to rid themselves of British rule. While some leaders such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem supported the Axis forces, countries such as Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral and provided the Allies with large supplies of oil. In an effort to reach out to the Arab community and to stop alliances with the Axis, President Franklin Roosevelt assured King Ibn Saud in a May 1943

letter that he would consult the Arabs before any decision was made on the post war settlement of Palestine. The importance of Standard Oil Company's Arabian American Oil Company (ARMCO) continued production of oil in Saudi Arabia for the Allies as well as the size of the Arab population concerned President Roosevelt and his State Department. It was at this time that diplomatic relations with the U.S. were established. Meanwhile, Palestinian Jews fought for the British during the war in special units such as the Jewish Brigade. The size of the Arab population and the strategic U.S. oil reserves being located in an unstable area greatly concerned the U.S. State Department within the context of the Cold War.

The majority of Zionists overwhelmingly supported the Biltmore Program of 1942. In addition to an immediate issuance of 100,000 certificates of immigration to Palestine, this called for the Mandate to hand over control of immigration to the Jewish Agency, to abolish restrictions on sale of land and to aim for the establishment of a Jewish state as soon as a Jewish majority was achieved. However, the Palestinian Jews were not all Zionists. Party Jewry was riddled with political differences. Many Jews doubted the wisdom of these demands.

At the end of WWII, a solution for displaced people, particularly the Jews, was imperative. Jews who survived the concentration camps and who had no home to return to were forced to stay in camps run by the Allies. Many looked to Palestine as an answer as to where to settle. In reaction, Arab delegates from seven nations met in Alexandria, Egypt and formed the Arab League. They announced that there would be no greater injustice than solving the problems of the Jews in Europe by inflicting injustices on Palestinian Arabs. After all, they had not participated in the Holocaust. They refuted "land without people for a people" without land," a slogan that promoted Jewish migration to Palestine. Their country was populated; it had just never exercised an independent government without controlling countries overseeing Palestine. They argued that the British were giving away land that did not belong to Britain and that the Mandate contradicted the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Mandate was seen as a violation of their self-government since it forced on them an immigration they did not want.

Palestinian Arabs pointed to the countries around them that had been granted independence. The promises made by the British and the reassurances from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman were seen by them as a recognition of the principle that they should enjoy the same rights as those in other countries. They demanded immediate independence. However, they had refused to develop a selfgoverning Arab community parallel to that of the Jews of Palestine.

On June 16, 1945, as British resources and manpower were strained to the breaking point, the Palestine settlement issue was placed before the new United Nations. On October 19, the British presented a formal proposal to the U.S. Secretary of State for a joint Anglo-American Committee for Inquiry into the Palestine Problem. Late in 1947, the British announced they would end their part of the Mandate and leave Palestine on May 15, 1948.







## ★ JEWISH HISTORY, DISPLACEMENT, AND THE HOLOCAUST

In 70 AD, Roman military forces crushed a Jewish revolt and drove Jews from Jerusalem. Displaced Jews fled to other regions where they were greeted with suspicion, contempt, and violence. As a result, Jews living outside of their homeland, or diaspora, banded together and adhered to their traditions in the midst of foreign customs in foreign lands.

Outsiders often viewed Jewish people's exclusivity as a threat. Christians labeled them Christ-killers and accused them of condoning ritual murder and spreading disease by poisoning the water. During the Middle Ages, Christian leaders demanded baptism or death for new Jewish settlers in their lands. In 1215, Pope Innocent III demanded that all Jews wear a distinguishing badge of shame in order to alert Christians of approaching danger. Other leaders prevented Jews from owning land and forced them to live in ghettos. Jews also faced travel restrictions and were not allowed to join certain professions.

They had no rights as citizens. The continued cycles of suspicion and persecution encouraged successive waves of Jewish immigration to their promised land in Palestine.

Restrictions on Jews' freedoms resulted in countless poverty stricken Jewish communities. The Western Enlightenment began after the French Revolution spread across Europe and emancipated Jews from many of these restrictions, helping them rise to positions of power and success in Western Europe, particularly in science and banking. Still, political anti-Semitism in the late 19th century continued to depict Jews as disloyal citizens.

# Beginning in the 1930s, racial anti-Semitism increased. The Nazi Party under the direction of Adolf Hitler used widespread religious and economic fear of the Jews to rally support for the Nazi Party's rise to power in Germany. German Nazis progressively took away the Jews' legal rights and even their right to live. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 defined Jews by blood, not religious belief. Hitler arranged forced labor camps and concentration camps to eradicate entire Jewish communities. On November 9 and 10, 1938, Nazis torched synagogues, vandalized Jewish homes, schools, and businesses, and killed nearly 100 Jews in a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms known as Kristallnacht, which is often referred to as the "Night of Broken Glass." Conditions for German Jews grew increasingly worsened after Kristallnacht.


The Holocaust, an attempt to exterminate European Jews, marked the height of Jewish persecution. Never before had Jews been systematically suppressed and exterminated in such massive numbers. Before the outbreak

## **★** FOR REVIEW:

- \_\_ Truman
- \_\_ Ross
- \_\_ Forrestal
- \_\_ Marshall
- \_\_ Clifford
- \_\_ Austin
- \_\_\_ Al-Faqih
- \_\_ Jacobson

of WWII, Poland was home to the most Jews in Europe. Nazi aggression reduced the country's Jewish population from 3 million to 45,000. At the end of WWII, the Allies discovered that more than 6 million Jews had lost their lives in Hitler's death camps due to direct execution, overexertion, starvation, or disease.

Triumph morphed into horror as Allied troops discovered skeletal survivors, inhumane living conditions, and evidence of mass murders from piles of corpses in the concentration camps they liberated. Survivors struggled to return home only to find nothing of the lives they once had. Many were forced to live in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Displaced Jews lived in separate camps from other



In the Displaced Persons Camps, Jews created the She'erit ha-Pletah or "surviving remnant." Jews were allowed to govern themselves in the camps, but conditions there, as throughout Europe, were poor. Quotas on immigration prevented Jews from entering other countries. They were not welcomed and a desire for a

homeland increased. Zionists in the camps pushed for only one solution: return to Palestine. Zionism, the Jewish political movement to emigrate to the Holy Land, had existed in Europe as early as the 1880s. Many Jewish prayers reminded Jews not to forget Jerusalem. Jews prayed toward Jerusalem and recited the words "next year in Jerusalem" every Passover.

Quotas on immigration prevented Jews from entering other countries. They were not welcomed and the need for a homeland increased. Zionists in the camps pushed for only one solution for displaced people: return to Palestine.

The cry to return became a roar in the summer of 1945 after President Harry S. Truman's personal emissary, Earl G. Harrison, advised that the British allow 100,000 Displaced Persons to immigrate to Palestine. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which examined the political, economic, and social conditions of Palestine as well as the position of the Jews in Europe, recommended that the whole world share responsibility for the Jews and that 100,000 Jews be allowed in Palestine. The committee also recommended that Palestine be a state for Muslims, Jews, and Christians and that Palestine should be placed under a UN trusteeship. Jews and the Arabs both rejected the findings. The British government also rejected the committee's recommendations and announced it will end the Mandate. The U.S. War Department estimated it would need to commit 300,000 military personnel to assist the British in the event of an Arab revolt. Britain's rejection of the report strengthened the resolve of Jews in Europe to go to Palestine.

In February 1947, British authorities refused 4,500 Jewish refugees on the ship Exodus entry to Palestine's port Haifa. Western countries were shocked that the ship, described as a "floating Auschwitz," was forced to return to France and eventually back to Germany. Displaced Jews rejected alternative solutions to remain in Europe where they felt they could never be safe. Like those who had long pursued a return to the Jewish homeland, many displaced Jews wished to return to Palestine. Two phrases joined Jews universally: Zachor, meaning to remember, and "never again." Never again would they stand by and allow other Jews to be slaughtered. To ensure this promise, they sought their own country.





The United Nations is an international intergovernmental organization founded in 1945 with a mission to: maintain international peace and cooperation among nations; develop friendly relations among nations and promote social progress, living standards, and human rights.

## **★** FOR REVIEW:

- \_\_ Truman
- \_\_ Ross
- \_\_ Forrestal
- \_\_ Marshall
- \_\_ Clifford
- \_\_ Austin
- \_\_ Al-Fagih
- \_\_\_ Jacobson

## **★ THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UN PARTITION PLAN**

The United Nations is an international intergovernmental organization founded in 1945 with a mission to maintain international peace and cooperation among nations, develop friendly relations among nations, and promote social progress, living standards, and human rights. The UN was conceived as the League of Nations' successor in 1942 when representatives from 26 nations resolved to fight together against the Axis Powers. In 1945, representatives of 50 nations drafted and later signed the UN Charter.

From its earliest years, the UN deliberated on the topic of control of Palestine. The British civil administration had operated in Palestine since a League of Nations' Mandate formalized British rule in the region in 1922. Under the Mandate, British officials controlled the government and allowed few Arabs or Jews any positions of power. Tensions between Arabs and Jews that had developed during the Mandate years in Palestine eased slightly during WWII as ending the war was the main focus of most in the region. Immediately after the war, however, violence erupted. Palestinian Arabs perceived two enemies: Jews and British authorities in Palestine. Jews in Palestine opposed British immigration quotas and their administration of Palestine—many were upset that British forces in Palestine failed to protect them from Arab attacks. Economic constraints stemming from WWII diminished British authorities' ability to control conflicts in Palestine. Caught in the middle of escalating violence waged by both Jews and Arabs, the British looked for a way out of Palestine.

On May 15, 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created in response to Great Britain's request that the General Assembly make recommendations concerning the future of Palestine. UNSCOP was comprised of eleven neutral countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Representatives from these nations were tasked with investigating the issues in Palestine and offering an unbiased plan. In the summer of 1947, UNSCOP members went on a fifteen-day tour of Palestine that spanned 2,200 miles.

During their tour, UNSCOP members met with Hussein Al-Khalid, the mayor of Jerusalem. He argued that Palestine Arabs had an inalienable right to statehood, that Jews had no historic rights in Palestine, and that Jews had always been a minority in Palestine. He rejected the idea of partitioning Palestine, stating that the Arabs should not have to suffer because of Hitler and displaced people in Europe. Instead, Hussein Al-Khalid called for a democratic state with an Arab majority.

UNSCOP members also met with leaders of the Jewish Agency and visited Jewish communities in Palestine. Their tours of Jewish schools contrasted sharply with the lack of educational opportunities in the Arab communities. Tours of Jewish industrial areas showed that Jews

had modernized parts of Palestine. UNSCOP members also went on a seven-day tour of the Displaced Peoples' Camps in the American and British zones in Germany. Of the displaced Jews they interviewed in those camps, 100% said they wanted to go to Palestine.


During their investigations, Yugoslavia's UNSCOP representative witnessed British Royal Marines board the *Exodus*, a ship carrying Jewish emigrants from France to British Mandatory Palestine, and order the ship to turn back to France. Distraught at the notion of returning to Displaced Peoples' Camps, Jewish emigrants aboard the ship fought the British forces with clubs, metal bars, screws, bolts, and tomatoes. Despite this resistance, all 4,500 displaced Jews on the Exodus were denied access to Palestine. The British were perceived as insensitive to the issue of displaced Jews.

After approximately three months of investigation and forty nine meetings, UNSCOP concluded that neither side could or would willingly live together in the same country. In September 1947, the committee reported that a majority of the nations represented on the committee favored partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. UNSCOP recommended that Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state, and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state. The resolution did not apportion land to reflect demographic realities, however, and much of the land designated for Arabs was ill-suited for agricultural production.

The UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to review UNSCOP 's recommendations. Representatives from the Jewish Agency, a nongovernmental organization the League of Nations created in 1929 to support Jewish settlements in Palestine, and the Arab Higher Committee, the central political organization of the Arab community, were

invited to comment. Given the incongruent land designations, the majority of Arab leaders and citizens rejected the UN 's mandate. The Jewish Agency supported most of the recommendations while insisting they be given the right and control to proceed immediately with Displaced Peoples' immigration. Violence once again broke out between Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly sanctioned Resolution 181, UNSCOP's proposal to split Palestine into two sovereign states. Resolution 181 officially eliminated the British Mandate of Palestine, gave Jerusalem international regime status, and established a deadline, August 1, 1948, for Great Britain to remove their troops. In December 1947, Great Britain announced it would withdraw all troops by May 14, 1948.



On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly sanctioned Resolution 181, UNSCOP's proposal to split Palestine into two sovereign states.

## **MODULE 2: PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADVISORS**

## **AUTHORITY, POWER, AND INFLUENCE IN THE TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE:**


## \* AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



HARRY S. TRUMAN

## PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Commander in Chief, chief diplomat, and chief executive and administrator.



CHARLIE ROSS

#### PRESS SECRETARY

Advises and assists President Truman in presenting himself and his policies to the press and the public.



GEORGE MARSHALL

## SECRETARY OF STATE

Advises President
Truman on foreign policy
and implements the
president's diplomatic
vision.



JAMES V. FOR<u>RESTAL</u>

## SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


Advises President Truman on national security policy and directs the U.S. Armed Forces.



CLARK CLIFFORD

## SPECIAL COUNSEL

Assists and advises President Truman on nearly all issues.



EDDIE JACOBSON

## **FRIEND**

Keeps the president informed about issues important to the Jewish people.



U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Represents U.S. interests in the United Nations.



ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH

SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. AND UNITED NATIONS

Represents Saudi Arabia's interests to the U.S. and United Nations.

1948

## ★ TIMELINE

## 1516

Ottoman rule over Palestine begins.

## August 1914 World War I begins.

**December 8, 1941** 

May 1942

Biltmore Declaration

to be a Jewish state.

calls for all of Palestine

Chelmno, the first Nazi

German extermination camp,

is put into operation. More

than six million European

Jews are murdered by 1945.

## July 14, 1915-January 30, 1916

## Hussein-McMahon Correspondence

Letters between Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt that exchanged Arab assistance in opposing the Ottoman Empire in WWI for British support of an independent Arab state.

## May 1916

## Sykes-Picot Agreement

Secret agreement between the British and French governments to divide the Ottoman Empire among the Allied Powers.

## **November 2, 1917**

#### **Balfour Declaration**

British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour declares "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

## November 11, 1918

Germany and Allies sign an Armistice ending World War I.

# **1945**

## February

President Roosevelt meets with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

## March 22

Arab League founded in Cairo, Egypt.

## April 12

President Roosevelt dies; Harry Truman becomes U.S. President.

## May 8

Germany surrenders.

## August 24

The report of the Intergovernment Committee on Refugees, known as the Harrison Report, is presented to President Truman. The report is critical of the Allied forces' treatment of displaced persons in Europe, especially displaced Jews in Germany.

## November 13

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry formed.

## **1946**

## April 20

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommends that Britain immediately admit 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Britain refuses to admit them.

## May 1

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report issued.

Ottoman Empire ends.

## June 3

The British White Paper (aka Churchill White Paper) confirms the Balfour Declaration, but limits Jewish immigration to Palestine.

## July 24

League of Nations ratifies Palestine Mandate including the Balfour Declaration.

## September

Transjordan exempted from provisions of the Balfour Declaration.

## August 1929

Riots at Western (or Wailing) Wall, a sacred site, nearly 250 Arabs and Jews were massacred and more than 500 in the area were wounded.

## 1936-1939

Arab rebellion in Palestine against British colonial rule.

## April 25, 1936

Arab Higher Committee formed

The Arab Higher Committee was the central political organization of the Arab community under the Palestine Mandate.

## **July 1937**

The Peel Commission Report on the causes of unrest among Palestinian Arabs and Jews is issued. The report proposed partition of the territory into separate Jewish and Arab states.

1939

## **May 17**

A new British White Paper on Palestine is issued, restricting Jewish land purchases and immigration.

## September 1

Germany invades Poland.

## September 3

France, the United Kingdom, and their allies declare war on Germany. World War II starts.

## February 7

The British government announces termination of its mandate for Palestine.

## **Mav 13**

UN appoints representatives from eleven nations to the Special Committee to study the Palestine problem (UNSCOP).

## August 31

UNSCOP report presented to UN General Assembly. It unanimously recommends that Great Britain end their mandate for Palestine and grant it independence at the earliest date. A seven-member majority also recommended that Palestine be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states.

## September

The British government announces its Mandate for Palestine would end at midnight on May 14, 1948.

## September 17

Secretary of State George Marshall indicates that the U.S. is reluctant to endorse the partition of Palestine.

## October 10

In a memorandum entitled "The Problem of Palestine," the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that the partition of Palestine would enable the Soviet Union to replace the United States and Great Britain in the region and would endanger United States access to Middle East oil.

## November 29

UN approves Resolution 181, the plan to partition Palestine.

## December 5

State Department places an embargo on all shipments of arms to the Middle East.

## December 12

President Truman writes to Chaim Weizmann, president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the World Zionist Organization, that it is essential that restraint and tolerance be exercised by all parties if a peaceful settlement is to be reached in the Middle East.

## January

## February 12

serious attempt at partition in Palestine would result in a partial mobilization of United States Armed Forces.

## March 13

White House without an appointment to request that the

President Truman meets with Chaim Weizmann.

that it has failed to arrange any compromise between Jews and Arabs. The commission recommends that the United Nations undertake a temporary trusteeship for Palestine in order to restore peace.

## March 19

Austin announces to the United Nations Security Council that the United States position is that the partition of Palestine is no longer a viable option.

## April 9

Jewish attack on Deir Yassin, a Palestinian Arab village.

## April 22

Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary organization, captures Haifa.

## May 15, 1948

British Mandate of Palestine is scheduled to end.

Arab Liberation Army enters Palestine.

Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal warns that any

President Truman's friend Eddie Jacobson walks into the president meet with Chaim Weizmann.

## March 18

The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine reports

United States representative to the United Nations Warren

## \* ADVISORY EVALUATION FORM

As President Truman's advisor, you must have working knowledge of issues and events affecting the nation and the world. Briefings are being circulated to a limited number of advisors including you. Use the form below to assess the importance of this briefing to your advisory role and then pass the briefing to another advisory group.

Briefing Title			
Relevant Informatio	n:		
•			
•			
•			
Based on my assess	sment, I believe my advice wou	ıld have been needed (check one):	
☐ A great deal	☐ Possibly/Not sure	☐ Not at all	
Why?			
Priofing Title			
Relevant Informatio			
•			
•			
Based on my assess	sment, I believe my advice wou	ıld have been needed (check one):	
☐ A great deal	Possibly/Not sure	☐ Not at all	
Why?			

Briefing Title			
Relevant Information	on:		
•			
Based on my asses	ssment, I believe my advice wo	uld have been needed (check one):	
☐ A great deal	☐ Possibly/Not sure	☐ Not at all	
Why?			
,			



become leaders.

But all leaders

must be readers.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

## **MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE**



#### **OVERVIEW**

Primary source documents paint a vivid picture of the events and issues President Truman and his advisors faced. Study and analysis of primary sources will provide a deeper understanding of Palestine.

## **LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

Students will analyze primary source documents and use the information they examine to prepare policies and address issues.

## **LENGTH OF LESSON**

60 minutes

## **MATERIALS**

- 1. 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
- 2. Anglo-American Committee Report Summary Form
- 3. Map of Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1922-1948
- 4. Map of the Middle East, 1948
- 5. Copies of Primary Source Documents
- 6. Primary Source Evaluation Form

## **GUIDING QUESTIONS**

- 1. How do you strategically read documents?
- 2. How would you describe the situation in Palestine in 1948? How do similarities and differences in Arab and Zionists perspectives on the following complicate the situation in Palestine: political, geographic, and economic characteristics; government structures and leadership styles; perspectives of one another, their cultures, and other factors?
- 3. What information is important for you, a president or presidential advisor, to know? Why?

#### **ADVANCE WORK**

- 1. Assign students to read the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom (Teacher's Manual, 36-47; Student Manual, 22-33) and highlight important information.
- 2. Have students complete **Anglo-American Committee Report Summary Form** (Teacher's Manual 48-49, Student Manual, 34-35).

#### **PROCEDURE**

- 1. Working as a class, complete the Maps of Palestine under the British Mandate and the Middle East (Teacher's Manual, 50-51; Student Manual, 36-37). Ask students how geography impacts any proposed plan to address the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.
- 2. As a class, review the Anglo-American Committee Report Summary Form (Teacher's Manual, 48-49; Student Manual, 34-35). Ask students to focus on similarities and differences in the Arab and Zionist perspectives on key issues indicated on that form. Facilitate a classroom discussion about how Arab and Zionist similarities and differences will make it difficult to develop a plan to address the end of the British Mandate in Palestine.
- 3. Divide students into their role groups.
- 4. Randomly distribute copies of the **Primary Source Documents** (Teacher's Manual, Appendix) among the groups. Have students read the documents and complete the Primary Source Evaluation Form (Teacher's Manual, 52; Student Manual, 38) for those documents. If there is time, have groups exchange documents and repeat the process. It is not necessary that students read all the documents. The key here is to practice analyzing primary sources.

## **MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE**

## **★ ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY\***

Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

April 20, 1946

We were appointed by the Governments of the United states and of the United Kingdom... with the following Terms of Reference:

- 1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
- 2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
- 3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine..., and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.
- 4. To make such other recommendations... as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above.

The Governments urged upon us the need for the utmost expedition in dealing with the subjects committed to us for investigation...

We assembled in Washington on Friday, 4th January, 1946, and began our public sessions. We... resumed our public sessions in London.... [W]orking in subcommittees, [we] proceeded our investigations in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and Greece... [W]e flew to Cairo and... reached Jerusalem on 6th March. In Palestine, our sessions were interspersed with personal visits to different parts of the country, during which we sought to acquaint ourselves at first hand with its various characteristics and the ways of life of its inhabitants. Subcommittees visited the capitals of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Transjordan to hear the views of the Arab Governments and representative bodies concerned with the subjects before us...

We now submit the following Report.

<sup>\*</sup> The White House Decision Center has abridged this report.



## CHAPTER II: THE POSITION OF THE JEWS IN EUROPE

...There are about 98,000 Jews from other countries-displaced personsnow living in Germany, Austria and Italy, and a small additional number scattered throughout the countries of Europe. We found that the majority of these Jews in the American and British zones of Germany and Austria were living in assembly centers, once known as "camps"... The Jewish occupants of these centers are not all "displaced persons," that is to say, persons outside their national boundaries by reason of the war...

The nature of the accommodation of displaced Jews differed widely in character. In some centers barracks were used; in others, huts, hotels, apartment houses and cottages... We saw many conditions in the centers that might be criticized, owing to circumstances which were not always within the power of the military authorities to improve. There were lack of furniture, unsatisfactory cooking arrangements, overcrowding and a shortage of beds and bedding... most of the centers could not be more than the place in which the occupants were given shelter, food and clothing. While everything possible was being done for their physical needs, there was little that could be done to improve their morale and relieve their mental anguish. Coming from the horrors of Nazi persecution, it was evident that they still felt themselves outcasts and unwanted.

These Jewish survivors have not emerged from their ordeals unscathed either physically or mentally. It is rare indeed to find a complete Jewish family. Those who return to their old homes find them destroyed or occupied by others, their businesses gone or else in other hands.

As described by many witnesses, a factor which has greatly increased the urgent, indeed frantic, desire of the Jews of Europe to emigrate is the feeling that all doors have been shut to them and that there is no exit.







It is perhaps unfortunate in some respects that nearly all of these settlements were in enemy territory. The displaced Jews see around them Germans living a family life in their own homes and outwardly little affected by the war, while they, usually the last surviving members of their families, are living still, as it seemed to them, under restrictions...

There can scarcely be a Jew in Europe who has not suffered in greater or less degree either himself or herself or by the loss of relatives...These Jewish survivors have not emerged from their ordeals unscathed either physically or mentally. It is rare indeed to find a complete Jewish family. Those who return to their old homes find them destroyed or occupied by others, their businesses gone or else in other hands. They search for relatives, frequently undertaking long journeys on hearing a rumor that one has been seen in another part of the country or in another center. Such was the system of the Germans that it is difficult for them ever to establish the death of their dear ones. They are faced also with very great difficulties in securing the restitution of their property. In Germany and in Poland, which were often described to us as "the cemetery of European Jewry," a Jew may see in the face of any man he looks upon the murderer of his family. It is understandable that few find themselves able to face such conditions.

In Poland, Hungary and Rumania, the chief desire is to get out, to get away somewhere where there is a chance of building up a new life, of finding some happiness, of living in peace and in security. In Germany also, where the number of Jews has been reduced from about 500,000 in 1933 to about 20,000 now, and most traces of Jewish life have been destroyed, there is a similar desire on the part of a large proportion of the survivors to make a home elsewhere, preferably in Palestine. In Czechoslovakia... the position in regard to the reestablishment of the Jewish populations is more hopeful. The vast majority of the Jewish displaced persons and migrants, however, believe that the only place which offers a prospect is Palestine...

Work to them is associated with concentration camps and slave labor... We were deeply impressed by the tragedy of the situation of these Jewish survivors in the centers and by the tragedy of their purposeless existence. Many months have passed since they were freed from Nazi oppression and brutality, but they themselves feel that they are as far as ever from restoration to normal life. We consider that these men, women and children have a moral claim on the civilized world. Their pitiable condition has evoked a world-

wide sympathy, but sympathy has so far taken the form only of providing them with the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter. It seems to them that the only real chance of rebuilding their shattered lives and of becoming normal men and women again is that offered by the Jewish people in Palestine. Even though many might be glad to join relatives and friends in other countries, the doors of those countries at present appear to be closed to them. They are resentful because they are prevented from going to Palestine.

In the meantime, as time passes, the new ties between those who are sharing this common frustration become stronger and, obsessed by their apparent rejection by other peoples of the world, their firm desire is to remain together in the future.... It is this sense of cohesion, born of common suffering, which doubtless accounts for, if it does not wholly excuse, the firm resistance offered to proposals by competent bodies to remove young children to happier surroundings in other countries for careful rehabilitation. Men and women are marrying in the centers in increasing number, and, together with other members of the center communities, they wait with growing impatience for the time when they can go to the only friendly place they know.

If, as we hope, our recommendation for the authorization of immigration certificates is accepted, the great majority of the Jewish displaced persons whose situation requires urgent action will be provided for, and it will be possible to achieve the desirable end of closing the Jewish displaced persons centers and thereby discourage the further migration of Jews in Europe. Jews have wandered through Europe almost as they wish, from center to center, zone to zone, and country to country... The governments of the countries we visited expressed their opposition to anti-Semitism, but this is a poison which after years of infection takes time to eradicate...

Taking into account the possibility that an improvement in the economic and political conditions in Europe may affect the attitudes of those who now see no hope of reestablishing themselves in their countries, we estimate that as many as 500,000 may wish or be impelled to emigrate from Europe.

As described by many witnesses, a factor which has greatly increased the urgent, indeed frantic, desire of the Jews of Europe to emigrate is the feeling that all doors have been shut to them and that there is no exit.

## **CHAPTER III: THE POLITICAL SITUATION** IN PALESTINE

The Peel Commission declared in one of the final chapters of its Report: "Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State . . . The conflict is primarily political, though the fear of economic subjection to the Jews is also in Arab minds . . . The conflict, indeed, is as much about the future as about the present. Every intelligent Arab and Jew is forced to ask the question, 'Who in the end will govern Palestine?' ... for internal and external reasons it seems probable that the situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse. The conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen." The Report concluded with a reference to "strife and bloodshed in a thrice hallowed land."

It is nine years since the Peel Commission made its report. The recommendations were unfulfilled, but the analysis of political conditions remains valid and impressive. The gulf between the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab world on the one side, and the Jews of Palestine and elsewhere on the other has widened still further. Neither side seems at all disposed at the present to make any sincere effort to reconcile either their superficial or their fundamental differences. The Arabs view the Mandatory Government with misgivings and anger. It is not only condemned verbally, but attacked with bombs and firearms by organized bands of Jewish terrorists. The Palestine Administration appears to be powerless to keep the situation under control except by the display of very large forces...

Arab political leadership is still in the hands of the small number of families which were prominent in Ottoman times, of which the most notable are the Husseinis. This family controls the most important of the Arab political parties, the Palestine Arab Party, which was formally organized in 1935. The objectives of this and of all Arab

parties in Palestine are the immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration, the immediate prohibition of the sale of land to Jews, and the concession of independence to a State in which the Arab majority would be dominant.

There has been no evidence that the Arab notables who appeared before the Committee, and whom the Committee visited in several countries, did not reflect accurately the views of their followers... In short, absolute, unqualified refusal of the Arabs to acquiesce in the admission of a single Jew to Palestine is the outstanding feature of Arab politics today; and the newly formed parties of the Left, based on the embryonic trade-union movement, display as intransigent a nationalism as the old leaders.

An additional reason for the insistence of the Palestinian Arabs on immediate independence is their desire for full membership in the newly formed Arab League. The Arabs of Palestine believe themselves to be as fitted for selfgovernment as are their neighbors in Syria and Lebanon who obtained their independence during the Second World War, and in Trans-Jordan which has since become an independent State. The formation of the Arab League has given Arab leaders in Palestine a greater confidence. They feel that the support of the whole Arab world for their cause has now been mobilized. Furthermore, the presence in the United Nations of five Arab States, one of which is a member of the Security Council, insures that the Arab case will not go by default when the issue of Palestine is brought before the United Nations.

Just as the Arab political parties are unalterably opposed to Jewish immigration, the various Jewish parties, even though some criticize the idea of a Jewish State, are all united in their advocacy of unlimited immigration, of the abolition of restrictions on the sale of land and of the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper. These parties accept the authority of the Jewish Agency which is recognized by Great Britain, according to the terms of the Mandate; as the instrument of Jews throughout the world...



Lord Peel and other members of the Palestine Royal Commission leaving the Palestine Royal Commission Offices, 1937

Photo courtesy Library of Congress

Aerial views of Palestine, 1936

Photo credit: Library of Congress





Many criticisms of the Jewish Agency have been made before the Committee in open and closed sessions, by Arabs and officials of the Palestine Government as well as by Agudath Israel and some individual Jews. The Agency's customary functions, which are centered on the establishment, maintenance and growth of a National Home for the Jews, were not condemned. That is easily explainable, for it has been one of the most successful colonizing instruments in history. But the present relations between the Government and the Jewish Agency must be corrected if the general welfare is to be promoted and the cause of peace in that crucial area of the world is to be protected. Unless this is achieved, Palestine might well be plunged into a civil war, involving the whole Middle East.

Neither Jews nor Arabs have been included in the highest ranks of the Administration. British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization. District and local officials, Arab and Jew alike, bear only limited discretion and responsibility, even in their own communities. The Palestine Administration is blamed by Arabs and Jews alike for this situation.

In consequence of these conditions, the Holy Land is scarred by shocking incongruities. Army tents, tanks, a grim fort and barracks overlook the waters of the Sea of Galilee. Blockhouses, road barriers manned by soldiers, barbed wire entanglements, tanks in the streets, peremptory searches, seizures and arrests on suspicion, bombings by gangsters, and shots in the night are now characteristic. A curfew is enforced, and the press of Palestine is subject to censorship. Palestine has become a garrisoned but restive land, and there is little probability that the tranquility dear to people of good will, Jews, Moslems, and Christians alike, will be restored until vastly better relations are established among the principal elements of the community, including the Administration. With that assured, the various groups could be united on the basis of those fundamentals which are common to civilized people who wish to live their own lives, undeterred and unterrified by the possibility that first one faction and then another will rise in open or covert rebellion against one another, or against the Government itself.

## **CHAPTER IV: GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS**

#### **GEOGRAPHY**

Palestine, about the size... of Vermont, is geographically an integral part of Syria, having no natural frontier on the north. A marked natural division within the country separates the rich soil of the coastal strip and the plain of

Esdraelon from the rocky mountain areas, parched for a large part of the year, and from the southern deserts. In the wide coastal plain there are thriving towns-Acre, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa and Gaza-with ports and a variety of industries. Here, moreover, is to be found intensive cultivation, by Arab and Jew alike, with attention concentrated on the old and profitable pursuit of citrus growing. The mountains contain not only desolate areas of barren rock and deforested hillside, but also fertile valleys and basins where cereals are grown; in addition remarkable results have been achieved in the cultivation of olives, vines and fruit trees on tiny terraced strips constructed and maintained with great patience and skill. In summer the hills are dry. In winter heavy rains tear away soil from every hillside that is not adequately protected by terracing or forest cover, and constant warfare has to be carried on against erosion.

Nearly all the Jews of Palestine and almost half the Arabs live in the plains, though these contain less than one-seventh of the total area of Palestine, while the mountains and the southern deserts are populated, apart from scattered Jewish colonies, exclusively by Arabs. Both Arab and Jew put forward historical and cultural claims to the whole of Palestine, and even the great deserts to the south, almost rainless and with more rock than soil, are not uncontested. With a small, semi-nomadic or nomadic Arab population, their emptiness appears to the Jews as a challenge to their powers of colonization; and, despite the unpromising outlook on any economic test, the Arabs regard proposals for Jewish settlement as yet further evidence of the well-planned "creeping conquest." Geography, indeed, partly explains the intransigent claims of both sides to the whole country. The plains are too small and the mountains too poor to subsist as independent economies.

The significance of Palestine in international affairs, apart from its possible strategic importance, derives largely from the fact that it lies across natural lines of communication. Major railway and road communications pass through the country. It is on the route between two great centers of Arab culture, Cairo and Damascus; between Egypt, the administrative center of the Arab League, and other member States; and between Iraq and the newly independent State of Transjordan and their outlets to the Mediterranean; and it has great potential importance in the air traffic of the future. Palestine is also deeply involved in the business and politics of the international trade in oil; for, although there are no wells in the country, a pipe-line delivers a stream of crude oil to the great refineries at Haifa; and from there tankers deliver it to countries around and beyond the Mediterranean. The American concession

in Saudi Arabia may produce another stream converging on much the same point of distribution.

## **POPULATION**

According to official estimates, the population of Palestine grew from 750,000 at the census of 1922 to 1,765,000 at the end of 1944. In this period the Jewish part of the population rose from 84,000 to 554,000, and from 13 to 31 percent of the whole. Three-fourths of this expansion of the Jewish community was accounted for by immigration. Meanwhile the Arabs, though their proportion of the total population was falling, had increased by an even greater number-the Moslems alone from 589,000 to 1,061,000. Of this Moslem growth by 472,000, only 19,000 was accounted for by immigration. The expansion of the Arab community by natural increase has been in fact one of the most striking features of Palestine's social history under the Mandate...

## **ECONOMIC CONTRASTS**

On the economic side Palestine is a country of marked contrasts. While the Arabs have remained preponderantly rural, in the Jewish sector, along with the "close settlement on the land" which had been laid down as a guiding principle of Jewish colonization, there has been, particularly in later years, a remarkable industrial development...

The passage of years has only sharpened the contrast in structure between the two economies. On the Arab side, notwithstanding some development in co-operation and trade unionism, individualism is still characteristic. In agriculture, small-scale peasant farming, still largely on the subsistence principle, remains predominant; and the many signs now visible of enterprise and expansion in Arab industry conform to the same pattern of strong individualism. In the Jewish economy, on the other hand, is to be found a nexus of centralized control. Thus the Jewish Agency, besides being a landowner on a large scale, is a promoter and financier of agricultural settlement, and has large and varied participations in industrial and other enterprises....

Not to over-emphasize the cleavage, it should be noted that there are points of contact between the Arab and Jewish economies, as in the Palestine Potash Works. There is indeed some limited interdependence, where for example the Jewish housewife buys vegetables from an Arab grower. But there can be few instances of so small a country being so sharply divided in its economic, let alone social and political, basis... Everywhere is to be seen a marked disparity between the standards of living, however measured, of the Arab and Jewish communities. Jewish wage rates are consistently higher than Arab, those for unskilled labor being more than twice as high. There is only a limited range of competition between them; and therefore a minimum of natural pressure towards equalization. Habits of consumption, the degree of reliance on the market, whether for supplies or income, housing standards and so forth, differ widely, and in general the social services available to the Arab are extremely limited. The war has done little, if anything, to weaken the division...

#### **ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND IMMIGRATION**

...Any forecast of Palestine's long-term prospects must necessarily be viewed against the background of the

country's natural resources. These are extremely limited, making Palestine peculiarly dependent on foreign trade for raw materials and supplies of many finished goods.

Even the exploitation of the natural asset comprised in a good soil irradiated by long hours of bright sunshine is limited by the availability of water. Despite an abundant winter rainfall in many parts, Palestine is an arid country. In the words of the Palestine Government, "there are few countries nowadays which can say that 'their water resources are of such little concern to their people that legislation to control their use is unnecessary;"' yet the Government of this arid country has no statutory authority to control the exploitation of its water resources, and no authority even to ascertain the extent of such water resources as exist...

We have in this immediate context another example of the manner in which Jewish zeal and energy are ready to outrun economic caution of the ordinary Western pattern. Full recognition of the weak points in the Jewish economy and its immediate prospects does not in the least deter the insistence upon providing a home for the homeless. If this should entail an all-round cut in standards of living the present Jewish population, so be it. There is much to admire in this demonstration of brotherhood carried, if need be, to the point of sacrifice. But it is conceivable that the passionate expansion of an economic structure, upon a dubious basis of natural resources, might lead to overdevelopment on such a scale as to render it top-heavy to the point of collapse. The argument thus returns to the need for Systematic improvement of the country's basic resources, for which, as already indicated, orderly progress in an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration is a sine qua non.

## CHAPTER V: THE JEWISH ATTITUDE

The Committee heard the Jewish case, presented at full length and with voluminous written evidence, in three series of public hearings.... The basic policy advocated was always the same, the so-called Biltmore Program of 1942, with the additional demand that 100,000 certificates for immigration into Palestine should be issued immediately to relieve the distress in Europe. This policy can be summed up in three points:

- 1. that the Mandatory should hand over control of immigration to the Jewish Agency:
- 2. that it should abolish restrictions on the sale of land; and
- 3. that it should proclaim as its ultimate aim the establishment of a Jewish State as soon as a Jewish majority has been achieved.

It should be noted that the demand for a Jewish State goes beyond the obligations of either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, and was expressly disowned by the Chairman of the Jewish Agency as late 1932...

As the result of the public hearings and of many private conversations, we came to the conclusion that the Biltmore Program has the support of the overwhelming majority of Zionists. Though many Jews have doubts about the wisdom of formulating these ultimate demands, the program has undoubtedly won the support of the Zionist movement as a whole, chiefly because it expresses the policy of Palestinian Jewry which now plays a leading role in the Jewish-Agency...

The position in Palestine itself is somewhat different. Here, where the issue is not the achievement of a remote idea, but is regarded as a matter of life and death for the Jewish nation, the position is naturally more complex. Palestinian Jewry is riddled with party differences. The number of political newspapers and periodicals bears witness to the variety and vitality of this political life, and, apart from pressure exerted on Jews considered to be disloyal to the National Home, we found little evidence to support the rumors that it was dangerous to advocate minority views...- Taken altogether, these Palestinian critics of the Biltmore Program certainly do not exceed at the moment one quarter of the Jewish population in Palestine. But they represent a constructive minority.

The Biltmore Program can only be fully understood if it is studied against this background of Palestinian life. Like all political platforms, it is a result of conflicting political pressures, an attempt by the leadership to maintain unity without sacrificing principle. The Jew who lives and works in the National Home is deeply aware both of his achievements and of how much more could have been achieved with whole-hearted support by the Mandatory Power. His political outlook is thus a mixture of self-confident pride and bitter frustration: pride that he has turned the desert and the swamp into a land flowing with milk and honey; frustration because he is denied opportunity of settlement in nine-tenths of that Eretz Israel which he considers his own by right; pride that he has disproved the theory that the Jews cannot build a



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healthy community based on the tilling of the soil; frustration that the Jew is barred entry to the National Home, where that community is now in being; pride that he is taking part in a bold collective experiment; frustration because he feels himself hampered by British officials whom he often regards as less able than himself; pride because in Palestine he feels himself at last a free member of a free community; frustration because he lives, not under a freely elected government, but under an autocratic if humane regime.

The main complaint of the Jews of Palestine is that, since the White Paper of 1930, the Mandatory Power has slowed up the development of the National Home in order to placate Arab opposition. The sudden rise of immigration after the Nazi seizure of power had as its direct result the three and a half years of Arab revolt, during which the Jew had to train himself for self defense, and to accustom himself to the life of a pioneer in an armed stockade. The high barbed wire

and the watchtowers, manned by the settlement police day and night, strike the eye of the visitor as he approaches every collective colony. They are an outward symbol of the new attitude to life and politics which developed among the Palestinian Jews between 1936 and 1938....

The Jews in Palestine are convinced that Arab violence paid off. Throughout the Arab rising, the Jews in the National Home, despite every provocation, obeyed the orders of their leaders and exercised a remarkable self-discipline. They shot, but only in self-defense; they rarely took reprisals on the Arab population. They state bitterly that the reward for this restraint was the Conference and the White Paper of 1939. The Mandatory Power, they argue, yielded to force, cut down immigration, and thus caused the death of thousands of Jews in Hitler's gas chambers. The Arabs, who had recourse to violence, received substantial concessions, while the Jews, who had put their faith in the Mandatory, were compelled to accept what they regard as a violation of the spirit and the letter of the Mandate.

An immediate result of the success of Arab terrorism was the beginning of Jewish terrorism and, even more significant, a closing of the ranks, a tightening of the discipline, and a general militarization of Jewish life in Palestine. The Agency became the political headquarters of a citizen army which felt that at any moment it might have to fight for its very existence. Deprived, as he believed, both of his natural and of his legal rights, the Palestinian Jew began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. The dangerous belief was spread that not patience but violence was needed to achieve justice. The position of the moderates who urged self-restraint and a reliance on Britain's pledged word was progressively undermined; the position of the extremists, eager to borrow a leaf from the Arab copy book, was progressively strengthened.

Then came the war. Apart from a small group of terrorists the Jewish community gave more solid support than the Palestinian Arabs to the British war effort. But when the immediate Middle Eastern danger was removed, the old struggle between the moderates and the extremists began again...

When the war ended and the Labor Government came to power, the White Paper still remained in force. The Jews, who had expected an immediate fulfillment by a Labor Government of the Labor Party program with regard to Zionism, felt a sense of outrage when no change of policy occurred. The bitterness reached a new peak of intensity, and the position of the moderates became almost impossible. The Jewish Agency frankly stated in public hearing that, after V-E day, it was quite futile for it to attempt to cooperate with the Mandatory in suppressing illegal activity.

Any decision on the future of Palestine will be futile and unrealistic unless it is made in full cognizance of the political tension among the Jews in Palestine and the reasons for it. Both in evidence given in public hearings, and in numerous private conversations with leading politicians and with ordinary citizens, we were repeatedly advised that the maintenance by the Mandatory of its present policy could only lead to a state of war, in which the extremists would have the passive support of almost the whole Jewish population and the moderates would be swept from

the key positions which they still hold. To use the words of one Jewish leader: "Our present crisis in Europe and Palestine is felt by all of us to be our Dunkirk".

## **CHAPTER VI: THE ARAB ATTITUDE**

The Committee heard a brief presentation of the Arab case in Washington, statements made in London by delegates from the Arab States to the United Nations, a fuller statement from the Secretary General and other representatives of the Arab League in Cairo, and evidence given on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Office in Jerusalem. In addition, subcommittees visited Baghdad Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut and Amman, where they were informed on the views of Government and of unofficial spokesmen.

Stripped to the bare essentials, the Arab case is based upon the fact that Palestine is a country which the Arabs have occupied for more than a thousand years, and a denial of the Jewish historical claims to Palestine. In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs maintain, the British Government were giving away something that did not belong to Britain, and they have consistently argued that the Mandate conflicted with the Covenant of the League of Nations from which it derived its authority. The Arabs deny that the part played by the British in freeing them from the Turks gave Great Britain a right to dispose of their country. Indeed, they assert that Turkish was preferable to British rule, if the latter involves their eventual subjection to the Jews. They consider the Mandate a violation of their right of self-determination since it is forcing upon them an immigration which they do not desire and will not tolerate-an invasion of Palestine by the Jews.


The Arabs of Palestine point out that all the surrounding Arab States have now been granted independence. They argue that they are just as advanced as are the citizens of the nearby States, and they demand independence for Palestine now. The promises which have been made to them in the name of Great Britain, and the assurances concerning Palestine given to Arab leaders by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, have been understood by the Arabs of Palestine as a recognition of the principle that they should enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed by the neighboring countries. Christian Arabs unite with Moslems in all of these contentions. They demand that their independence should be recognized at once. and they would like Palestine, as a self-governing country, to join the Arab League.

The Arabs attach the highest importance to the fulfillment of the promises made by the British Government in the White Paper of 1939. King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, when he spoke with three members of the Committee at Riyadh, made frequent reference both to these promises and to the assurances given him by the late President Roosevelt at their meeting in February, 1945. His Majesty made clear the strain which would be placed upon Arab friendship with Great Britain and the United States by any policy which Arabs regarded as a betrayal of these pledges. The same warning was repeated by an Arab witness in Jerusalem, who said that "Zionism for the Arabs has become a test of Western intentions."

The suggestion that self-government should be withheld from Palestine until the Jews have acquired a majority seems outrageous to the Arabs. They wish to be masters in their own house. The Arabs were opposed to the idea of a Jewish National Home even before the Biltmore Program and the demand for a Jewish State. Needless to say, however, their opposition has become more intense and more bitter since that program was adopted.

The Arabs maintain that they have never been anti-Semitic; indeed, they are Semites themselves. Arab spokesmen profess the greatest sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe, but they point out that they have not been responsible for this persecution and that it is not just that they should be compelled to atone for the sins of Western peoples by accepting into their country hundreds of thousands of victims of European anti-Semitism. Some Arabs even declare that they might be willing to do their share in providing for refugees on a quota basis if the United States, the British Commonwealth and other Western countries would do the same.

The Peel Commission took the view that the enterprise of the Jews in agriculture and industry had brought large, if indirect, benefits to the Arabs in raising their standard of living.... The improvement of health conditions in many parts of the country, while due in part to the activities of Government and in part to the efforts of the Arabs themselves, has undoubtedly been assisted by the work of the Jewish settlers. It is also argued that the Jewish population has conferred substantial indirect benefits on the Arabs through its contribution to the public revenue. On the other hand, the Arabs contend that such improvement as there



In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs maintain, the British Government were giving away something that did not belong to Britain, and they have consistently argued that the Mandate conflicted with the Covenant of the League of Nations from which it derived its authority.

may have been in their standard of living is attributable solely to their own efforts, perhaps with a measure of aid at some points from the Administration.... They assert that at least equal improvements have occurred in other Arab countries, and that the action taken by the Government to assist Jewish industry and agriculture has reacted unfavorably on the Arabs. Import duties for the protection of Jewish industries, for example, are said to have confronted Arab consumers with the necessity of buying high priced local products in place of cheaper imported goods. In any event the Arabs declare that, if they must choose between freedom and material improvement, they prefer freedom.

In exasperation at the disregard of their objection to Jewish immigration, the Arabs of Palestine have repeatedly risen in revolt. A substantial number of them still declare their allegiance to the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem and are satisfied with his policies. In the Second World War, Palestinian Arabs were on the whole spiritually neutral...[but], [a]s Jamal Effendi el-Husseini stated in his evidence before the Committee: "The Grand Mufti in Germany was working for the interests not of the English who were warring with the Germans, but for the interests of his people who had no direct interest, at least, in the controversy." They felt that it was not their war and that the Mufti was right in taking such steps as he could to do the best for Palestine whoever might be victorious.

The White Paper of 1939, and the drastic limitation of Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews which followed, met the Arab view only in part. The Arabs would have gone much further. The demands voiced by their leaders are for immediate independence, for the final cessation of Jewish immigration and for the prohibition of all land sales by Arabs to Jews....

One witnesses in Palestine not merely the impact of European culture upon the East, but also the impact of Western science and Western technology upon a semifeudal civilization. It is not surprising that the Arabs have bitterly resented this invasion and have resisted it by force of arms. The Arab civilization of Palestine is based on the clan; leadership resides in a small group of influential families, and it is almost impossible for the son of an Arab fellah to rise to a position of wealth and political influence. Arab agriculture in Palestine is traditional, and improvement is hampered by an antiquated system of land tenure. The Arab adheres to a strict social code far removed from the customs of the modern world, and he is shocked by innovations of dress and manners which seem completely natural to the Jewish immigrant. Thus, the sight of a Jewish woman in shorts offends the Arab concept of propriety. The freedom of relations between the sexes and the neglect of good form as he conceives it violate the entire code of life in which the Arab is brought up.

The Arabs of Palestine are overwhelmed by a vague sense of the power of Western capital represented by the Jewish population. The influx of Western capital and the purchase of modern equipment for agriculture and industry excite in the minds of the Arabs a sense of inferiority and the feeling that they are contending against an imponderable force which is difficult to resist. This feeling is accentuated by the fact that they realize that the Jewish case is well

understood and well portrayed in Washington and London, and that they have no means comparable in effectiveness of stating their side of the controversy to the Western World. They have particularly resented the resolutions in favor of Zionist aspirations, adopted respectively by the United States Congress and by the British Labor Party....

The period since the First World War has been marked by a rising wave of nationalism in all Arab countries. Palestinian Arabs share this sentiment, and they are strongly supported in their demand for independence and self-government by all the States of the Arab League. No other subject has occupied so much of the attention of the Arab League or has done so much to unite its membership as has the question of Palestine.

Those members of the Committee who traveled in the neighboring Arab countries found that hostility to Zionism was as strong and widespread there as in Palestine itself...

# CHAPTER VII: CHRISTIAN INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

In addition to the witnesses concerned exclusively with political issues, the Committee also heard representatives of Christian churches. The Arab Christians, divided among many denominations, and numbering some 125,000, form the overwhelming majority of Christians actually living in Palestine. Their delegation, led by the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, declared their complete solidarity with the Moslem Arabs in the demand for an independent Arab State. The non-Palestinian Christian groups were unable to speak with a common voice... The lamentable fact that there is no single spokesman in Palestine for Christendom tends to obscure the legitimate Christian interest in the Holy Land, which must be safeguarded in any solution of the national problem. This interest demands not only freedom of access to the Holy Places, but also that tranquility should be achieved in a country all of which, from the Christian point of view, is a Holy Land....

The extent to which the Holy Places, sacred to Christians, Moslems and Jews, are interspersed is often not fully appreciated. It is impossible to segregate the Holy Places sacred to the three great religions into separate geographical units. They are scattered over the whole of Palestine, and not, as is often imagined, confined to the Jerusalem and Nazareth areas...

The religious importance of Palestine to Moslems, Jews and Christians alike makes it improper to treat it either as an Arab State or as exclusively designated to the fulfillment of Jewish national aspirations. A solution of the Palestine problem must not only heal political rivalries of Jew and Arab, but must also safeguard its unique religious values.

# CHAPTER VIII: JEWS, ARABS AND GOVERNMENT

## "The State within the State"

The Jews have developed, under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, a strong and tightly-woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish nonterritorial State with its own executive and legislative



The Tower of David (left) and the Dome of the Rock (right) in Jerusalem, with a portion of the Western Wall in the foreground.

organs, parallel in many respects to the Mandatory Administration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National Home. This Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the Administration in the maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of terrorism.


Quite apart from the increasing strength of the terrorist gangs, which enjoy widespread popular support, there are many signs that fanaticism and nationalist propaganda are beginning to affect detrimentally the Jewish educational system. It appears to us wholly harmful that the obligatory period of one year's "national service," instituted by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, is now partly used for military training. The "closing of the ranks," moreover, which we noted above, has increased that totalitarian tendencies to which a nationalist society is always liable. To speak of a Jewish terror would be a gross exaggeration. But there are disquieting indications that illegal organization and the atmosphere of conspiracy, which inevitably accompanies it, are having their corroding effects on that free democracy which has always been the pride of the Palestinian Jews. Every thoughtful Jew with whom we talked was profoundly disturbed by these symptoms. But none was bold enough to prophesy that they would disappear so long as the Palestine Administration carried out a policy which seems to every Jew to be in direct contravention of his natural rights.

#### **Jewish Relations with Arabs**

Not only is the Jewish community largely independent of and at odds with the Palestine Government, but it is also quite distinct from and in conflict with the Arab community with which, in many areas, it is territorially intertwined. In part this is a natural result of Zionist concentration upon the development of the Jewish community. If the Arabs

have benefited, they have done so only in comparison with the non-Palestinian Arabs; whereas they have remained far beneath the Palestinian Jews in terms of national income, social services, education and general standard of living. This has made it easier for the Arab political leaders to keep alive anti-Jewish feeling in the minds of the Arab masses. The economic gulf separating Jew and Arab in Palestine has been widened, in part at least, by Jewish policies concerning the nonemployment of Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and the refusal to devote Jewish funds and energies directly to the improvement of Arab standards of living. Efforts by the Jews in this direction might be quite as important for the growth and security of the National Home as the draining of swamp lands or the creation of Jewish industry.

But unfortunately there are signs of a hardening of the Jewish attitude towards the Arabs. Too often the Jew is content to refer to the indirect benefits accruing to the Arabs from his comings and to leave the matter there. Passionately loving every foot of Eretz Israel, he finds it almost impossible to look at the issue from the Arab point of view, and to realize the depth of feeling aroused by his "invasion" of Palestine. He compares his own achievements with the slow improvements made by the Arab village, always to the disadvantage of the latter; and forgets the enormous financial, educational and technical advantages bestowed upon him by world Zionism. When challenged on his relations with the Arabs, he is too often content to point out the superficial friendliness of everyday life in town and village- a friendliness which indubitably exists. In so doing, he sometimes ignores the deep political antagonism which inspires the whole Arab community; or thinks that he has explained it away by stating that it is the "result of selfseeking propaganda by the rich effendi class."...



David Ben Gurion, Zionist statesman and political leader, 1947



Members of the Arab Higher Committee, 1936

We noted, however, a few hopeful signs. Reference was made above to the proposals for cooperation with the Arabs made by Hashomer Hatzair and by the Ihud group. The Committee observed with pleasure the Arab-Jewish cooperation achieved on the Municipal Commission which governs Haffa, and in the Citrus Control and Marketing Boards, as well as the joint trade union activity between Jew and Arab in the Palestine Potash Company and on the railways. But such examples of cooperation are rare in Palestine; and they are far outweighed in Arab eyes by the exclusiveness of the General Federation of Jewish Labor in its trade union policy and of the Jewish Agency in its labor policy on land purchased for Jewish settlement.

#### The Jews and the Administration

We were profoundly impressed by the very varied experiments in land settlement which we inspected, ranging from individualist cooperatives to pure collectivist communities. Here, indeed, is a miracle both of physical achievement and of spiritual endeavor, which justifies the dreams of those Jews and Gentiles who first conceived the idea of the National Home. Of Jewish industry in Palestine it is too early yet to speak with confidence. There is boundless optimism and energy, great administrative capacity, but a shortage of skilled labor and, as a result, more quantity than quality of output.

As pioneers in Palestine the Jews have a record of which they can be proud. In Palestine there has been no expulsion of the indigenous population, and exploitation of cheap Arab labor has been vigorously opposed as inconsistent with Zionism. The failing of Palestinian Jewry is a different one. The Jews have always been in the biblical phrase a "peculiar people" which turned in on itself and suffered the consequences of its peculiarity. In Palestine, under the special conditions of the Mandate, they have regained their national self-confidence, but they have not been able to throw off their exclusiveness and tendency to self-isolation.

We believe that this failure is, in part at least, attributable to the relations between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish community since 1939, which have undoubtedly exaggerated the natural Jewish tendency to exclusiveness. Moreover, the Jews feel that they have enough to do defending their own position, without taking on the Arab problem as well.

A second factor of great importance is the failure to develop self-governing institutions. The Jews, like the Arabs, are completely deprived of all responsible participation in central government. Their democracy can only work within the Jewish community, and to a limited degree in local affairs. Thus, they have not had the opportunity which self-government brings, to learn the lesson of responsibility for the good of the whole State... But nothing which we saw in Palestine gave us any reason to believe that, charged with the democratic responsibilities for which they are undoubtedly fit, the Jews of Palestine would not master the lessons of self-government.

## **Arab Leadership**

The Arabs are divided politically by the personal bickerings of the leaders, which still center round the differences of the Husseinis and their rivals: and socially by the gap which separates the small upper class from the mass of the peasants-a gap which the new intelligentsia is not yet strong enough to bridge. Consequently they have developed no such internal democracy as have the Jews. That their divisions have not been overcome and a formally organized community developed is in part the result of a less acutely selfconscious nationalism than is found today among the Jews. It is, however, also the outcome of a failure of political responsibility. The Arab leaders, rejecting what they regard as a subordinate status in the Palestinian State, and viewing themselves as the proper heirs of the Mandatory Administration, have refused to develop a self-governing Arab community parallel to that of the Jews. Nor, so far, have they been prepared to see their position called in question by such democratic forms as elections for the Arab Higher Committee, or the formation of popularly based political parties. This failure is recognized by the new intelligentsia which, however, is unlikely to exercise much power until it has the backing of a larger middle class.

#### **Need for Arab Education**

Many Arabs are graduates of the American University at Beirut; a few have studied in universities in Cairo, England, Europe and the United States; others have received higher education at the Arab College for men and the Women's Training College in Jerusalem, both of which are efficient but inadequately financed Government institutions. The Arabs are aware of Western civilization and increasingly eager to share its benefits. But the numbers receiving such education are still miserably small, since the only university in Palestine, the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, teaches only in Hebrew. So, too, with secondary education.... There are only some fifteen Arab secondary schools in the whole of Palestine, and one fully developed agricultural school-the Kadoorie School at Tulkarm which specializes in the training of teachers of agriculture for Arab schools. With only 65 places, however, it too is totally inadequate. The problem of teaching modern methods of agriculture to a population 80 per cent of which gains its living by farming has not yet been solved by the Government, or faced by the Arab politicians. Facilities for technical education are no better-a single school with some 60 places.

On the primary level the position is slightly better.... But the fact remains that something less than half the Arab children who would like to attend school can do so today... Only one Arab girl in eight receives any education.

The lamentable condition of Arab education is a real cause for discontent. This discontent is increased by the contrast with the opportunities offered to the Jewish child. Jewish education in Palestine is financed by the Jewish community and by the fees which Jewish parents can afford to pay. Practically every Jewish Child has the opportunity for primary education.... With advice and financial aid from the Government, and with a new sense of responsibility on the part of the Arab leadership, compulsory education could, we were informed, be introduced within the next ten years. This is not only essential from an educational point of view; there can be no real unity between a literate and an illiterate population.

#### The Administration

Palestine is administered by officials of the British Colonial Service. Subject to the provisions of the Mandate, all major decisions of policy are taken in London as they would be for a Colonial territory...

While admitting this difficulty, we must express the view that this system militates most gravely against the chances of reconciliation between Jew and Arab....

Palestine is a unique country, bearing no resemblance to most of the countries administered by the British Colonial Service. It may be guestioned therefore whether an Administration of the Colonial type is the ideal instrument for governing two peoples each of which, in the absence of the other, would probably by now be enjoying complete independence. On the other hand, it seems difficult to foresee radical changes in the system so long as the division between Arabs and Jews compels British officials to assume so extensively a responsibility, and in view of the fact that their actions must be accounted for both to Parliament and to an international organization, each responsive to a keenly interested public opinion...

## **CHAPTER IX: PUBLIC SECURITY**

Palestine is an armed camp. We saw signs of this almost as soon as we crossed the frontier, and we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day. Many buildings have barbed wire and other defenses. We ourselves were closely guarded by armed police, and often escorted by armored cars. It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine. The police are armed; they are conspicuous everywhere; and throughout the country there are substantially built police barracks.

We do not think that the conditions in Palestine since the Mandate have been fully appreciated throughout the world, and accordingly we have thought it right to set out in Appendix V a list of the main incidents of disorder. It will be seen that up to the year 1939 the Jews exercised very great restraint. It is in recent years that the threat to law and order has come from them...

A sinister aspect of recent years is the development of large illegal armed forces. The following is the structure as stated to us by the military authorities.

The general organization is the "Haganah." It is an illegal development of ... armed watchmen who protected Jewish settlements. Today it is completely organized, under a central control and with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women...

It is known that the Haganah has been procuring arms over a period of years. Vast quantities have been obtained from the residue of the campaigns in the Middle East. Arms and ammunition are kept and concealed in specially constructed caches in settlements and towns...

All three organizations to which reference has been made [Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Stern Group] are illegal.

We recognize that until comparatively recently, efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to curb attacks; we regret that these efforts appear to have ceased. We believe that those responsible for the working of the Jewish Agency-a body of great power and influence over the Jews in Palestine-could do a great deal towards putting an end to outrages such as we have described, which place the people of Palestine as well as British soldiers and police in constant danger.

Private armies ought not to exist if they constitute a danger to the peace of the world.

The position of Great Britain as Mandatory is not a happy one. The Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency said that, in the event of the withdrawal of the British troops, the Jews would take care of themselves. Jamal Effendi Husseini, replying to a question, said that it was the wish of the Arabs of Palestine that British forces and police should be withdrawn forthwith. Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, also representing the Arab Higher Committee, expressed his agreement. Jamal Effendi Husseini stated that he did not expect bloodshed but that, on the withdrawal of British forces, there would be a return to the condition which preceded the first World War (i.e. pre-Balfour Declaration). We are clear in our minds that if British forces were withdrawn there would be immediate and prolonged bloodshed the end of which it is impossible to predict. \*

## **★** Anglo-American Committee Report Summary Form

List important facts gleaned from the Anglo-American Committee Report. Circle facts that would be relevant to your role.


TOPIC	ARAB PERSPECTIVE	ZIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Position/ current situation		
Political considerations: interactions with and views of the British Mandate		
Geography and population		
Economic characteristics		

TOPIC	ARAB PERSPECTIVE	ZIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Attitudes and relations toward each other		
Government structures and leadership styles		
Culture (including daily life and education)		
Other factors, views, and influences important to the region (both foreign and domestic)		

## $\star$ MAP OF PALESTINE UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE, 1922-1948 $\star$

As a key advisor to President Truman, you must have a working knowledge of the geography in and around Palestine. Use a textbook, atlas, or other reference source to find and label the following on the map of the Middle East:

West Bank
Jerusalem
Dead Sea
Jaffa
Tel Aviv
Jordan River
Gaza
Sea of Galilee
Lebanon
Bethlehem
Negev Desert
Golan Heights
Mediterranean Sea



## $\star$ MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST, 1948 $\star$

U.S.S.R Saudi Arabia Mediterranean Sea Palestine Iraq Transjordan Turkey Black Sea Iran Syria Red Sea Lebanon **Egypt** Sinai Peninsula Persian Gulf Yemen



## **★ PRIMARY SOURCE EVALUATION FORM**

It is May 1948. The British Mandate that has governed Palestine for the last 40 years is about to end. The Jews want statehood immediately, while the Arabs want Palestine to be declared an independent Arab state. Violence escalates as both groups refuse to consider compromises. Tired of war and facing financial difficulties, the British place the problem in front of the young United Nations to solve. While the mandate is still intact, the British have begun to pull out their forces which adds to the volatile situation as there fewer forces to keep peace between the two factions.

Meanwhile, the Soviet interest in the Middle East is increasing, which could threaten U.S. access to the vast supplies of oil there and Truman's pledge to contain communism. Time is of the essence; the United States must quickly formulate a response. Acting in your role as a presidential advisor, ask yourself which documents you need to read to effectively advise President Truman on how to respond to the question of postwar Palestine. After you select which documents to read, prioritize them before you begin analyzing the primary sources.

Document Title and Author of Origin	Is this document relevant to understanding the situation in Palestine?		Is this relevant to my advisory role? Explain.		To which other advisors would this information be relevant?	
1. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
2. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	☐ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
3. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	☐ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
4. Title:	☐ Yes	☐ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	☐ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
5. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	☐ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			

## MODULF 4: **DECISIONS AND DILEMMAS**



#### **OVERVIEW**

Students will learn a method for decision making that includes research, problem identification, analysis, and communication. Working together, students will use a Decision Making Matrix to craft possible solutions to problems posed.

#### **LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

Students will learn to research a problem, generate recommendations, and evaluate each by analyzing positive and negative consequences.

## **LENGTH OF LESSON**

45 minutes

#### **MATERIALS**

- 1. Decision Making Matrix Terms and Instructions
- 2. Three Decision Making Matrices

## **GUIDING OUESTIONS**

- 1. How do you approach, research, and analyze a problem?
- 2. What is necessary to develop a solution to a problem?
- 3. How do you assess and propose a solution to a problem?

## **PROCEDURE**

- 1. Facilitate a class discussion on a recent decision either in school, state or federal government that your students would be interested in. Discuss why it was made, the process used, and the impact on the students.
- 2. Ask students to read **Decision Making Matrix Instructions** (Teacher's Manual, 54, Student Manual, 39). Discuss the benefits of using this matrix to solve a problem.
- 3. Divide students into their roles to work together. Choose either the school based or historical **Decision Making Matrix** (Teacher's Manual, 55-58, Student Manual, 40-43) for students to complete in their small groups. Stress there is a time limit—the decision must be made within approximately 10-15 minutes. This fast-paced decision making will recreate the reality of the decision making in the White House where crises demand immediate action.
  - a. Teacher's Note: An instructional example for the school based problem is available on pages 55-57 of your Teacher's Manual.
- 4. Ask the groups to share their final solutions including the positive and negative consequences with the class.

## **MODULE 4: DECISIONS AND DILEMMAS**

## **★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX: INSTRUCTIONS**

# 1. RESEARCH THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE BY GATHERING AND ANALYZING RELEVANT INFORMATION

As the president's key advisors, create a plan for processing the information provided. Make sure that you share and discuss your strategies for analyzing information that will assist your advisory group in developing recommendations for resolving the problem.

## 2. ANALYZE THE PROBLEM AND DETERMINE THE SOLUTION CRITERIA

The major difference between expert and novice problem solvers is that experts spend time analyzing the problem while novices tend to jump to solutions. Before thinking of possible solutions, your group must analyze the problem and decide what criteria any solution must meet. This is an essential step in problem solving and one that is often overlooked.

Working as a group, discuss and write answers to the following questions:

#### a. What is the ideal result?

Look at the problem to be solved. What would you consider the most desired outcome?

## b. What will NOT be compromised or given up?

If and when we must negotiate or compromise in order to achieve the desired outcome, what would we advise the president not to give up or compromise? What is too important to let go?

## c. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?

If the president must settle for less than the optimum outcome, what is still acceptable? What would be sacrificed from the optimum outcome?

## d. What is an unacceptable outcome?

What would we not advise, under any circumstances, be allowed to happen?

## e. How will we know when we meet our desired outcome?

What does success look like? How will we know when the problem has been resolved?

**f. Who else needs to be involved in developing advice for the outcome?** In order to meet the outcome, what other advisors need to be involved?

#### 3. PROPOSE AND ASSESS THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

As a group, think of three possible solutions. Determine three negative and positive consequences of each.

## 4. COMMIT, CHOOSE, AND COMMUNICATE A FINAL RECOMMENDATION

Take time for your group to look at the options along with the pros and cons of each. Your group will need to debate and decide what solution to recommend to the president. Your selected solution may be a combination of ideas from several possibilities. Write out your final selection, and make sure all group members fully understand which solution has been chosen for recommendation and why. Next, report your recommendation to the president.



You get all the facts and you make up your mind.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

## **ANSWER KEY**

## **★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – SCHOOL BASED ★**

**Your Role:** You just volunteered to serve on a student representative group to monitor the issues of safety and security in your school.

**Situation:** A group of 30 to 40 students is very aggressive during lunch shifts. They shout insults and threats to other students. The group occupies different tables each day and forces other students to move. Rumors indicate that some students are ready to fight.

Research Plan	
How you would gather and analyze information about this problem?	We will try to interview several groups of students and adults in the school. Get someone to observe and record how often, how, who, where, etc.
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.	
1. What is the ideal result?	1. The best outcome is a safe school.
2. What will not be compromised?	2. Safety will not be compromised.
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?	3. To provide a place which students will accept as okay to eat lunch.
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?	4. The students continue to misbehave.
5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?	5. We reach our goal when students no longer feel threatened.
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?	6. Our group of representatives, students making threats, and administration.

Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.	Positive	Negative	
Recommendation  Administrators will assign seating	Safe school areas.	Students will refuse or redirect their anger.	
for this group and limit access to the hallways.		Violence escalates.	
		Students expelled.	
Recommendation  Students sign up for their own	Students have some say in where they sit and with whom they sit.	Students may make a bad choice sitting next to someone they get into trouble with.	
permanent seat on a chart in the lunchroom.	Students misbehaving aren't allowed to move around the cafeteria.	Students may not be chosen by anyone to sit with and feel isolated.	
Recommendation  Students eat in their classrooms.	Students cannot mix with those causing trouble in the other classes.	Teachers do not get the break they need at lunch time.	
	Small group is easier to manage and maintain order.	The classroom isn't equipped for food waste, drinks, free & reduced lunches.	
	Students create a closer bond by eating with classmates.	Students may feel like they are being treated like younger students.	

Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.

Students vote to choose their own seating with the understanding that their behavior will be evaluated in the new arrangement and possible changes made if the evaluation is negative.

## **★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – HISTORICAL ★**

## Your WHDC Role:

**Situation:** The time is 1947-1951. The United States must consider its national security in a global context as communism threatens to undermine democratic structures and the U.S. efforts to rebuild war-torn Europe. The U.S. national security council is disorganized and at risk. It lacks a central policy and, as a result, fails to adequately advise the president on national security issues.

Research Plan  How you would gather and analyze information about this problem?	Information gathered would include the current economic status of Western European countries, information on the current military capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., and seek out advice from a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders.
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.	
1. What is the ideal result?	Communism ceases to expand and western countries have flourishing democracies and are economically self supporting.
2. What will not be compromised?	Western European countries will not be relinquished to the Soviet sphere of influence.
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?	Western European countries can decide not to join a self-defense alliance.
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?	The Soviet Union expanding into West Berlin and West Germany.
5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?	Income of war torn countries in Western Europe have reached levels where they are self supporting and they have free and fair elections.
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?	Members of the State Department, government leaders from the other countries, leaders of our military.

Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.	Positive	Negative
Recommendation  Have the Council decide what the	Helps the group focus on the challenges.	Competing interests can bring conflict.
mission goals are.	All members will have input.	
	Group can prioritize challenges.	
Recommendation  Have Council divided into smaller	Smaller groups can be more efficient.	Members may not see the big picture.
groups with a specific task or goal to each group.	Smaller groups can target specific goals.	Specific goals may conflict with other goals.
	Less personality conflicts.	Subgroups may not be able to go back to the whole group effectively.
Recommendation  Remove and replace members that	Sends a message to others to follow the example.	Limited by law to who are members.
are obstructing progress.	Can replace with those who have the same goals.	May lead to a lack of diverse opinions and recommendations.
	Can replace with those with more expertise.	No guarantee a better policy will emerge.

|--|--|

	★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – BLANK ★
Your Role:	
Situation:	
Research Plan	
How you would gather	
and analyze information about this problem?	
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.	
1. What is the ideal	
result?	
2. What will not be compromised?	
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?	
be acceptable:	
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?	
5. How will we know	
when we have reached our desired	
outcome?	
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the	
goal?	

Determine and assess three possible recommendation risks, consequences and be	s with	Positive	Negative
Recommendation			
Recommendation			
Recommendation			
	l.		
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.			

★ TEACHER'S CHECKLIST ★
New Teacher Training
<ul> <li>Arrange a professional development or training session for teachers at your school.</li> <li>Arrange to observe another teacher and their class in action before your visit.</li> <li>Email TheWhiteHouseDecisionCenter@gmail.com to make arrangements.</li> </ul>
6-8 Weeks before Your WHDC Session: Plan
<ul> <li>Return reservation agreement</li> <li>Receive WHDC instructional materials via e-mail (if not, call The White House Decision Center staff at 816.268.8241)</li> <li>Make arrangements to pick up or ship the Official Briefing Papers</li> <li>Arrange bus transportation</li> </ul>
1 Week before Your WHDC Session: Prepare
<ul> <li>Complete four pre-visit modules</li> <li>Complete Role Assignment worksheet</li> <li>Notify your public relations person of your visit</li> <li>Make arrangements for staffing and equipment for students with special needs</li> <li>Give your class list to the head of Nutrition Services in your school so he/she can identify those who will need a sack lunch (free or reduced lunches) for your trip and can adjust their lunch count for that day.</li> </ul>
1 Day before Your WHDC Session: Remind
Remind students of their presidential letter group Remind students to dress up Remind students to bring their Official Briefing Papers Remind students to bring a sack lunch and beverage Remind the head of Nutrition Services in your building about the lunch needs for tomorrow. Make a general announcement in class reminding students to pick up their lunches before boarding the bus. (Suggested wording: "Those of you who eat the school lunch can see Nutrition Services today about your lunch tomorrow.")
After Your WHDC Session: Review and Rebook
<ul> <li>Review lessons learned at The WHDC with students (see Optional Assessment Activities on p. 63)</li> <li>Fill out online survey (e-mailed each semester)</li> <li>Book your next visit (reservations for the next school year open on March 1)</li> <li>Complete required documentation for billing and/or fulfill requirements if approved for scholarship.</li> </ul>

## **★ THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER ON-SITE EXPERIENCE**

# Bus will arrive and drop off students at the main entrance on the east side of the building.



- The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum is one of 15 presidential libraries nationwide.
- You are entering a federal building that is overseen by the National Archives and Records Administration.
- After leaving office in 1952, Truman returned here to his home in Independence and began planning for his museum and library which opened in 1957.
- When you look out into the courtyard you will see the final resting places of President Truman, his wife Bess, and their daughter Margaret.
- The Truman Museum was closed from 2019-2021 as it underwent a \$30 million renovation.

The White House Decision Center is a unique venue for experiential and collaborative learning. Students 6th grade and up are immersed in American history, government, the presidency, democracy and high-stakes decision making. Set in a recreated West Wing, students will be challenged to step back in time (1940's) and into the roles of President Truman and his advisors to tackle a world crisis.

## ★ TENTATIVE ITINERARY

(4 hours for simulation and lunch + additional time for the museum)

- Introduction: 30 minutes
- Document reading/collaboration: 60 min
- Press Conference/Senate Briefing: 30 min
- · Advisors/Cabinet Meeting: 30 min
- Lunch: 20 to 30 min
- Presidential conference/briefing/debrief: 30 to 45 min
- Guided museum tour: 1 to 2 hours (as time allows); self-guided optional

## **\* EXPECTATIONS AND COMMITMENTS**

## **Students**

- Dress for success
- Complete prior reading and assignments
- Bring lunch
- Challenge yourself
- Be respectful of the artifacts, the place, all adults and peers
- No phones
- Actively be engaged and participate

## **Teachers**

- Confirm date/bus/approval/permission slips
- Prepare students
- Assign roles and cabinet letters
- Complete Modules 1-4
- Ensure students have manual on-site
- Remind students to bring lunch
- Manage student behavior as needed on-site
- Guide students but allow them to create solutions and make decisions
- Be active in student learning and engage with small groups

## The WHDC Staff

- Communicate with teacher in advance of trip and be available for questions.
- Meet and greet your group upon arrival
- Provide first rate experience led by master teachers and trained facilitators
- Enrich students' understanding of American History
- Provide clear instructions and guidance
- Encourage students to use information to create and discover solutions
- · Guide students to success
- · Challenge students to excel
- Provide opportunities for students to develop and practice leadership skills
- Expose students to collaborative decision making
- Provide opportunities for student to practice speech writing and/or public speaking
- Stimulate awareness and importance of civic engagement
- Inspire students to become actively engaged citizens

## **★ OPTIONAL ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES**

- 1. Facilitate a classroom discussion about the government officials that students role played at The WHDC and what the experience taught them about the inner workings of the government.
  - a. Students may also write a five-paragraph essay exploring the impact and value of their educational experience at The WHDC.
- 2. Create a headline and three paragraph news story about President Truman's decision. Include details about the decision and its significance. the implications of the decision (including risks and consequences) for the U.S. and the world, and commentary on the president's leadership, decision making, and communication on this issue.
- 3. Have students select a current topic that the President of the United States is facing. Research their topic and complete the blank Decision Making Matrix. Compare and contrast your students' decisions with those made by the current president and his advisors.
- 4. Ask students to select a problem their school or class is facing. Research the problem by interviewing those people they believe are involved or impacted. Encourage them to look at this problem from all angles. Using the blank Decision Making Matrix ask them to discuss possible solutions with positive and negative consequences. Finally, ask them to make a short speech about their final solution they wish to commit. They could present this to the administration or the school board.
- 5. Have students investigate a current issue and write to their senator. representative, or the President of the United States, depending on the topic chosen.
- 6. Have students look up who holds the role they played at The WHDC (or role equivalent), then have the students write a letter to the advisors discussing what they learned playing a similar role.
  - a. Alternatively, students could investigate an issue their present-day equivalent is facing, then write a letter to their present-day equivalent incorporating what they learned at The WHDC.
- 7. Ask students to identify events that dramatically changed the future of Palestine. Discuss how the history of the region might change if other decisions had been made. Next, ask students to create a list identifying other events that changed the course of history in the broader Middle East.
- 8. In your opinion, what should have Truman decided and why? Provide evidence in support with primary source documents available on trumanlibrary.org.
- 9. Write a response to the decision you chose to present. Students should decide who they are, to whom they're speaking, the format of their response (e.g., a letter to the president or an op ed), and topics of support or contention. Use evidence from primary source documents available on trumanlibrary.org.



**6** The White **House Decision** Center provided my students with "hands on" history. The past became the present, an interactive drama as my freshmen lived the push and pull of conflicting opinions within the halls of power, wrestled with the burden of the presidency, and dealt with the power of the press.

> - GAYLEN, **WINNETONKA** HIGH SCHOOL

# APPENDIX A\*

## $\star$ MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE $\star$

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D. C.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

November 3, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Saudi Arabian Note on Palestine

I am attaching a telegram from our Charge d'Affaires at Jidda giving the text of a note which he received from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister with further reference to Palestine.

The note expresses the appreciation of the Saudi Arab Government for our action in making public President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud and for the information contained in the Department's press release of October 18. The need for finding a haven for the oppressed Jews is admitted but the position is taken that this question is separate from that of Palestine.

The note concludes by expressing confidence that the American Government will not deviate from its announced policy with respect to Palestine and will continue to give consideration to the Arab attitude.

Enclosure:

Telegram no. 383 from Jidda.

## **★ MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE ★**

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## INCOMING TELEGRAM

## DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION - ME INFO:

JS-1737-P

EUR NEA A-B

PLAIN

Jidda

Dated October 29, 1945

Rec'd 10:23 p.m.

Scoretary of State

Washington

383, Twenty-rinth

- REDEPTS 311, October 18.

Following note dated twenty-seventh from Foreign Minister:

"Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires:

It is my pleasure to acknowledge your note number 268 dated October 20, 1945 that contains the text of the statement made in Washington by His Excellency Mr. James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, in which there was stated the policy of the Government of the United States of America in regard to Palestine and His Excellency's confirmation that no final decision that will effect the basic situation in Palestine will be taken before consultation with both .rabs and Jews

and that

PLAIN

## **★ MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE ★**

#### PLAIN

-2-#383, October 29, from Jidda and that the discussion between His Excellency President Truman and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Atlee, were exploratory in order to find a solution for the problem of the Jews who have been displaced from their homes and the possibility of Palestine as a shelter for some of them.

His Majesty's Government appreciates the value of this declaration and avails itself of this opportunity to thank His Excellency President Truman and the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, for their good will toward the mabs and perceives that Mr. Byrnes' statement is positive proof that the American Government has adhered to the promise officially given in President Roosevelt's letter to His Majesty The King which has recently been published. The promise is that no decision in regard to the basic situation in Palestine will be made before full consultation with the mabs and that the American Government will not take any action that will prove hostile to the mab people.

It is also my pleasure and duty to call the attention of the friendly American Government to the fact that the subject to which His Excellency the Secretary of State has referred about the interest of President Truman in finding a

PLAIN

## **★ MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE ★**

PL.IN

-3-#383, October 29, from Jidda finding a shelter for oppressed Jews, the search for such shelter for those oppressed people, is admitted by the Government of Saudi Arabia and all to be a humans act, but one which should be completely separate from the question of political Zionism. In the interest of justice in distribution the oppressed Jews over the world it should be noted that Palestine has already borne the greatest share of those refugees and that the avowed purpose of the Zionists in crowding the greatest possible numbers of Jews in Palestine is not based on human principles but rather on a determination to alter the "basic situation" in Palestine and to lodge a Jewish majority there in order to disturb the arabs and expel them from their homes and that this is what the friendly American Government has guaranteed that it will not do, according to its promise not to affect any basic change or to the any unfriendly step against the arab in Palestine. All over the world there are wide lands for Jews where they can live prospercusly instead of being crowded in this narrow land (Palestine) that has borne from them and from the crimes of the Zionists a great burden that has not been supported by

any other

PLAIN

#### PLAIN

any other country in the world. All the committees that have been sent by the British Government to study the situation in Palestine have confessed this fact and the British Government was obliged to express it in the White Paper. Therefore, to add any number of refugees whatsover without consultation with the Arabs is a change in the basic situation, a step which the Government of the United States has guaranteed that it will not take. Such action will increase the danger of the Palestinian question and will be a menace to the peace of the Middle East in general and of the Arab countries in particular.

The Government of Saude Arabia asks the Government of the United States, that is tied to this country by the strongest bonds of friendship, not to take any step that will be a menace to peace in the Middle East, revoke the principles drawn up by the United Nations and violate the guarantees given by President Roosevelt to His Majesty The King and declared in writing.

The Government of Saudi Arabia as it submits this request to the Government of the United States of America has the fullest confidence that it will receive due consideration

PLAIN

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-5-#383, October 29, from Jidda
due consideration as it is a request calling for confirmation of high principles and guaranteed promises.

Please accept the assurances of my high respect.

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed Yusuf Yassin".

SANDS

JT

PLAIN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 24, 1945

Dear Joe:

I appreciated your letter of the nineteenth and the quotation from the Palestine Histadruth Committee of Minneapolis.

I told the Jews that if they were willing to furnish me with five hundred thousand men to carry on a war with the Arabs, we could do what they are suggesting in the Resolution - otherwise we will have to negotiate awhile.

It is a very explosive situation we are facing and naturally I regret it very much but I don't think that you, or any of the other Senators, would be inclined to send a half dozen Divisions to Palestine to maintain a Jewish State.

What I am trying to do is to make the whole world safe for the Jews. Therefore, I don't feel like coing to war for Ralestine.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Joseph H. Ball United States Senate Washington, D. C.

JAMES E, MI
DAVID J. WALSH, MASS.
ELBERT D. THOMAS, UTAN
CLAUDE PEPPER, FLA.
ALLEN J. ELLENDER, LA.
LISTER HILL, ALA.
DENNIS CHAVAEZ, N. MEX.
JAMES M. TUNNELL, DEL.
JOSEPH F. GUFFEY, PA.
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, S. C.
J. W. PULBERGIST, ARK.

Minited States Senate

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR HOW ZI II 34 MM OUSE RECEIVED

PAUL SAMPLE, ASST, CLERK

November 19, 1945

The President of the United States The White House Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

The Palestine Histadruth Committee, in Minneapolis, at a meeting attended by nearly 500 people adopted the following resolution, which they asked me to communicate to you:

"The Minneapolis Jewish community, through its recognized leaders and workers, assembled at the Histadruth campaign dinner, at the Radisson Hotel, on November 14,1945, does hereby resolve: 1. That we call on the President of the United States to put into effect immediately the pledges of his party and those of the other great party in regard to Jewish rights and aspirations in Palestine: 2. That we condemn any program of delay in abrogating the so-called White paper of 1939 and hereby demand the immediate opening of the gates of Palestine to free Jewish immigration in the spirit and letter of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate; and 3. That we petition our Senator Joseph H. Ball to present this resolution to President Harry S. Truman at his earliest convenience."

I would like to add on my own behalf that I have gone into this Palestine issue quite extensively and it seems to me the United States has no alternative, in all honesty and fairness, but to insist on the carrying out of the original Balfour Declaration. Frankly, I was a little disturbed at the reference of this question to another joint committee. It seems to me that there have been enough investigations so that the facts are all available and I am a little fearful that the committee may simply postpone the decision which eventually will have to be made.

Vosenh H. Ball

JHB: T

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

E.O. 12065, March 6, 1982

Washington

State Dept. Guidelines, West 11-12-55

By Deb NLT, Date 11-12-55

POVER THE

May 11, 1948

#### Memorandum for the President

The Department of State recommends that the President approve the following position on Palestine for the United States during the remainder of the Special Session of the General Assembly, and authorize the United States Delegation to introduce necessary resolutions, if that appears desirable in the light of the negotiating situation at Lake Success.

- The General Assembly should strongly support by resolution the present efforts of the Security Council to obtain a truce in Palestine.
- 2. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine, who shall have the following functions:
  - a. The United Nations Commissioner shall use his good offices as a mediator with the local and community authorities in Palestine to
    - Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the maintenance of law and order in Palestine and the health and well-being of its population.
    - (2) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.
    - (3) Assist in reaching agreement between the local and community authorities on the future government of Palestine.
  - b. The United Nations Commissioner shall cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.
  - c. The United Nations Commissioner may, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, invite the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

-2-



- d. The United Nations Commissioner shall render monthly progress reports, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations.
- e. The United Nations Commissioner shall be guided in his activities by the provisions of this resolution and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.
- f. Measures taken by the United Nations Commissioner under the terms of the present resolution shall become immediately effective unless the United Nations Commissioner has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.
- 3. The General Assembly should establish a Temporary United Nations Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem under the direction of the Trusteeship Council or some other form of special regime under the United Nations suspices for that city.
- 4. The November 29, 1947, resolution should stand, except that the General Assembly should relieve the Palestine Commission of any responsibilities thereunder and should take note of any directive given by the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council relarding an alternative course with respect to the City of Jerusalem.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

April 18, 1945

#### PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

It is very likely that efforts will be made by some of the Zionist leaders to obtain from you at an early date some commitments in favor of the Zionist program which is pressing for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment there of a Jewish state.

As you are aware, the Government and people of the United States have every sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe and are doing all in their power to relieve their suffering. The question of Palestine is, however, a highly complex one and involves questions which go far beyond the plight of the Jews of Europe. If this question shall come up, therefore, before you in the form of a request to make a public statement on the matter, I believe you would probably want to call for full and detailed information on the subject before taking any particular position in the premises. I should be very glad, therefore, to hold myself in readiness to furnish you with background information on this subject any time you may desire.

There is continual tenseness in the situation in the Near East largely as a result of the Palestine question and as we have interests in that area which are vital to the United States, we feel that this whole subject is one that should be handled with the greatest care and with a view to the long-range interests of this country.

Faithfully yours.

The President,

The White House.

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B.O. 11852, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (Z)

Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1872

By METHERN NARR Date 7:16 7.5

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

June 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Palestine.

According to information reaching us from Zionist sources at San Francisco, the Zionists desire to confer with you in the near future in anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Churchill, as they think it is likely that Palestine will be discussed at that meeting.

For your information, we are preparing some material for you on Palestine for possible use at the meeting, as we feel that it will be necessary for the British to make some decision regarding that country in the near future. It is not our belief that the question is one which will require detailed discussion, or any decision on your part, during the course of your meeting with Mr. Churchill. It would be most helpful, however, if we could have some idea of the intentions of the British Government with regard to the future of Palestine.

The Zionists will undoubtedly give you some memorials and some printed matter and will urge that you insist upon a settlement of the question in their favor. You may recall that our basic attitude on Palestine is that it is one of the problems which should come up for settlement after the war through the United Nations

Organization,

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

-2-

Bruct 44 NARS Date 7:16:75

Organization, and that in any event no decision regarding it should be taken without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. It does not seem, therefore, that you need to go any further, unless you care to do so, than to thank the Zionist leaders for any material which they may give you and to assure them that their views will be given your careful consideration.

Acting Secretary

"Suggestion OK HST"

Carbon initialed and returned to Acting Sec. of State 6/26/45, elb

United Nations

Nations Unies

UNRESTRICTED S/P.V.258 27 February 1948 English

SECURITY COUNCIL

CONSEIL DE SECURITE

SECURITY COUNCIL

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Lake Success, New York 27 February 1948, at

President: General A.G.L. McNAUGHTON

NOTE: Any corrections of the originals of speeches in this record, provided for in rule 50 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, should be submitted in writing within two working days to Mr. E. Delavenay, Director, Editorial Division, Room CC-87, Lake Success. Corrections should be accompanied by or incorporated in a letter written on headed notepaper and enclosed in an envelope warked "Urgent" and bearing the appropriate document symbol number.

(Interpretation of speeches will be replaced in the official

records by full translations from the originals.)

JC/ift

S/P.V.258

The PRESIDENT: I declare the two hundred and fifty-eighth meeting of the Security Council open.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA

The agenda was adopted without discussion.

On the invitation of the President, Mr. Lisicky, Chairman of the United Nations Palestine Commission, Fawzi Ali, the representative of of Egypt, Mr. Chamoun, the representative of Lebanon, and Mr. Shortok, the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, took their places at the Security Council table.

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

- (a) FIRST MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/663)
- (b) FIRST SPECIAL REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN PALESTINE, SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS PALESTINE COMMISSION (DOCUMENT S/676)

The PRESIDENT: When the Security Council deferred the discussion of the Palestine Question last Wednesday evening it was engaged in the consideration of the First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council and the First Special Report to the Security Council of the United Nations Palestine Commission on the problem of security in Palestine.

Two resolutions have been submitted to the Security Council: one by the representative of Colombia, circulated as document S/684; and the other by the representative of the United States, circulated as document S/685.

At this point the system of simultaneous interpretation was adopted.

Mr. SHERTOK (Jewish Agency for Palestine): Jews throughout the world,

and particularly the Jews of Palestine in their grave ordeal, have for many weeks past eagerly awaited the opportunity of bringing their case regarding

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s/P.V.258

Security Council that will be appointed, if our draft resolution is adopted, to ascertain if it is not possible to bring about an agreement between the Jewish Agoncy and the Arab Higher Committee.

However, I should like to submit on behalf of the Colombian delegation that even if our efforts prove fruitless and the Arabs or the Jews are adamant in their determination to maintain an uncompromising attitude, or if the prevailing conditions in Palestine continue to deteriorate, or if the Palestine Commission should definitely be found unable to perform its functions without undue delay, the General Assembly may be required to make adequate provisions for the administration of Palestine at the termination of the British mandate, or may have to discuss other arrangements. We believe it is idle to attempt to close our eyes to the possible need of a new meeting of the General Assembly. In our humble opinion, the Security Council would be illedvised in failing to give due weight to these eventualities, regardless of their political repercussions in any of the member states of the United Nations.

The Security Council cannot lightly ignore or underestimate the many evidences, the many solemn warmings, which it has received from all directions, of inevitable chaos in Falestine if nothing effective is done before 15 May to stave it off. When we hear that attempts to frustrate the Coneral Assembly's recommendations by threats or the use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of states or peoples outside of Palestine are contrary to the Cherter, we feel prompted to ponder on the irony of the predicament in which our Organization is placed, if we look back at its record. We wholeheartedly agree that any and all attempts to frustrate the General Assembly's recommendation by the threat or the

JC/gg

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use of force, or by incitement to force, on the part of states or peoples cutside of Pelestine, are contrary to the Charter. But what shall we think, what shall we say, of the fact that any member state can deliberately frustrate the recommendations of the General Assembly without the threat or the use of force or without any incitement to force? The recommendations of the General Assembly are not binding upon the members of our Organization, and the recommendations or decisions of the Security Council may be vetoed by its permanent members or disregarded by other states. The records of the two principal organs of our Organization show that such has been too often the case.

In the present instance we do not wish to disclaim that the United Kingdom has been given, whether wittingly or not, a legal excuse for withdrawing from Palestine. Nor do we feel inclined to question the validity of some of her reasons for doing so; but we are not sure that such an influential member of the United Nations can or should give up a mandate to which interests of such diverse nature attach, according to its own timetable and conditions, showing, in the closing stages of her trust, considerably less willingness to co-operate than we could have expected. The Government of the United Kingdom has not seen fit to comply with the recommendation of the General Assembly to use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the proposed Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, be evacuated not later than 1 February 1948. Nor has the Government of the United Kingdom agreed to make gradual delivery of the territories to be administered by the United Nations Palestine Commission.

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of the Furthermore, they have declared themselves opposed to the organization/milities and to the presence of the United Nations Palestine Commission in Palestine before they see fit.

Very fortunately, we/now seem to have accepted the view that if force is to be used in Palestine, it must be used in accordance with Article 106 of the Charter, and not otherwise; that is, to prevent or remove any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression arising from the implementation of the Resolution of 29 November 1947. Article 106 of the Charter provides as follows:

"Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943 and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."

of the Charter
The special agreements referred to in Article 43/have not come
into force. Their discussion by the Military Staff Committee is still
in its early stages. Not even the bases of a system of collective
security have been agreed upon. It is our considered view that, under
the circumstances, if any joint action on behalf of this Organization
is necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security in Palestine, that responsibility devolves primarily upon the
permanent members of the Security Council. We have worded the first
paragraph of our draft resolution accordingly because we have not

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been able to understand on what grounds the so-called neutral countries could be called upon to supersede the great powers in the discharge of that responsibility, just as they were entrusted without the tasks of the Special Committee on Palestine and of the Palestine Commission now at work.

I have taken the liberty of/the attention of the Security Council to these brief comments, notwithstanding our belief that the terms of our proposals are self-explanatory, in order to restate our ideas unequivocally. We are not taking sides in the dispute between Arabs and Jews. We are simply making our contribution to the peaceful settlement of that dispute in the way we deem most adequate, to the best of our knowledge and belief. We know our position is apt to be misunderstood, and, naturally, we should like to avoid being misinterpreted if we came to a decrease the needs of the situation, and we must admit that we do not fall in line with several of the premises or preconceptions from which those plans spring.

Originally, if I am not misinformed, the idea of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine sought to give the Jews the benefit and comfort of moving from hostile surroundings to a land which they could call their own, when Jews and Gentiles alike were free to travel all over the world without a visa, and to settle and thrive free from the restrictions, discrimination and persecution which weigh so heavily upon the former in our days. Half a century ago, the Jews could settle in any part of the civilized world. They had the alternative of going to the Holy Land if and when they so desired. It is hardly any exaggeration to say that they could make a choice; a choice that, to all intents and purposes, is being denied to them today. Part of Palestine is being offered as a

MA/mb S/p.v.258 58

refuge for the unfortunate thousands of Jews who have been displaced from their homes in Europe or who feel unwanted in Europe and elsewhere, and/want to be free from the endless hardship and sorrow to which they have been subjected during the past twenty years. In the last analysis, Palestine will eventually offer them an escape from discrimination or persecution in the democratic world. But we submit that it will likewise offer an escape to the democratic countries from their obligations to put a stop to racial and religious discrimination or persecution, while to restore to the Jewish people their natural right to share With others the opportunity to struggle for the joys of a peaceful life. We feel strongly that the Jewish people should not be driven to live in certain parts of Palestine only, but should be allowed also to settle in the territories of member states of the United Nations according to a prepared plan of quotas, as has already been proposed. We do not relish the prospect of seeing an immense ghetto carved out of the Holy Land so that the Gentile portion of mankind may relieve its conscience of the wrongs that have been inflicted on the Jewish race at the behest of Hitler and his cohorts. We want to see the and of this great human tragedy.

We approach the solution of this problem free from racial and religious prejudices that may lead us to side with either Arabs or Jews. We cannot change our position, yielding to considerations of economic advantage or political expediency. We have to act in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which are so close to our minds and our hearts, because they are incorporated in our national institutions and are so deeply rooted in our political heritage. This explains why we have ventured again, relying on the indulgence of the Security Council, to make suggestions

MA/mb/jeb

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concerning Palestine which do not deviate from the line of reasoning that we pursued before the General Assembly without success.

I ask to be allowed to review, as briefly as possible, the framework of our draft resolution.

AC/gv

s/P.V.258

The first part of the preamble presents the relevant views of the Palestine Commission as they appear in the First Special Report on the problem of security in Palestine. The second part states that the General Assembly did not provide for the creation of a military force outside of Palestine for the implementation of its Resolution of 29 November 1947, and that Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter do not authorize the Security Council to create special forces for the specific purpose of enforcing the plan of partition.

Unless we are very much mistaken, no disagreement with the preliminary portion of our draft resolution has developed so far. Its substantive part embodies five proposals which, at least to the mind of the Colombian delegation, face the facts of the situation squarely, however stern they may be.

First, we concur in the view that the parties to the Four-Nation

Declaration, signed at Mescow on 30 October 1943, and France should be
invited by the Security Council to consult with one another as to the
action that it may be necessary to take in order to prevent or remove
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression arising
from the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947.

Many a critic of this provision has remarked that a time limit should be
fixed for such consultations, considering that action by the Security
Council in this matter is very urgent, and that heretofore its permanent
members have usually held conflicting views on every important issue
that has come before this body. In this case it is well known that,
while two of them supported the plan of partition, two others have not
looked upon it with great favour, and another has consistently withdrawn to an isolated position. But we have deliberately refrained from

AC/gv

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fixing any such time limit, taking for granted the fact that the gravity of the situation in Palestine will, of itself, impress upon them the need of an early recommendation to the Security Council.

Next, we have asked the Security Council to appoint a committee composed of the representatives of two of its permanent members and three of its non-permanent members. In this connection, we should like to recall that on every provious occasion we advocated the appointment of representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council to the Special Commistee on Palestine and to the Palestine Commission as well, but they were of the opinion that representatives of the so-called neutral countries should take their place. This time the Colembian delegation sought to reconcile these conflicting points of view, suggesting that the committee under consideration should comprise representatives of both the permanent and the non-permanent members of the Security Council. It has appeared to us to be the logical course to have in that committee representatives of the two great powers which specient the plan and are primarily responsible for roprosentatives its adoption, and likewise of the very large group of nations which have no direct political, economic or strategic interest at stake but which have contributed so generously to the formulation and execution of the plan.

Our idea is that, while China, France, the United States, the Seviet Union and the United Kingdom carry on their consultations, this committee might undertake, first, to ascertain what can be done, and perhaps what cannot be done, to ensure the co-operation of both the Jevish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in the peaceful implementation of the Resolution of 29 November 1947, not closing the door beforehand to a possible agreement between them on the basis of some amendments

AC/6v S/P.V.258

to that Resolution; secondly, to examine the advisability of calling a special session of the General Assembly in the light not only of their conversation with the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, but of the outcome of the consultations among the great powers. Last but not least, we would have the Security Council request the Government of the United Kingdom to postpone the date of the termination of its mandate and, accordingly, its arrangements for the evacuation of its troops from Palestine.

We know well enough that the United Kingdom Government does not want to do so. We believe that, rather than bow to its decision, whatever the consequences in Palestine to the peace of the world and to the prestige of the United Nations, the Security Council will be expected to call for a more co-operative attitude on the part of the United Kingdom, if it is necessary, and we shall be glad to join in that request.

Before closing, I should like to say on behalf of the Colombian delegation that we do not wish in any way to delay action by the Security Council on Palestine through the discussion of more proposals than are strictly necessary in connection therewith. In due course we gave our reasons for not voting in favour of the plan of partition. The more we think about the outlook in Palestine, the more convinced we feel that the Resolution of 29 November 1947 was adopted with undue haste, and that it could have been improved upon without great difficulty or protracted discussions. But we labour under no misapprehension as to the very scant weight that our opinions on this question would carry. Therefore, we feel no embarrassment in giving priority to the consideration of the opinions of our colleagues or in leaving ours indefinitely in aboyance.

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The representative of the United States, with a much better understanding of all the complex elements that have to be considered in a debate of this magnitude, many of which escape our information on world affairs, has emphatically announced that he will oppose our draft resolution. I am confident that the Security Council will agree with me that we can make a more positive contribution to the success of its deliberations on this extremely delicate question by withdrawing our proposals without engaging in an argument in their support. The United States and the Soviet Union strongly advocated and encouraged the adoption of the partition plan. Substantially, it is their plan. We shall be glad to join in examining their recommendations to the Security Council as to how it should be implemented.

BHS/gg

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Mr. El KHOURI (Syria): I do not intend to make a speech at this time. However, I wish to refer to certain points which I feel it is necessary to mention at this time.

References were made to Article 106 of the Charter to the effect that action will be taken under it. As Article 106 reads, it does under it not mean that the Big Five would act/at this stage of the matter. Action by them would take place under Article 106 only when the Security Council decides that a case requires the use of armed force, under Article 42 of the Charter. There is nothing in the present stage of the case to imply such action by the Big Five under Article 106.

The amendment presented by the representative of Belgium to delete the first paragraph of the United States draft resolution is certainly in order and is in conformity with the functions and competence of the Security Council. We are not here to prejudge our future actions in this matter. Therefore, I agree with the amendment submitted by the representative of Belgium as it applies to the first paragraph of the United States draft resolution.

Another point in the United States draft resolution to which
I wish to call your attention that the Security Council does
not use any force to implement political decisions, but it must
keep the peace. The word "peace" has been used in reference to
maintaining public order in a territory or country, while
in the language of international law and of the Charter it is only
meant to apply to international peace and security. For this reason,
I consider that the attempt to establish peace in Palestine is not
within the competence of the Security Council.

BHS/gg/jeb

s/r.v.258

Furthermore, it means that we do not interfere, as the representative of the United States has wisely said, with the implementation of the partition plan, but that we are interested in establishing peace in Palestine. It would appear to me, in this case, that the United States delegation wishes to secure indirectly what it could not secure directly.

I consider that the implementation of the partition plan and the trenquillity of Palestine are so linked together that they cannot be distinguished one from the other. The disturbance in Palestine is a result of the implementation of the partition plan. As long as the implementation is on the list and is to be acted upon, the people of Palestine cannot be compelled to keep silence. If the implementation were to be suspended, or if the partition plan were to be considered unworkable and the Security Council were to adopt some other method of finding a solution which is practicable, wise and just, leaving aside the partition plan, then necessarily Palestine and especially the Arabs of Palestine would be quiet and would not do anything. As long as the implementation of the partition plan is to be carried out, no one can ask the Arabs to submit tamely and meekly. I explained this point clearly in my statement yesterday and I do not think I need make any further comment upon it.

FAH/mb/1ft

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Another point to which I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council is the fact that I do not believe there would be any use in the consultations, envisaged in the United States resolution, between the Arabs and the Jews and all sections of Palestine for the implementation of this plan. Today the Security Council has heard the statement of the representative of the Jewish Agency who said very clearly that the Jews have already made great concessions and accepted many compromises, and that this plan is the minimum that they can accept. The Jews had aspirations to own all of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and now they have left a part of Palestine for the Arabs, which they consider to be a gift. They feel they cannot give any more.

This reminds me of the story of the Jew who once asked a friend of his to lend him ten dollars. His friend said, "I only have six dollars." The Jew said, "Give me the six dollars and you can owe me the four dollars."

In the same way the Jews feel that they have left the Arabs a part of Palestine and that the Arabs now owe that part to them.

All their arguments to substantiate their claim to Palestine depend, first of all, on the promises of outsiders, such as the Balfour Declaration. On the basis of such declarations they have been clamouring and arguing for years. Now they are basing their claims on the resolution passed by the majority of the General Assembly. They have no other bases to substantiate their claims or aspirations.

FAH/mb

S/P.V.258

Sometimes they present another proof of their claim to the effect that they have been claiming Palestine and considering Palestine as their homeland for twenty centuries, as if such a fact could establish any substantial or material right to Palestine when they have had no actual connection with Palestine during all those years. I do not believe that in any international law or human rights declaration there is any statement which substantiates such a claim.

These are the bases on which their arguments are founded.

Then there is the other suggestion for establishing peace by asking the people of Palestine to be quiet all the time. That is like saying that if looters or robbers enter a person's home and the owner resists them, the police could say to him, "I do not admit that there is trouble here. Our duty is to prevent disorder." Then, as the owner of the house is resisting, the police could take him off to gool. It would mean that looting or robbing would be allowed so long as there was no disorder or disturbance.

That is what would happen if the Arabs did not resist. Their country would be occupied illegally by others. To allow the partition plan to be implemented in that way would be unjust.

The PRESIDENT: The representative of China, who will be President of the Security Council during the month of Merch, has asked me to announce that, if there is no objection, the Security Council will resume consideration of the Palestine question on Tuesday, 2 March, at 2:30 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5:50 p.m.

March 6, 1948

Dear Frank:

I appreciated your letter of March fourth very much.

I think it would be advisable for you to come in and see me off the record and I'll talk with you very frankly about the situation referred to in your letter.

I naturally am not happy over the implication that I might be ducking any issues - that is not my manner of meeting a situation, as you are well familiar with by this time. However, you come in and we'll discuss the matter from the beginning of the alphabet to the end.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Honorable Francis J. Myers United States Senate Washington, D. C.

WALLACE H. WHITE, JR., MAINE, CHAIRMAN WALLACE H. WH CHARLES W. TOBEY, N. H. CLYDE M. REED, KANS. OWEN BREWSTER, MAINE ALBERT W. HAWKES, N. J. E. H. MOORE, OKLA. HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

#### United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

March 4, 1948

Honorable Harry S. Truman The White House Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

As one who has fought with you and behind you on all of those things which are important to us both as Democrats, but primarily as Americans, I must get this off my chest, and this seems the best way to do it - in a personal letter which is not designed for public circulation as an indication to my constituents of my efforts at statesmanship, but is purely a heartfelt attempt to help our party and our country.

As you no doubt know, there has been a veritable uproar in this country over the American position in the United Nations on Palestine. The protest is vocal among Jewish citizens, of course; but it is also genuine among all non-Jews, I believe, who sincerely believe this United Nations must be made to work.

The news stories on Senator Austin's speech at the UN when the Palestine debate opened gave the impression, still current, that our country is "selling out" the Jewish people and undercutting the UN structure. A few Democratic party leaders in my state, in the lower political levels, have resigned in protest and have stated categorically they can no longer support our party because of what it has "done" in the Palestine case. Many Pennsylvanians of Jewish extraction seem to be as bitter against you and the party over this incident as some of our brethren from the South profess to be.

I have obtained a copy of Senator Austin's text at the opening session of the Security Council on Palestine and I have read it. It strikes me that the main trouble here is sloppy draftsmanship, perhaps purposely so. I could find nothing in the Austin text to bear out the charges that the United States has sold out. However, I found vague, weasel-worded passages so involved and so legalistic and confusing that it is hard to tell just exactly where we stand. Yet, a careful reading shows, I think, that fundamentally the United States has not retreated and is not "selling out."

-2-

Honorable Harry S. Truman

March 4, 1948

Why can't we come right out and say what we mean instead of hedging the thing around with such phraseology that even the trained newsmen and commentators can't seem to penetrate the fog?

If I'm wrong and if we are in truth ducking on this issue, then the American people should be told in simple and direct language what we are doing and why. The facts should be put on the table.

Those of us who support you and have supported you and who want to continue fighting in behalf of your program, are at a terrible disadvantage in this Palestine incident because we just can't put our finger on the facts. It isn't fair to you and it isn't fair to us for us to be in such a position of complete bafflement that we hesitate to open our mouths.

Foreign affairs and the United Nations are things which are now real and personal to nearly all Americans. We want them to stay that way. The quickest way to dissipate this interest and revive isolationism and unconcern is, I think, to feed the public vague generalities and legalistic double-talk which the public can't understand.

I don't think you could lend yourself to any "sell-out" such as has been charged in regard to Palestine. And yet, Mr. President, it is so terribly difficult to find solid facts and plain, understandable information on just where we do stand that I am most disturbed.

I do not ask that you answer my letter. I just thought I owed it to you to pass my thoughts along.

Sincerely and most respectfully yours,

FJM:rz

# THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER

AT THE HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM

# THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948

**★ OFFICIAL BRIEFING PAPERS ★** 



STUDENT NAME:		
ASSIGNED ROLE:	ASSIGNED LETTER:	



I hope...this Library will give you, and especially the young people among you, a better understanding of the history and the nature of the Presidency and the government of the United States.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN speaking about his presidential library

2 * THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER	THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948
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


# THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER

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our first line of defense. In the conflict of principle and policy which divides the world today, America's hope—our hope—the hope of the world, is in education.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

#### MODULE 1: PRESIDENTIAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES



#### **★ SIX ROLES, ONE PRESIDENT**

#### 1. CHIEF OF STATE

As the U.S. Chief of State, the president is a living symbol of the nation who stands for the highest values and ideals of the country.

#### **Examples of Behavior:**

- Presenting important national awards to citizens
- · Congratulating U.S. Olympic gold medal winners
- Making a patriotic speech on the Fourth of July
- Pitching the first ball of the baseball season

#### 2. CHIEF EXECUTIVE

As Chief Executive, the president employs millions of government workers in the Executive Branch, decides how to enforce the laws of the U.S., and chooses officials and advisors to help run the Executive Branch.

#### **Examples of Behavior:**

- Appointing the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- · Holding a cabinet meeting to discuss government business
- Reading a report and recommendations about problems in the management of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

#### 3. CHIEF DIPLOMAT

With the help of his advisors, the president makes the foreign policy of the United States. He or she also determines what American diplomats and ambassadors should say to foreign governments.

#### **Examples of Behavior:**

- Traveling to London to meet with British leaders regarding European issues
- Entertaining Japanese diplomats in the White House to discuss trade issues
- · Writing a message or a letter to Russian leaders on arms control
- Trying to bring peace to the Middle East

#### 4. COMMANDER IN CHIEF

As commander of the nation's armed services, the president determines the size and deployment of the armed forces and, with Defense Department leaders and the highest military officers he or she appoints, shapes the defense policy. The president shares some military powers with Congress—top appointments, major military expenses, and plans to expand the armed forces require congressional approval; and only Congress can declare war.

#### **Examples of Behavior:**

- Inspecting a Navy yard
- · Deciding whether to bomb foreign cities in wartime
- Calling troops to stop a riot
- · Deciding on which new weapon systems to request in the budget
- Ordering troops to Afghanistan





66 You have to know something to be a president. You have got to be a jack-of-all-trades and know something about all of them.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

#### **5. CHIEF LEGISLATOR**

While only Congress has the power to make laws, the Constitution gives the president power to influence Congress in its lawmaking—a president may urge Congress to pass new laws and may veto bills that he or she does not favor.

#### Examples of Behavior:

- Inviting members of Congress to lunch to discuss pending legislation
- Signing a bill passed by Congress
- Making public statements supporting or opposing pending legislation in Congress


#### 6. CHIEF OF PARTY

As chief of his or her political party, the president helps members of his or her political party get elected or appointed to office.

#### **Examples of Behavior:**

- Choosing leading party members to serve in the Cabinet
- Speaking at a rally for a party nominee to the U.S. Senate
- Attending events to raise funds for his party's congressional candidates

# **★ TRUMAN'S SCHEDULE, MAY 21, 1945**



66 Being a president is like riding a tiger.

A man has to keep on riding or be swallowed.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

## PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND INFLUENCE

## **★ ISSUE: REBUILDING EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II**

WWII left millions of European soldiers and civilians dead. Many survivors experienced starvation, poverty, and a sense of hopelessness. Most Western European nations suffered great physical ruin from the war and were weakened. Although the Middle East did not endure the devastating bombing from Allied and Axis forces during WWII, postwar political, social, and economic upheavals left extensive power vacuums throughout the region. Faced with massive debts from WWII, the British government announced in early 1947 that it could not continue to provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Truman worried that without financial and military assistance, Turkey and Greece would succumb to internal and external communist pressures, giving the Soviets strategic access to the Mediterranean. The U.S. State Department believed that swift action needed to be taken to help rebuild Western European nations and strengthen Eastern European nations before they lost faith in democracy.

Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?
☐ Chief of State	
☐ Chief Executive	
☐ Chief Diplomat	
☐ Commander in Chief	
☐ Chief Legislator	
☐ Chief of Party	

### **★ ISSUE: IRAN**

Allied forces invaded Iran during WWII because of the perceived comradery between Hitler and Reza Khan, the Shah of Iran. The Allies, who sought to overcome Tehran's totalitarian tendencies, removed Reza Khan from power. Iran was then divided into three zones, with Iran, Britain, and the USSR each gaining sovereignty over a zone. Partial occupation of Iran provided a safe route through which the Allies could supply Soviet forces fighting on the Eastern Front.

After WWII, Soviet troops refused to relinquish control of northern Iran, breaking the Allies' promise to extract all forces from Iran within six months of the war's conclusion. The Truman administration feared that continued Soviet control of northern Iran would spur the fall of Turkey to communist rule. Soviet control of Iran's vast oil resources would also give Stalin leverage in the global economic market, a power that could jeopardize Western Europe's recovery from war.

Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?
☐ Chief of State	
☐ Chief Executive	
☐ Chief Diplomat	
☐ Commander in Chief	
☐ Chief Legislator	
☐ Chief of Party	

★ CURRENT ISSUE:			
Check up to three presidential roles that apply to this issue:	What kind of action(s) might the president take in this role?		
☐ Chief of State			
☐ Chief Executive			
☐ Chief Diplomat			
☐ Commander in Chief			
☐ Chief Legislator			
☐ Chief of Party			

# **MODULE 2: PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ADVISORS**

# **AUTHORITY, POWER, AND INFLUENCE IN THE TRUMAN WHITE HOUSE:**

# \* AN ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



HARRY S. TRUMAN

#### PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Commander in Chief, chief diplomat, and chief executive and administrator.



**CHARLIE ROSS** 

#### PRESS SECRETARY

Advises and assists President Truman in presenting himself and his policies to the press and the public.



**GEORGE MARSHALL** 

#### **SECRETARY OF STATE**

Advises President Truman on foreign policy and implements the president's diplomatic vision.



#### JAMES V. **FORRESTAL**

#### SECRETARY OF **DEFENSE**

Advises President Truman on national security policy and directs the U.S. Armed Forces.



#### **CLARK CLIFFORD**

#### SPECIAL COUNSEL

Assists and advises President Truman on nearly all issues.



**EDDIE JACOBSON** 

#### **FRIEND**

Keeps the president informed about issues important to the Jewish people.



# **WARREN AUSTIN**

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Represents U.S. interests in the United Nations.



#### **ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH**

SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. AND UNITED **NATIONS** 

Represents Saudi Arabia's interests to the U.S. and United Nations.

1948

### **★ TIMELINE**

#### 1516

Ottoman rule over Palestine begins.

## August 1914 World War I begins.

**December 8, 1941** 

May 1942

Biltmore Declaration

to be a Jewish state.

calls for all of Palestine

Chelmno, the first Nazi

German extermination camp,

is put into operation. More

than six million European

Jews are murdered by 1945.

# July 14, 1915-January 30, 1916

#### Hussein-McMahon Correspondence

Letters between Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, emir of Mecca, and Sir Henry McMahon, the British high commissioner in Egypt that exchanged Arab assistance in opposing the Ottoman Empire in WWI for British support of an independent Arab state.

# May 1916

# Sykes-Picot Agreement

Secret agreement between the British and French governments to divide the Ottoman Empire among the Allied Powers.

# November 2, 1917

#### **Balfour Declaration**

British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour declares "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."

# November 11, 1918

Germany and Allies sign an Armistice ending World War I.

# 1945

# **February**

President Roosevelt meets with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.

# March 22

Arab League founded in Cairo, Egypt.

# April 12

President Roosevelt dies; Harry Truman becomes U.S. President.

# May 8

Germany surrenders.

# August 24

The report of the Intergovernment Committee on Refugees, known as the Harrison Report, is presented to President Truman. The report is critical of the Allied forces' treatment of displaced persons in Europe, especially displaced Jews in Germany.

# November 13

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry formed.

1946

# April 20

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommends that Britain immediately admit 100,000 Jews into Palestine. Britain refuses to admit them.

# May 1

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Report issued.

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1922

Ottoman Empire ends.

### June 3

The British White Paper (aka Churchill White Paper) confirms the Balfour Declaration, but limits Jewish immigration to Palestine.

# July 24

League of Nations ratifies Palestine Mandate including the Balfour Declaration.

# September

Transjordan exempted from provisions of the Balfour Declaration.

# August 1929

Riots at Western (or Wailing) Wall, a sacred site, nearly 250 Arabs and Jews were massacred and more than 500 in the area were wounded.

## 1936-1939

Arab rebellion in Palestine against British colonial rule.

# April 25, 1936

#### Arab Higher Committee formed

The Arab Higher Committee was the central political organization of the Arab community under the Palestine Mandate.

# **July 1937**

The Peel Commission Report on the causes of unrest among Palestinian Arabs and Jews is issued. The report proposed partition of the territory into separate Jewish and Arab states.

1939

# **May 17**

A new British White Paper on Palestine is issued, restricting Jewish land purchases and immigration.

# September 1

Germany invades Poland.

# September 3

France, the United Kingdom, and their allies declare war on Germany. World War II starts.

# February 7

The British government announces termination of its mandate for Palestine.

## **May 13**

UN appoints representatives from eleven nations to the Special Committee to study the Palestine problem (UNSCOP).

# August 31

UNSCOP report presented to UN General Assembly. It unanimously recommends that Great Britain end their mandate for Palestine and grant it independence at the earliest date. A seven-member majority also recommended that Palestine be partitioned into Jewish and Arab states.

# September

The British government announces its Mandate for Palestine would end at midnight on May 14, 1948.

# September 17

Secretary of State George Marshall indicates that the U. S. is reluctant to endorse the partition of Palestine.

#### October 10

In a memorandum entitled "The Problem of Palestine," the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that the partition of Palestine would enable the Soviet Union to replace the United States and Great Britain in the region and would endanger United States access to Middle East oil.

### November 29

UN approves Resolution 181, the plan to partition Palestine.

### December 5

State Department places an embargo on all shipments of arms to the Middle East.

### December 12

President Truman writes to Chaim Weizmann, president of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the World Zionist Organization, that it is essential that restraint and tolerance be exercised by all parties if a peaceful settlement is to be reached in the Middle East.

# **January**

# February 12

serious attempt at partition in Palestine would result in a partial mobilization of United States Armed Forces.

White House without an appointment to request that the

President Truman meets with Chaim Weizmann.

that it has failed to arrange any compromise between Jews and Arabs. The commission recommends that the United Nations undertake a temporary trusteeship for Palestine in order to restore peace.

#### March 19

Austin announces to the United Nations Security Council that the United States position is that the partition of Palestine is no longer a viable option.

# April 9

Jewish attack on Deir Yassin, a Palestinian Arab village.

# April 22

Haganah, a Jewish paramilitary organization, captures Haifa.

# May 15, 1948

Arab Liberation Army enters Palestine.

Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal warns that any

## March 13

President Truman's friend Eddie Jacobson walks into the president meet with Chaim Weizmann.

## March 18

The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine reports

United States representative to the United Nations Warren

British Mandate of Palestine is scheduled to end.



Palestine came to be known as the land west of the Jordan River. Jews, Arabs, and Christians living in Palestine under the British Mandate were considered Palestinians.



#### **★ PALESTINE HISTORY**

The region known as modern Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, the victorious Allies created the League of Nations, which then carved out new states in the Levant, a large area in Southwest Asia. The League of Nations Mandate awarded Syria and Lebanon to France, and awarded Iraq and the entity of Palestine to the British. The League of Nations Mandate placed these new states under either British or French administration until the people were deemed ready for self-government.

The future of the Palestine Mandate was complicated by wartime pledges such as the secret wartime arrangements between the British and the French in the Skyes-Picot Agreement and promises to the inhabitants of the area, including negotiations with the Arabs (e.g., the Hussein-McMahon correspondence) and the Jews (e.g., the Balfour Declaration).\*

No definite borders existed for Palestine until 1922. That year, the area east of the Jordan River was separated from the rest of Palestine and called Transjordan. Palestine came to be known as the land west of the Jordan River. Jews, Arabs, and Christians living in Palestine under the British Mandate were considered Palestinians.

The Middle East economy took a dramatic turn early in the 20th century. From 1908-1925, the discovery of oil encouraged British and American oil companies to invest in these countries, especially after WWI when leaders saw the need for petroleum

in future wars. King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia eventually became wealthy and his country's importance grew in the eyes of the world as did other countries with oil.

Under the Mandate, British leaders in Palestine worked towards a unified government with both the Arabs and the Jews from 1921 to 1929. However, the Arab political leadership, which was led by a few prominent families such as the Husseins, insisted that any legislature should reflect their majority numbers and rejected any form of government that did not give them real power. The British insistence of holding veto power, the ultimate authority, increased Arab frustration in their goal for self-government.

Meanwhile, Jews of Palestine began to organize under the Jewish Agency. The Jewish Agency was established under the Mandate with the primary objectives of aiding Jewish immigration and buying land for Jews to settle in Palestine. Although Palestinian laws prohibited the selling of land to outsiders, the creation of the Jewish National Fund enabled Jews to legally buy the land. Subsequent land value increases in Palestine enticed many wealthy Arab landowners to sell their property, especially in the plains of Palestine. This displaced Arab sharecroppers and their families, forcing them to relocate to poor villages and to the mountains. As the population of Jews in Palestine during the 1920s and 30s increased from 13% to 31%, especially after the Nazi seizure of power, many Arab Palestinians moved towards nationalist activism and increased their demands for independence and self-government.

Economic contrasts in Palestine increased the pressure between the Palestinian Jews and Arabs. Arabs' small-scale farming reflected their individualism. Even the expansion of Arab industry conformed to the idea of individualism. Educational opportunities were limited. In contrast, the Jewish Agency promoted and financed agricultural settlements, industries, and education. For example, Arab families, not corporations, controlled businesses and industries. As a result, Jewish wages tended to be higher than Arab wages, which, in

# **★ FOR REVIEW:**

- \_\_ Truman
- \_\_ Ross
- \_\_ Forrestal
- \_\_ Marshall
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turn, impacted housing standards. The disparity in wages and housing made it easier for Arab political leaders to encourage anti-Jewish feelings in the Arab communities. Jewish policies banning the employment of Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and their refusal to use Jewish funds to directly improve the Arab standard of living increased Palestinian Arab feelings of resentment against Palestinian Jews. That resentment grew to anger when the British gave Zionist Pinhas Rutenberg approval for electricity production in 1921, which Palestinian Arabs viewed as proof that the British favored Zionism.

In 1936, tensions and violence escalated in Palestine, and then erupted in the Arab Revolt that lasted three years. Members of the Palestinian Arab nationalist uprising refused to pay British taxes and demanded independence and the elimination of mass Jewish immigration. In reaction to the revolt, the British increased military presence in Palestine. The British also formed the Peel Commission to investigate the problems in Palestine. The Peel Commission reported that the British Mandate was unsuccessful and suggested that Palestine be divided into two countries. Arabs both in Palestine and in neighboring countries were outraged at the suggestion and the revolt intensified. The British declared martial law and dissolved the Arab Higher Committee, forcing many of its leaders to flee. The outcome of the revolt was ruinous for the Arabs: the casualty count was high and many leaders were killed

At the same time, Palestinian Jews organized to protect themselves. The British had given support to the Haganah, a Jewish defense military organization under the Mandate. Palestinian Jews also created underground militia groups with their own unique goals. They began comprehensive military training and established weapon depots during this period. As a result of this tightening of discipline, there was a general militarization of the Jews in Palestine. Palestinian Jews began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. They began to think that violence, not patience, was needed to achieve justice. Moderates who urged trust in the British Mandate and self-restraint were undermined.

In May 1939, the British released a White Paper in which they announced that Palestine should be one country governed by both Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers of the population and restrict the sale of land to Jews. The British White Paper also proposed limiting Jewish immigration. The Arabs rejected it as it did not grant immediate independence from British rule, eliminate the land sales to Jews, or end Jewish immigration to the region. The Jews also rejected the White Paper because they objected to limits on immigration and land sales. British leaders could not find a compromise.

When World War II began four months later, some Arab leaders saw a chance to rid themselves of British rule. While some leaders such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem supported the Axis forces, countries such as Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral and provided the Allies with large supplies of oil. In an effort to reach out to the Arab community and to stop alliances with the Axis, President Franklin Roosevelt assured King Ibn Saud in a May 1943

letter that he would consult the Arabs before any decision was made on the post war settlement of Palestine. The importance of Standard Oil Company's Arabian American Oil Company (ARMCO) continued production of oil in Saudi Arabia for the Allies as well as the size of the Arab population concerned President Roosevelt and his State Department. It was at this time that diplomatic relations with the U.S. were established. Meanwhile, Palestinian Jews fought for the British during the war in special units such as the Jewish Brigade. The size of the Arab population and the strategic U.S. oil reserves being located in an unstable area greatly concerned the U.S. State Department within the context of the Cold War.

The majority of Zionists overwhelmingly supported the Biltmore Program of 1942. In addition to an immediate issuance of 100,000 certificates of immigration to Palestine, this called for the Mandate to hand over control of immigration to the Jewish Agency, to abolish restrictions on sale of land and to aim for the establishment of a Jewish state as soon as a Jewish majority was achieved. However, the Palestinian Jews were not all Zionists. Party Jewry was riddled with political differences. Many Jews doubted the wisdom of these demands.

At the end of WWII, a solution for displaced people, particularly the Jews, was imperative. Jews who survived the concentration camps and who had no home to return to were forced to stay in camps run by the Allies. Many looked to Palestine as an answer as to where to settle. In reaction, Arab delegates from seven nations met in Alexandria, Egypt and formed the Arab League. They announced that there would be no greater injustice than solving the problems of the Jews in Europe by inflicting injustices on Palestinian Arabs. After all, they had not participated in the Holocaust. They refuted "land without people for a people without land," a slogan that promoted Jewish migration to Palestine. Their country was populated; it had just never exercised an independent government without controlling countries overseeing Palestine. They argued that the British were giving away land that did not belong to Britain and that the Mandate contradicted the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Mandate was seen as a violation of their self-government since it forced on them an immigration they did not want.

Palestinian Arabs pointed to the countries around them that had been granted independence. The promises made by the British and the reassurances from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman were seen by them as a recognition of the principle that they should enjoy the same rights as those in other countries. They demanded immediate independence. However, they had refused to develop a selfgoverning Arab community parallel to that of the Jews of Palestine.

On June 16, 1945, as British resources and manpower were strained to the breaking point, the Palestine settlement issue was placed before the new United Nations, On October 19, the British presented a formal proposal to the U.S. Secretary of State for a joint Anglo-American Committee for Inquiry into the Palestine Problem. Late in 1947, the British announced they would end their part of the Mandate and leave Palestine on May 15, 1948.







## ★ JEWISH HISTORY, DISPLACEMENT, AND THE HOLOCAUST

In 70 AD, Roman military forces crushed a Jewish revolt and drove Jews from Jerusalem. Displaced Jews fled to other regions where they were greeted with suspicion, contempt, and violence. As a result, Jews living outside of their homeland, or diaspora, banded together and adhered to their traditions in the midst of foreign customs in foreign lands.

Outsiders often viewed Jewish people's exclusivity as a threat. Christians labeled them Christ-killers and accused them of condoning ritual murder and spreading disease by poisoning the water. During the Middle Ages, Christian leaders demanded baptism or death for new Jewish settlers in their lands. In 1215, Pope Innocent III demanded that all Jews wear a distinguishing badge of shame in order to alert Christians of approaching danger. Other leaders prevented Jews from owning land and forced them to live in ghettos. Jews also faced travel restrictions and were not allowed to join certain professions.

They had no rights as citizens. The continued cycles of suspicion and persecution encouraged successive waves of Jewish immigration to their promised land in Palestine.

Restrictions on Jews' freedoms resulted in countless poverty stricken Jewish communities. The Western Enlightenment began after the French Revolution spread across Europe and emancipated Jews from many of these restrictions, helping them rise to positions of power and success in Western Europe, particularly in science and banking. Still, political anti-Semitism in the late 19th century continued to depict Jews as disloyal citizens.

Beginning in the 1930s, racial anti-Semitism increased. The Nazi Party under the direction of Adolf Hitler used widespread religious and economic fear of the Jews to rally support for the Nazi Party's rise to power in Germany. German Nazis progressively took away the Jews' legal rights and even their right to live. The Nuremberg Laws of 1935 defined Jews by blood, not religious belief. Hitler arranged forced labor camps and concentration camps to eradicate entire Jewish communities. On November 9 and 10, 1938, Nazis torched synagogues, vandalized Jewish homes, schools, and businesses, and killed nearly 100 Jews in a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms known as Kristallnacht, which is often referred to as the "Night of Broken Glass." Conditions for German Jews grew increasingly worsened after Kristallnacht.

The Holocaust, an attempt to exterminate European Jews, marked the height of Jewish persecution. Never before had Jews been systematically suppressed and exterminated in such massive numbers. Before the outbreak

# **★ FOR REVIEW:**

- \_\_ Truman
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of WWII. Poland was home to the most Jews in Europe. Nazi aggression reduced the country's Jewish population from 3 million to 45,000. At the end of WWII, the Allies discovered that more than 6 million Jews had lost their lives. in Hitler's death camps due to direct execution, overexertion, starvation, or disease.

Triumph morphed into horror as Allied troops discovered skeletal survivors, inhumane living conditions, and evidence of mass murders from piles of corpses in the concentration camps they liberated. Survivors struggled to return home only to find nothing of the lives they once had. Many were forced to live in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Displaced Jews lived in separate camps from other

displaced people. Some of the camps in Germany were the very same camps the Nazis held them as prisoners. By the end of 1946, 300,000 displaced Jewish people, most from Eastern Europe, were crowded in camps.

In the Displaced Persons Camps, Jews created the She'erit ha-Pletah or "surviving remnant." Jews were allowed to govern themselves in the camps, but conditions there, as throughout Europe, were poor. Quotas on immigration prevented Jews from entering other countries. They were not welcomed and a desire for a

homeland increased. Zionists in the camps pushed for only one solution: return to Palestine. Zionism, the Jewish political movement to emigrate to the Holy Land, had existed in Europe as early as the 1880s. Many Jewish prayers reminded Jews not to forget Jerusalem. Jews prayed toward Jerusalem and recited the words "next year in Jerusalem" every Passover.

The cry to return became a roar in the summer of 1945 after President Harry S. Truman's personal emissary, Earl G. Harrison, advised that the British allow 100,000 Displaced Persons to immigrate to Palestine. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which examined the political, economic, and social conditions of Palestine as well as the position of the Jews in Europe, recommended that the whole world share responsibility for the Jews and that 100,000 Jews be allowed in Palestine. The committee also recommended that Palestine be a state for Muslims, Jews, and Christians and that Palestine should be placed under a UN trusteeship. Jews and the Arabs both rejected the findings. The British government also rejected the committee's recommendations and announced it will end the Mandate. The U.S. War Department estimated it would need to commit 300,000 military personnel to assist the British in the event of an Arab revolt. Britain's rejection of the report strengthened the resolve of Jews in Europe to go to Palestine.

In February 1947, British authorities refused 4,500 Jewish refugees on the ship Exodus entry to Palestine's port Haifa. Western countries were shocked that the ship, described as a "floating Auschwitz," was forced to return to France and eventually back to Germany. Displaced Jews rejected alternative solutions to remain in Europe where they felt they could never be safe. Like those who had long pursued a return to the Jewish homeland, many displaced Jews wished to return to Palestine. Two phrases joined Jews universally: Zachor, meaning to remember, and "never again." Never again would they stand by and allow other Jews to be slaughtered. To ensure this promise, they sought their own country.



Quotas on immigration prevented Jews from entering other countries. They were not welcomed and the need for a homeland increased. Zionists in the camps pushed for only one solution for displaced people: return to Palestine.





The United Nations is an international intergovernmental organization founded in 1945 with a mission to: maintain international peace and cooperation among nations; develop friendly relations among nations and promote social progress, living standards, and human rights.

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- \_\_ Truman
- \_\_ Ross
- \_\_ Forrestal
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- \_\_ Austin
- \_\_ Al-Fagih
- \_\_ Jacobson

# **★ THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UN PARTITION PLAN**

The United Nations is an international intergovernmental organization founded in 1945 with a mission to maintain international peace and cooperation among nations, develop friendly relations among nations, and promote social progress, living standards, and human rights. The UN was conceived as the League of Nations' successor in 1942 when representatives from 26 nations resolved to fight together against the Axis Powers. In 1945, representatives of 50 nations drafted and later signed the UN Charter.

From its earliest years, the UN deliberated on the topic of control of Palestine. The British civil administration had operated in Palestine since a League of Nations' Mandate formalized British rule in the region in 1922. Under the Mandate, British officials controlled the government and allowed few Arabs or Jews any positions of power. Tensions between Arabs and Jews that had developed during the Mandate years in Palestine eased slightly during WWII as ending the war was the main focus of most in the region. Immediately after the war, however, violence erupted. Palestinian Arabs perceived two enemies: Jews and British authorities in Palestine. Jews in Palestine opposed British immigration quotas and their administration of Palestine—many were upset that British forces in Palestine failed to protect them from Arab attacks. Economic constraints stemming from WWII diminished British authorities' ability to control conflicts in Palestine. Caught in the middle of escalating violence waged by both Jews and Arabs, the British looked for a way out of Palestine.

On May 15, 1947, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created in response to Great Britain's request that the General Assembly make recommendations concerning the future of Palestine. UNSCOP was comprised of eleven neutral countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Representatives from these nations were tasked with investigating the issues in Palestine and offering an unbiased plan. In the summer of 1947, UNSCOP members went on a fifteen-day tour of Palestine that spanned 2,200 miles.

During their tour, UNSCOP members met with Hussein Al-Khalid, the mayor of Jerusalem. He argued that Palestine Arabs had an inalienable right to statehood, that Jews had no historic rights in Palestine, and that Jews had always been a minority in Palestine. He rejected the idea of partitioning Palestine, stating that the Arabs should not have to suffer because of Hitler and displaced people in Europe. Instead, Hussein Al-Khalid called for a democratic state with an Arab majority.

UNSCOP members also met with leaders of the Jewish Agency and visited Jewish communities in Palestine. Their tours of Jewish schools contrasted sharply with the lack of educational opportunities in the Arab communities. Tours of Jewish industrial areas showed that Jews

had modernized parts of Palestine. UNSCOP members also went on a seven-day tour of the Displaced Peoples' Camps in the American and British zones in Germany. Of the displaced Jews they interviewed in those camps, 100% said they wanted to go to Palestine.


During their investigations, Yugoslavia's UNSCOP representative witnessed British Royal Marines board the Exodus, a ship carrying Jewish emigrants from France to British Mandatory Palestine, and order the ship to turn back to France. Distraught at the notion of returning to Displaced Peoples' Camps, Jewish emigrants aboard the ship fought the British forces with clubs, metal bars, screws, bolts, and tomatoes. Despite this resistance, all 4,500 displaced Jews on the Exodus were denied access to Palestine. The British were perceived as insensitive to the issue of displaced Jews.

After approximately three months of investigation and forty nine meetings, UNSCOP concluded that neither side could or would willingly live together in the same country. In September 1947, the committee reported that a majority of the nations represented on the committee favored partitioning Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. UNSCOP recommended that Jews and Arabs living in the Jewish state would become citizens of the Jewish state, and Jews and Arabs living in the Arab state would become citizens of the Arab state. The resolution did not apportion land to reflect demographic realities, however, and much of the land designated for Arabs was ill-suited for agricultural production.

The UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to review UNSCOP 's recommendations. Representatives from the Jewish Agency, a nongovernmental organization the League of Nations created in 1929 to support Jewish settlements in Palestine, and the Arab Higher Committee, the central political organization of the Arab community, were

invited to comment. Given the incongruent land designations, the majority of Arab leaders and citizens rejected the UN's mandate. The Jewish Agency supported most of the recommendations while insisting they be given the right and control to proceed immediately with Displaced Peoples' immigration. Violence once again broke out between Palestinian Arabs and Jews.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly sanctioned Resolution 181, UNSCOP's proposal to split Palestine into two sovereign states. Resolution 181 officially eliminated the British Mandate of Palestine, gave Jerusalem international regime status, and established a deadline, August 1, 1948, for Great Britain to remove their troops. In December 1947, Great Britain announced it would withdraw all troops by May 14, 1948.



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# \* ADVISORY EVALUATION FORM

As President Truman's advisor, you must have working knowledge of issues and events affecting the nation and the world. Briefings are being circulated to a limited number of advisors including you. Use the form below to assess the importance of this briefing to your advisory role and then pass the briefing to another advisory group.

Briefing Title			
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Based on my assess	sment, I believe my advice wou	ıld have been needed (check one):	
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**66** Not all readers become leaders. But all leaders must be readers. ""

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

# **MODULE 3: RIGHT TO THE SOURCE**

# **★ ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY\***

Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

April 20, 1946

We were appointed by the Governments of the United states and of the United Kingdom... with the following Terms of Reference:

- 1. To examine political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.
- 2. To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their conditions to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.
- 3. To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine..., and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States for ad interim handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.
- 4. To make such other recommendations... as may be necessary to meet the immediate needs arising from conditions subject to examination under paragraph 2 above.

The Governments urged upon us the need for the utmost expedition in dealing with the subjects committed to us for investigation...

We assembled in Washington on Friday, 4th January, 1946, and began our public sessions. We... resumed our public sessions in London.... [W]orking in subcommittees, [we] proceeded our investigations in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and Greece... [W]e flew to Cairo and... reached Jerusalem on 6th March. In Palestine, our sessions were interspersed with personal visits to different parts of the country, during which we sought to acquaint ourselves at first hand with its various characteristics and the ways of life of its inhabitants. Subcommittees visited the capitals of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Transjordan to hear the views of the Arab Governments and representative bodies concerned with the subjects before us...

We now submit the following Report.

<sup>\*</sup> The White House Decision Center has abridged this report.



#### CHAPTER II: THE POSITION OF THE JEWS IN EUROPE

...There are about 98,000 Jews from other countries-displaced personsnow living in Germany, Austria and Italy, and a small additional number scattered throughout the countries of Europe. We found that the majority of these Jews in the American and British zones of Germany and Austria were living in assembly centers, once known as "camps"... The Jewish occupants of these centers are not all "displaced persons," that is to say, persons outside their national boundaries by reason of the war...

The nature of the accommodation of displaced Jews differed widely in character. In some centers barracks were used; in others, huts, hotels, apartment houses and cottages... We saw many conditions in the centers that might be criticized, owing to circumstances which were not always within the power of the military authorities to improve. There were lack of furniture, unsatisfactory cooking arrangements, overcrowding and a shortage of beds and bedding... most of the centers could not be more than the place in which the occupants were given shelter, food and clothing. While everything possible was being done for their physical needs, there was little that could be done to improve their morale and relieve their mental anguish. Coming from the horrors of Nazi persecution, it was evident that they still felt themselves outcasts and unwanted.

These Jewish survivors have not emerged from their ordeals unscathed either physically or mentally. It is rare indeed to find a complete Jewish family. Those who return to their old homes find them destroyed or occupied by others, their businesses gone or else in other hands.

As described by many witnesses, a factor which has greatly increased the urgent, indeed frantic, desire of the Jews of Europe to emigrate is the feeling that all doors have been shut to them and that there is no exit.







It is perhaps unfortunate in some respects that nearly all of these settlements were in enemy territory. The displaced Jews see around them Germans living a family life in their own homes and outwardly little affected by the war, while they, usually the last surviving members of their families, are living still, as it seemed to them, under restrictions...

There can scarcely be a Jew in Europe who has not suffered in greater or less degree either himself or herself or by the loss of relatives...These Jewish survivors have not emerged from their ordeals unscathed either physically or mentally. It is rare indeed to find a complete Jewish family. Those who return to their old homes find them destroyed or occupied by others, their businesses gone or else in other hands. They search for relatives, frequently undertaking long journeys on hearing a rumor that one has been seen in another part of the country or in another center. Such was the system of the Germans that it is difficult for them ever to establish the death of their dear ones. They are faced also with very great difficulties in securing the restitution of their property. In Germany and in Poland, which were often described to us as "the cemetery of European Jewry," a Jew may see in the face of any man he looks upon the murderer of his family. It is understandable that few find themselves able to face such conditions.

In Poland, Hungary and Rumania, the chief desire is to get out, to get away somewhere where there is a chance of building up a new life, of finding some happiness, of living in peace and in security. In Germany also, where the number of Jews has been reduced from about 500,000 in 1933 to about 20,000 now, and most traces of Jewish life have been destroyed, there is a similar desire on the part of a large proportion of the survivors to make a home elsewhere, preferably in Palestine. In Czechoslovakia... the position in regard to the reestablishment of the Jewish populations is more hopeful. The vast majority of the Jewish displaced persons and migrants, however, believe that the only place which offers a prospect is Palestine...

Work to them is associated with concentration camps and slave labor... We were deeply impressed by the tragedy of the situation of these Jewish survivors in the centers and by the tragedy of their purposeless existence. Many months have passed since they were freed from Nazi oppression and brutality, but they themselves feel that they are as far as ever from restoration to normal life. We consider that these men, women and children have a moral claim on the civilized world. Their pitiable condition has evoked a world-

wide sympathy, but sympathy has so far taken the form only of providing them with the bare essentials of food, clothing and shelter. It seems to them that the only real chance of rebuilding their shattered lives and of becoming normal men and women again is that offered by the Jewish people in Palestine. Even though many might be glad to join relatives and friends in other countries, the doors of those countries at present appear to be closed to them. They are resentful because they are prevented from going to Palestine.

In the meantime, as time passes, the new ties between those who are sharing this common frustration become stronger and, obsessed by their apparent rejection by other peoples of the world, their firm desire is to remain together in the future.... It is this sense of cohesion, born of common suffering, which doubtless accounts for, if it does not wholly excuse, the firm resistance offered to proposals by competent bodies to remove young children to happier surroundings in other countries for careful rehabilitation. Men and women are marrying in the centers in increasing number, and, together with other members of the center communities, they wait with growing impatience for the time when they can go to the only friendly place they know.

If, as we hope, our recommendation for the authorization of immigration certificates is accepted, the great majority of the Jewish displaced persons whose situation requires urgent action will be provided for, and it will be possible to achieve the desirable end of closing the Jewish displaced persons centers and thereby discourage the further migration of Jews in Europe. Jews have wandered through Europe almost as they wish, from center to center, zone to zone, and country to country... The governments of the countries we visited expressed their opposition to anti-Semitism, but this is a poison which after years of infection takes time to eradicate...

Taking into account the possibility that an improvement in the economic and political conditions in Europe may affect the attitudes of those who now see no hope of reestablishing themselves in their countries, we estimate that as many as 500,000 may wish or be impelled to emigrate from Europe.

As described by many witnesses, a factor which has greatly increased the urgent, indeed frantic, desire of the Jews of Europe to emigrate is the feeling that all doors have been shut to them and that there is no exit.

# CHAPTER III: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN PALESTINE

The Peel Commission declared in one of the final chapters of its Report: "Neither Arab nor Jew has any sense of service to a single State . . . The conflict is primarily political, though the fear of economic subjection to the Jews is also in Arab minds . . . The conflict, indeed, is as much about the future as about the present. Every intelligent Arab and Jew is forced to ask the question, "Who in the end will govern Palestine?" . . . for internal and external reasons it seems probable that the situation, bad as it now is, will grow worse. The conflict will go on, the gulf between Arabs and Jews will widen." The Report concluded with a reference to "strife and bloodshed in a thrice hallowed land."

It is nine years since the Peel Commission made its report. The recommendations were unfulfilled, but the analysis of political conditions remains valid and impressive. The gulf between the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab world on the one side, and the Jews of Palestine and elsewhere on the other has widened still further. Neither side seems at all disposed at the present to make any sincere effort to reconcile either their superficial or their fundamental differences. The Arabs view the Mandatory Government with misgivings and anger. It is not only condemned verbally, but attacked with bombs and firearms by organized bands of Jewish terrorists. The Palestine Administration appears to be powerless to keep the situation under control except by the display of very large forces...

Arab political leadership is still in the hands of the small number of families which were prominent in Ottoman times, of which the most notable are the Husseinis. This family controls the most important of the Arab political parties, the Palestine Arab Party, which was formally organized in 1935. The objectives of this and of all Arab

parties in Palestine are the immediate stoppage of Jewish immigration, the immediate prohibition of the sale of land to Jews, and the concession of independence to a State in which the Arab majority would be dominant.

There has been no evidence that the Arab notables who appeared before the Committee, and whom the Committee visited in several countries, did not reflect accurately the views of their followers... In short, absolute, unqualified refusal of the Arabs to acquiesce in the admission of a single Jew to Palestine is the outstanding feature of Arab politics today; and the newly formed parties of the Left, based on the embryonic trade-union movement, display as intransigent a nationalism as the old leaders.

An additional reason for the insistence of the Palestinian Arabs on immediate independence is their desire for full membership in the newly formed Arab League. The Arabs of Palestine believe themselves to be as fitted for self-government as are their neighbors in Syria and Lebanon who obtained their independence during the Second World War, and in Trans-Jordan which has since become an independent State. The formation of the Arab League has given Arab leaders in Palestine a greater confidence. They feel that the support of the whole Arab world for their cause has now been mobilized. Furthermore, the presence in the United Nations of five Arab States, one of which is a member of the Security Council, insures that the Arab case will not go by default when the issue of Palestine is brought before the United Nations.

Just as the Arab political parties are unalterably opposed to Jewish immigration, the various Jewish parties, even though some criticize the idea of a Jewish State, are all united in their advocacy of unlimited immigration, of the abolition of restrictions on the sale of land and of the abrogation of the 1939 White Paper. These parties accept the authority of the Jewish Agency which is recognized by Great Britain, according to the terms of the Mandate; as the instrument of Jews throughout the world...



Lord Peel and other members of the Palestine Royal Commission leaving the Palestine Royal Commission Offices, 1937

Photo courtesy Library of Congress

Aerial views of Palestine, 1936

Photo credit: Library of Congress





Many criticisms of the Jewish Agency have been made before the Committee in open and closed sessions, by Arabs and officials of the Palestine Government as well as by Agudath Israel and some individual Jews. The Agency's customary functions, which are centered on the establishment, maintenance and growth of a National Home for the Jews, were not condemned. That is easily explainable, for it has been one of the most successful colonizing instruments in history. But the present relations between the Government and the Jewish Agency must be corrected if the general welfare is to be promoted and the cause of peace in that crucial area of the world is to be protected. Unless this is achieved, Palestine might well be plunged into a civil war, involving the whole Middle East.

Neither Jews nor Arabs have been included in the highest ranks of the Administration. British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilization. District and local officials, Arab and Jew alike, bear only limited discretion and responsibility, even in their own communities. The Palestine Administration is blamed by Arabs and Jews alike for this situation.

In consequence of these conditions, the Holy Land is scarred by shocking incongruities. Army tents, tanks, a grim fort and barracks overlook the waters of the Sea of Galilee. Blockhouses, road barriers manned by soldiers, barbed wire entanglements, tanks in the streets, peremptory searches, seizures and arrests on suspicion, bombings by gangsters, and shots in the night are now characteristic. A curfew is enforced, and the press of Palestine is subject to censorship. Palestine has become a garrisoned but restive land, and there is little probability that the tranquility dear to people of good will, Jews, Moslems, and Christians alike, will be restored until vastly better relations are established among the principal elements of the community, including the Administration. With that assured, the various groups could be united on the basis of those fundamentals which are common to civilized people who wish to live their own lives, undeterred and unterrified by the possibility that first one faction and then another will rise in open or covert rebellion against one another, or against the Government itself.

#### **CHAPTER IV: GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS**

#### **GEOGRAPHY**

Palestine, about the size... of Vermont, is geographically an integral part of Syria, having no natural frontier on the north. A marked natural division within the country separates the rich soil of the coastal strip and the plain of

Esdraelon from the rocky mountain areas, parched for a large part of the year, and from the southern deserts. In the wide coastal plain there are thriving towns-Acre, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Jaffa and Gaza-with ports and a variety of industries. Here, moreover, is to be found intensive cultivation, by Arab and Jew alike, with attention concentrated on the old and profitable pursuit of citrus growing. The mountains contain not only desolate areas of barren rock and deforested hillside, but also fertile valleys and basins where cereals are grown; in addition remarkable results have been achieved in the cultivation of olives, vines and fruit trees on tiny terraced strips constructed and maintained with great patience and skill. In summer the hills are dry. In winter heavy rains tear away soil from every hillside that is not adequately protected by terracing or forest cover, and constant warfare has to be carried on against erosion.

Nearly all the Jews of Palestine and almost half the Arabs live in the plains, though these contain less than one-seventh of the total area of Palestine, while the mountains and the southern deserts are populated, apart from scattered Jewish colonies, exclusively by Arabs. Both Arab and Jew put forward historical and cultural claims to the whole of Palestine, and even the great deserts to the south, almost rainless and with more rock than soil, are not uncontested. With a small, semi-nomadic or nomadic Arab population, their emptiness appears to the Jews as a challenge to their powers of colonization; and, despite the unpromising outlook on any economic test, the Arabs regard proposals for Jewish settlement as yet further evidence of the well-planned "creeping conquest." Geography, indeed, partly explains the intransigent claims of both sides to the whole country. The plains are too small and the mountains too poor to subsist as independent economies.

The significance of Palestine in international affairs, apart from its possible strategic importance, derives largely from the fact that it lies across natural lines of communication. Major railway and road communications pass through the country. It is on the route between two great centers of Arab culture, Cairo and Damascus; between Egypt, the administrative center of the Arab League, and other member States; and between Iraq and the newly independent State of Transjordan and their outlets to the Mediterranean; and it has great potential importance in the air traffic of the future. Palestine is also deeply involved in the business and politics of the international trade in oil; for, although there are no wells in the country, a pipe-line delivers a stream of crude oil to the great refineries at Haifa; and from there tankers deliver it to countries around and beyond the Mediterranean. The American concession

in Saudi Arabia may produce another stream converging on much the same point of distribution.

#### **POPULATION**

According to official estimates, the population of Palestine grew from 750,000 at the census of 1922 to 1,765,000 at the end of 1944. In this period the Jewish part of the population rose from 84,000 to 554,000, and from 13 to 31 percent of the whole. Three-fourths of this expansion of the Jewish community was accounted for by immigration. Meanwhile the Arabs, though their proportion of the total population was falling, had increased by an even greater number-the Moslems alone from 589,000 to 1,061,000. Of this Moslem growth by 472,000, only 19,000 was accounted for by immigration. The expansion of the Arab community by natural increase has been in fact one of the most striking features of Palestine's social history under the Mandate...

#### **ECONOMIC CONTRASTS**

On the economic side Palestine is a country of marked contrasts. While the Arabs have remained preponderantly rural, in the Jewish sector, along with the "close settlement on the land" which had been laid down as a guiding principle of Jewish colonization, there has been, particularly in later years, a remarkable industrial development...

The passage of years has only sharpened the contrast in structure between the two economies. On the Arab side, notwithstanding some development in co-operation and trade unionism, individualism is still characteristic. In agriculture, small-scale peasant farming, still largely on the subsistence principle, remains predominant; and the many signs now visible of enterprise and expansion in Arab industry conform to the same pattern of strong individualism. In the Jewish economy, on the other hand, is to be found a nexus of centralized control. Thus the Jewish Agency, besides being a landowner on a large scale, is a promoter and financier of agricultural settlement, and has large and varied participations in industrial and other enterprises....

Not to over-emphasize the cleavage, it should be noted that there are points of contact between the Arab and Jewish economies, as in the Palestine Potash Works. There is indeed some limited interdependence, where for example the Jewish housewife buys vegetables from an Arab grower. But there can be few instances of so small a country being so sharply divided in its economic, let alone social and political, basis... Everywhere is to be seen a marked disparity between the standards of living, however measured, of the Arab and Jewish communities. Jewish wage rates are consistently higher than Arab, those for unskilled labor being more than twice as high. There is only a limited range of competition between them; and therefore a minimum of natural pressure towards equalization. Habits of consumption, the degree of reliance on the market, whether for supplies or income, housing standards and so forth, differ widely, and in general the social services available to the Arab are extremely limited. The war has done little, if anything, to weaken the division...

#### **ECONOMIC EXPANSION AND IMMIGRATION**

...Any forecast of Palestine's long-term prospects must necessarily be viewed against the background of the

country's natural resources. These are extremely limited, making Palestine peculiarly dependent on foreign trade for raw materials and supplies of many finished goods.

Even the exploitation of the natural asset comprised in a good soil irradiated by long hours of bright sunshine is limited by the availability of water. Despite an abundant winter rainfall in many parts, Palestine is an arid country. In the words of the Palestine Government, "there are few countries nowadays which can say that 'their water resources are of such little concern to their people that legislation to control their use is unnecessary;"' yet the Government of this arid country has no statutory authority to control the exploitation of its water resources, and no authority even to ascertain the extent of such water resources as exist...

We have in this immediate context another example of the manner in which Jewish zeal and energy are ready to outrun economic caution of the ordinary Western pattern. Full recognition of the weak points in the Jewish economy and its immediate prospects does not in the least deter the insistence upon providing a home for the homeless. If this should entail an all-round cut in standards of living the present Jewish population, so be it. There is much to admire in this demonstration of brotherhood carried, if need be, to the point of sacrifice. But it is conceivable that the passionate expansion of an economic structure, upon a dubious basis of natural resources, might lead to overdevelopment on such a scale as to render it top-heavy to the point of collapse. The argument thus returns to the need for Systematic improvement of the country's basic resources, for which, as already indicated, orderly progress in an atmosphere of peaceful collaboration is a sine qua non.

#### CHAPTER V: THE JEWISH ATTITUDE

The Committee heard the Jewish case, presented at full length and with voluminous written evidence, in three series of public hearings.... The basic policy advocated was always the same, the so-called Biltmore Program of 1942, with the additional demand that 100,000 certificates for immigration into Palestine should be issued immediately to relieve the distress in Europe. This policy can be summed up in three points:

- 1. that the Mandatory should hand over control of immigration to the Jewish Agency:
- 2. that it should abolish restrictions on the sale of land; and
- 3. that it should proclaim as its ultimate aim the establishment of a Jewish State as soon as a Jewish majority has been achieved.

It should be noted that the demand for a Jewish State goes beyond the obligations of either the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate, and was expressly disowned by the Chairman of the Jewish Agency as late 1932...

As the result of the public hearings and of many private conversations, we came to the conclusion that the Biltmore Program has the support of the overwhelming majority of Zionists. Though many Jews have doubts about the wisdom of formulating these ultimate demands, the program has undoubtedly won the support of the Zionist movement as a whole, chiefly because it expresses the policy of Palestinian Jewry which now plays a leading role in the Jewish-Agency...

The position in Palestine itself is somewhat different. Here, where the issue is not the achievement of a remote idea, but is regarded as a matter of life and death for the Jewish nation, the position is naturally more complex. Palestinian Jewry is riddled with party differences. The number of political newspapers and periodicals bears witness to the variety and vitality of this political life, and, apart from pressure exerted on Jews considered to be disloyal to the National Home, we found little evidence to support the rumors that it was dangerous to advocate minority views...- Taken altogether, these Palestinian critics of the Biltmore Program certainly do not exceed at the moment one quarter of the Jewish population in Palestine. But they represent a constructive minority.

The Biltmore Program can only be fully understood if it is studied against this background of Palestinian life. Like all political platforms, it is a result of conflicting political pressures, an attempt by the leadership to maintain unity without sacrificing principle. The Jew who lives and works in the National Home is deeply aware both of his achievements and of how much more could have been achieved with whole-hearted support by the Mandatory Power. His political outlook is thus a mixture of self-confident pride and bitter frustration: pride that he has turned the desert and the swamp into a land flowing with milk and honey; frustration because he is denied opportunity of settlement in nine-tenths of that Eretz Israel which he considers his own by right; pride that he has disproved the theory that the Jews cannot build a



Any decision
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Palestine and the
reasons for it.

healthy community based on the tilling of the soil; frustration that the Jew is barred entry to the National Home, where that community is now in being; pride that he is taking part in a bold collective experiment; frustration because he feels himself hampered by British officials whom he often regards as less able than himself; pride because in Palestine he feels himself at last a free member of a free community; frustration because he lives, not under a freely elected government, but under an autocratic if humane regime.

The main complaint of the Jews of Palestine is that, since the White Paper of 1930, the Mandatory Power has slowed up the development of the National Home in order to placate Arab opposition. The sudden rise of immigration after the Nazi seizure of power had as its direct result the three and a half years of Arab revolt, during which the Jew had to train himself for self defense, and to accustom himself to the life of a pioneer in an armed stockade. The high barbed wire

and the watchtowers, manned by the settlement police day and night, strike the eye of the visitor as he approaches every collective colony. They are an outward symbol of the new attitude to life and politics which developed among the Palestinian Jews between 1936 and 1938....

The Jews in Palestine are convinced that Arab violence paid off. Throughout the Arab rising, the Jews in the National Home, despite every provocation, obeyed the orders of their leaders and exercised a remarkable self-discipline. They shot, but only in self-defense; they rarely took reprisals on the Arab population. They state bitterly that the reward for this restraint was the Conference and the White Paper of 1939. The Mandatory Power, they argue, yielded to force, cut down immigration, and thus caused the death of thousands of Jews in Hitler's gas chambers. The Arabs, who had recourse to violence, received substantial concessions, while the Jews, who had put their faith in the Mandatory, were compelled to accept what they regard as a violation of the spirit and the letter of the Mandate.

An immediate result of the success of Arab terrorism was the beginning of Jewish terrorism and, even more significant, a closing of the ranks, a tightening of the discipline, and a general militarization of Jewish life in Palestine. The Agency became the political headquarters of a citizen army which felt that at any moment it might have to fight for its very existence. Deprived, as he believed, both of his natural and of his legal rights, the Palestinian Jew began to lose faith in the Mandatory Power. The dangerous belief was spread that not patience but violence was needed to achieve justice. The position of the moderates who urged self-restraint and a reliance on Britain's pledged word was progressively undermined; the position of the extremists, eager to borrow a leaf from the Arab copy book, was progressively strengthened.

Then came the war. Apart from a small group of terrorists the Jewish community gave more solid support than the Palestinian Arabs to the British war effort. But when the immediate Middle Eastern danger was removed, the old struggle between the moderates and the extremists began again...

When the war ended and the Labor Government came to power, the White Paper still remained in force. The Jews, who had expected an immediate fulfillment by a Labor Government of the Labor Party program with regard to Zionism, felt a sense of outrage when no change of policy occurred. The bitterness reached a new peak of intensity, and the position of the moderates became almost impossible. The Jewish Agency frankly stated in public hearing that, after V-E day, it was quite futile for it to attempt to cooperate with the Mandatory in suppressing illegal activity.

Any decision on the future of Palestine will be futile and unrealistic unless it is made in full cognizance of the political tension among the Jews in Palestine and the reasons for it. Both in evidence given in public hearings, and in numerous private conversations with leading politicians and with ordinary citizens, we were repeatedly advised that the maintenance by the Mandatory of its present policy could only lead to a state of war, in which the extremists would have the passive support of almost the whole Jewish population and the moderates would be swept from

the key positions which they still hold. To use the words of one Jewish leader: "Our present crisis in Europe and Palestine is felt by all of us to be our Dunkirk".

#### **CHAPTER VI: THE ARAB ATTITUDE**

The Committee heard a brief presentation of the Arab case in Washington, statements made in London by delegates from the Arab States to the United Nations, a fuller statement from the Secretary General and other representatives of the Arab League in Cairo, and evidence given on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Office in Jerusalem. In addition, subcommittees visited Baghdad Riyadh, Damascus, Beirut and Amman, where they were informed on the views of Government and of unofficial spokesmen.

Stripped to the bare essentials, the Arab case is based upon the fact that Palestine is a country which the Arabs have occupied for more than a thousand years, and a denial of the Jewish historical claims to Palestine. In issuing the Balfour Declaration, the Arabs maintain, the British Government were giving away something that did not belong to Britain, and they have consistently argued that the Mandate conflicted with the Covenant of the League of Nations from which it derived its authority. The Arabs deny that the part played by the British in freeing them from the Turks gave Great Britain a right to dispose of their country. Indeed, they assert that Turkish was preferable to British rule, if the latter involves their eventual subjection to the Jews. They consider the Mandate a violation of their right of self-determination since it is forcing upon them an immigration which they do not desire and will not tolerate-an invasion of Palestine by the Jews.

The Arabs of Palestine point out that all the surrounding Arab States have now been granted independence. They argue that they are just as advanced as are the citizens of the nearby States, and they demand independence for Palestine now. The promises which have been made to them in the name of Great Britain, and the assurances concerning Palestine given to Arab leaders by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, have been understood by the Arabs of Palestine as a recognition of the principle that they should enjoy the same rights as those enjoyed by the neighboring countries. Christian Arabs unite with Moslems in all of these contentions. They demand that their independence should be recognized at once, and they would like Palestine, as a self-governing country, to join the Arab League.

The Arabs attach the highest importance to the fulfillment of the promises made by the British Government in the White Paper of 1939. King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, when he spoke with three members of the Committee at Riyadh, made frequent reference both to these promises and to the assurances given him by the late President Roosevelt at their meeting in February, 1945. His Majesty made clear the strain which would be placed upon Arab friendship with Great Britain and the United States by any policy which Arabs regarded as a betrayal of these pledges. The same warning was repeated by an Arab witness in Jerusalem, who said that "Zionism for the Arabs has become a test of Western intentions."

The suggestion that self-government should be withheld from Palestine until the Jews have acquired a majority seems outrageous to the Arabs. They wish to be masters in their own house. The Arabs were opposed to the idea of a Jewish National Home even before the Biltmore Program and the demand for a Jewish State. Needless to say, however, their opposition has become more intense and more bitter since that program was adopted.

The Arabs maintain that they have never been anti-Semitic; indeed, they are Semites themselves. Arab spokesmen profess the greatest sympathy for the persecuted Jews of Europe, but they point out that they have not been responsible for this persecution and that it is not just that they should be compelled to atone for the sins of Western peoples by accepting into their country hundreds of thousands of victims of European anti-Semitism. Some Arabs even declare that they might be willing to do their share in providing for refugees on a quota basis if the United States, the British Commonwealth and other Western countries would do the same.

The Peel Commission took the view that the enterprise of the Jews in agriculture and industry had brought large, if indirect, benefits to the Arabs in raising their standard of living.... The improvement of health conditions in many parts of the country, while due in part to the activities of Government and in part to the efforts of the Arabs themselves, has undoubtedly been assisted by the work of the Jewish settlers. It is also argued that the Jewish population has conferred substantial indirect benefits on the Arabs through its contribution to the public revenue. On the other hand, the Arabs contend that such improvement as there



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may have been in their standard of living is attributable solely to their own efforts, perhaps with a measure of aid at some points from the Administration.... They assert that at least equal improvements have occurred in other Arab countries, and that the action taken by the Government to assist Jewish industry and agriculture has reacted unfavorably on the Arabs. Import duties for the protection of Jewish industries, for example, are said to have confronted Arab consumers with the necessity of buying high priced local products in place of cheaper imported goods. In any event the Arabs declare that, if they must choose between freedom and material improvement, they prefer freedom.

In exasperation at the disregard of their objection to Jewish immigration, the Arabs of Palestine have repeatedly risen in revolt. A substantial number of them still declare their allegiance to the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem and are satisfied with his policies. In the Second World War, Palestinian Arabs were on the whole spiritually neutral...[but], [a]s Jamal Effendi el-Husseini stated in his evidence before the Committee: "The Grand Mufti in Germany was working for the interests not of the English who were warring with the Germans, but for the interests of his people who had no direct interest, at least, in the controversy." They felt that it was not their war and that the Mufti was right in taking such steps as he could to do the best for Palestine whoever might be victorious.

The White Paper of 1939, and the drastic limitation of Jewish immigration and of land sales to Jews which followed, met the Arab view only in part. The Arabs would have gone much further. The demands voiced by their leaders are for immediate independence, for the final cessation of Jewish immigration and for the prohibition of all land sales by Arabs to Jews....

One witnesses in Palestine not merely the impact of European culture upon the East, but also the impact of Western science and Western technology upon a semifeudal civilization. It is not surprising that the Arabs have bitterly resented this invasion and have resisted it by force of arms. The Arab civilization of Palestine is based on the clan; leadership resides in a small group of influential families, and it is almost impossible for the son of an Arab fellah to rise to a position of wealth and political influence. Arab agriculture in Palestine is traditional, and improvement is hampered by an antiquated system of land tenure. The Arab adheres to a strict social code far removed from the customs of the modern world, and he is shocked by innovations of dress and manners which seem completely natural to the Jewish immigrant. Thus, the sight of a Jewish woman in shorts offends the Arab concept of propriety. The freedom of relations between the sexes and the neglect of good form as he conceives it violate the entire code of life in which the Arab is brought up.

The Arabs of Palestine are overwhelmed by a vague sense of the power of Western capital represented by the Jewish population. The influx of Western capital and the purchase of modern equipment for agriculture and industry excite in the minds of the Arabs a sense of inferiority and the feeling that they are contending against an imponderable force which is difficult to resist. This feeling is accentuated by the fact that they realize that the Jewish case is well

understood and well portrayed in Washington and London, and that they have no means comparable in effectiveness of stating their side of the controversy to the Western World. They have particularly resented the resolutions in favor of Zionist aspirations, adopted respectively by the United States Congress and by the British Labor Party....

The period since the First World War has been marked by a rising wave of nationalism in all Arab countries. Palestinian Arabs share this sentiment, and they are strongly supported in their demand for independence and self-government by all the States of the Arab League. No other subject has occupied so much of the attention of the Arab League or has done so much to unite its membership as has the question of Palestine.

Those members of the Committee who traveled in the neighboring Arab countries found that hostility to Zionism was as strong and widespread there as in Palestine itself...

# CHAPTER VII: CHRISTIAN INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

In addition to the witnesses concerned exclusively with political issues, the Committee also heard representatives of Christian churches. The Arab Christians, divided among many denominations, and numbering some 125,000, form the overwhelming majority of Christians actually living in Palestine. Their delegation, led by the Greek Catholic Archbishop of Galilee, declared their complete solidarity with the Moslem Arabs in the demand for an independent Arab State. The non-Palestinian Christian groups were unable to speak with a common voice... The lamentable fact that there is no single spokesman in Palestine for Christendom tends to obscure the legitimate Christian interest in the Holy Land, which must be safeguarded in any solution of the national problem. This interest demands not only freedom of access to the Holy Places, but also that tranquility should be achieved in a country all of which, from the Christian point of view, is a Holy Land....


The extent to which the Holy Places, sacred to Christians, Moslems and Jews, are interspersed is often not fully appreciated. It is impossible to segregate the Holy Places sacred to the three great religions into separate geographical units. They are scattered over the whole of Palestine, and not, as is often imagined, confined to the Jerusalem and Nazareth areas...

The religious importance of Palestine to Moslems, Jews and Christians alike makes it improper to treat it either as an Arab State or as exclusively designated to the fulfillment of Jewish national aspirations. A solution of the Palestine problem must not only heal political rivalries of Jew and Arab, but must also safeguard its unique religious values.

# CHAPTER VIII: JEWS, ARABS AND GOVERNMENT

#### "The State within the State"

The Jews have developed, under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, a strong and tightlywoven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish nonterritorial State with its own executive and legislative



The Tower of David (left) and the Dome of the Rock (right) in Jerusalem, with a portion of the Western Wall in the foreground.

organs, parallel in many respects to the Mandatory Administration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National Home. This Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the Administration in the maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of terrorism.


Quite apart from the increasing strength of the terrorist gangs, which enjoy widespread popular support, there are many signs that fanaticism and nationalist propaganda are beginning to affect detrimentally the Jewish educational system. It appears to us wholly harmful that the obligatory period of one year's "national service," instituted by the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi, is now partly used for military training. The "closing of the ranks," moreover, which we noted above, has increased that totalitarian tendencies to which a nationalist society is always liable. To speak of a Jewish terror would be a gross exaggeration. But there are disquieting indications that illegal organization and the atmosphere of conspiracy, which inevitably accompanies it, are having their corroding effects on that free democracy which has always been the pride of the Palestinian Jews. Every thoughtful Jew with whom we talked was profoundly disturbed by these symptoms. But none was bold enough to prophesy that they would disappear so long as the Palestine Administration carried out a policy which seems to every Jew to be in direct contravention of his natural rights.

#### **Jewish Relations with Arabs**

Not only is the Jewish community largely independent of and at odds with the Palestine Government, but it is also quite distinct from and in conflict with the Arab community with which, in many areas, it is territorially intertwined. In part this is a natural result of Zionist concentration upon the development of the Jewish community. If the Arabs

have benefited, they have done so only in comparison with the non-Palestinian Arabs; whereas they have remained far beneath the Palestinian Jews in terms of national income, social services, education and general standard of living. This has made it easier for the Arab political leaders to keep alive anti-Jewish feeling in the minds of the Arab masses. The economic gulf separating Jew and Arab in Palestine has been widened, in part at least, by Jewish policies concerning the nonemployment of Arab labor on land purchased by the Jewish National Fund and the refusal to devote Jewish funds and energies directly to the improvement of Arab standards of living. Efforts by the Jews in this direction might be quite as important for the growth and security of the National Home as the draining of swamp lands or the creation of Jewish industry.

But unfortunately there are signs of a hardening of the Jewish attitude towards the Arabs. Too often the Jew is content to refer to the indirect benefits accruing to the Arabs from his comings and to leave the matter there. Passionately loving every foot of Eretz Israel, he finds it almost impossible to look at the issue from the Arab point of view, and to realize the depth of feeling aroused by his "invasion" of Palestine. He compares his own achievements with the slow improvements made by the Arab village, always to the disadvantage of the latter; and forgets the enormous financial, educational and technical advantages bestowed upon him by world Zionism. When challenged on his relations with the Arabs, he is too often content to point out the superficial friendliness of everyday life in town and village- a friendliness which indubitably exists. In so doing, he sometimes ignores the deep political antagonism which inspires the whole Arab community; or thinks that he has explained it away by stating that it is the "result of selfseeking propaganda by the rich effendi class."...



David Ben Gurion, Zionist statesman and political leader, 1947



Members of the Arab Higher Committee, 1936

We noted, however, a few hopeful signs. Reference was made above to the proposals for cooperation with the Arabs made by Hashomer Hatzair and by the Ihud group. The Committee observed with pleasure the Arab-Jewish cooperation achieved on the Municipal Commission which governs Haffa, and in the Citrus Control and Marketing Boards, as well as the joint trade union activity between Jew and Arab in the Palestine Potash Company and on the railways. But such examples of cooperation are rare in Palestine; and they are far outweighed in Arab eyes by the exclusiveness of the General Federation of Jewish Labor in its trade union policy and of the Jewish Agency in its labor policy on land purchased for Jewish settlement.

#### The Jews and the Administration

We were profoundly impressed by the very varied experiments in land settlement which we inspected, ranging from individualist cooperatives to pure collectivist communities. Here, indeed, is a miracle both of physical achievement and of spiritual endeavor, which justifies the dreams of those Jews and Gentiles who first conceived the idea of the National Home. Of Jewish industry in Palestine it is too early yet to speak with confidence. There is boundless optimism and energy, great administrative capacity, but a shortage of skilled labor and, as a result, more quantity than quality of output.

As pioneers in Palestine the Jews have a record of which they can be proud. In Palestine there has been no expulsion of the indigenous population, and exploitation of cheap Arab labor has been vigorously opposed as inconsistent with Zionism. The failing of Palestinian Jewry is a different one. The Jews have always been in the biblical phrase a "peculiar people" which turned in on itself and suffered the consequences of its peculiarity. In Palestine, under the special conditions of the Mandate, they have regained their national self-confidence, but they have not been able to throw off their exclusiveness and tendency to self-isolation.

We believe that this failure is, in part at least, attributable to the relations between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish community since 1939, which have undoubtedly exaggerated the natural Jewish tendency to exclusiveness. Moreover, the Jews feel that they have enough to do defending their own position, without taking on the Arab problem as well.

A second factor of great importance is the failure to develop self-governing institutions. The Jews, like the Arabs, are completely deprived of all responsible participation in central government. Their democracy can only work within the Jewish community, and to a limited degree in local affairs. Thus, they have not had the opportunity which self-government brings, to learn the lesson of responsibility for the good of the whole State... But nothing which we saw in Palestine gave us any reason to believe that, charged with the democratic responsibilities for which they are undoubtedly fit, the Jews of Palestine would not master the lessons of self-government.

#### **Arab Leadership**

The Arabs are divided politically by the personal bickerings of the leaders, which still center round the differences of the Husseinis and their rivals: and socially by the gap which separates the small upper class from the mass of the peasants-a gap which the new intelligentsia is not yet strong enough to bridge. Consequently they have developed no such internal democracy as have the Jews. That their divisions have not been overcome and a formally organized community developed is in part the result of a less acutely selfconscious nationalism than is found today among the Jews. It is, however, also the outcome of a failure of political responsibility. The Arab leaders, rejecting what they regard as a subordinate status in the Palestinian State, and viewing themselves as the proper heirs of the Mandatory Administration, have refused to develop a self-governing Arab community parallel to that of the Jews. Nor, so far, have they been prepared to see their position called in question by such democratic forms as elections for the Arab Higher Committee, or the formation of popularly based political parties. This failure is recognized by the new intelligentsia which, however, is unlikely to exercise much power until it has the backing of a larger middle class.

#### **Need for Arab Education**

Many Arabs are graduates of the American University at Beirut; a few have studied in universities in Cairo, England, Europe and the United States; others have received higher education at the Arab College for men and the Women's Training College in Jerusalem, both of which are efficient but inadequately financed Government institutions. The Arabs are aware of Western civilization and increasingly eager to share its benefits. But the numbers receiving such education are still miserably small, since the only university in Palestine, the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, teaches only in Hebrew. So, too, with secondary education.... There are only some fifteen Arab secondary schools in the whole of Palestine, and one fully developed agricultural school-the Kadoorie School at Tulkarm which specializes in the training of teachers of agriculture for Arab schools. With only 65 places, however, it too is totally inadequate. The problem of teaching modern methods of agriculture to a population 80 per cent of which gains its living by farming has not yet been solved by the Government, or faced by the Arab politicians. Facilities for technical education are no better-a single school with some 60 places.

On the primary level the position is slightly better.... But the fact remains that something less than half the Arab children who would like to attend school can do so today... Only one Arab girl in eight receives any education.

The lamentable condition of Arab education is a real cause for discontent. This discontent is increased by the contrast with the opportunities offered to the Jewish child. Jewish education in Palestine is financed by the Jewish community and by the fees which Jewish parents can afford to pay. Practically every Jewish Child has the opportunity for primary education.... With advice and financial aid from the Government, and with a new sense of responsibility on the part of the Arab leadership, compulsory education could, we were informed, be introduced within the next ten years. This is not only essential from an educational point of view; there can be no real unity between a literate and an illiterate population.

#### The Administration

Palestine is administered by officials of the British Colonial Service. Subject to the provisions of the Mandate, all major decisions of policy are taken in London as they would be for a Colonial territory...

While admitting this difficulty, we must express the view that this system militates most gravely against the chances of reconciliation between Jew and Arab....

Palestine is a unique country, bearing no resemblance to most of the countries administered by the British Colonial Service. It may be guestioned therefore whether an Administration of the Colonial type is the ideal instrument for governing two peoples each of which, in the absence of the other, would probably by now be enjoying complete independence. On the other hand, it seems difficult to foresee radical changes in the system so long as the division between Arabs and Jews compels British officials to assume so extensively a responsibility, and in view of the fact that their actions must be accounted for both to Parliament and to an international organization, each responsive to a keenly interested public opinion...

#### CHAPTER IX: PUBLIC SECURITY

Palestine is an armed camp. We saw signs of this almost as soon as we crossed the frontier, and we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day. Many buildings have barbed wire and other defenses. We ourselves were closely guarded by armed police, and often escorted by armored cars. It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine. The police are armed; they are conspicuous everywhere; and throughout the country there are substantially built police barracks.

We do not think that the conditions in Palestine since the Mandate have been fully appreciated throughout the world, and accordingly we have thought it right to set out in Appendix V a list of the main incidents of disorder. It will be seen that up to the year 1939 the Jews exercised very great restraint. It is in recent years that the threat to law and order has come from them...

A sinister aspect of recent years is the development of large illegal armed forces. The following is the structure as stated to us by the military authorities.

The general organization is the "Haganah." It is an illegal development of ... armed watchmen who protected Jewish settlements. Today it is completely organized, under a central control and with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women...

It is known that the Haganah has been procuring arms over a period of years. Vast quantities have been obtained from the residue of the campaigns in the Middle East. Arms and ammunition are kept and concealed in specially constructed caches in settlements and towns...

All three organizations to which reference has been made [Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi, and the Stern Group] are illegal.

We recognize that until comparatively recently, efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to curb attacks; we regret that these efforts appear to have ceased. We believe that those responsible for the working of the Jewish Agency-a body of great power and influence over the Jews in Palestine-could do a great deal towards putting an end to outrages such as we have described, which place the people of Palestine as well as British soldiers and police in constant danger.

Private armies ought not to exist if they constitute a danger to the peace of the world.

The position of Great Britain as Mandatory is not a happy one. The Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency said that, in the event of the withdrawal of the British troops, the Jews would take care of themselves. Jamal Effendi Husseini, replying to a question, said that it was the wish of the Arabs of Palestine that British forces and police should be withdrawn forthwith. Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, also representing the Arab Higher Committee, expressed his agreement. Jamal Effendi Husseini stated that he did not expect bloodshed but that, on the withdrawal of British forces, there would be a return to the condition which preceded the first World War (i.e. pre-Balfour Declaration). We are clear in our minds that if British forces were withdrawn there would be immediate and prolonged bloodshed the end of which it is impossible to predict. \*

# **★** Anglo-American Committee Report Summary Form

List important facts gleaned from the Anglo-American Committee Report. Circle facts that would be relevant to your role.

TOPIC	ARAB PERSPECTIVE	ZIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Position/ current situation		
Political considerations: interactions with and views of the British Mandate		
Geography and population		
Economic characteristics		

TOPIC	ARAB PERSPECTIVE	ZIONIST PERSPECTIVE
Attitudes and relations toward each other		
Government structures and leadership styles		
Culture (including daily life and education)		
Other factors, views, and influences important to the region (both foreign and domestic)		

# $\star$ MAP OF PALESTINE UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE, 1922-1948 $\star$

As a key advisor to President Truman, you must have a working knowledge of the geography in and around Palestine. Use a textbook, atlas, or other reference source to find and label the following on the map of the Middle East:

West Bank
Jerusalem
Dead Sea
Jaffa
Tel Aviv
Jordan River
Gaza
Sea of Galilee
Lebanon
Bethlehem
Negev Desert
Golan Heights
Mediterranean Sea



# $\star$ MAP OF THE MIDDLE EAST, 1948 $\star$

U.S.S.R Saudi Arabia Mediterranean Sea Palestine Iraq Transjordan Turkey Black Sea Syria Iran Red Sea Lebanon **Egypt** Sinai Peninsula Persian Gulf Yemen



#### **★ PRIMARY SOURCE EVALUATION FORM**

It is May 1948. The British Mandate that has governed Palestine for the last 40 years is about to end. The Jews want statehood immediately, while the Arabs want Palestine to be declared an independent Arab state. Violence escalates as both groups refuse to consider compromises. Tired of war and facing financial difficulties, the British place the problem in front of the young United Nations to solve. While the mandate is still intact, the British have begun to pull out their forces which adds to the volatile situation as there fewer forces to keep peace between the two factions.

Meanwhile, the Soviet interest in the Middle East is increasing, which could threaten U.S. access to the vast supplies of oil there and Truman's pledge to contain communism. Time is of the essence; the United States must quickly formulate a response. Acting in your role as a presidential advisor, ask yourself which documents you need to read to effectively advise President Truman on how to respond to the question of postwar Palestine. After you select which documents to read, prioritize them before you begin analyzing the primary sources.

Document Title and Author of Origin	Is this document relevant to understanding the situation in Palestine?		Is this relevant to my advisory role? Explain.		To which other advisors would this information be relevant?	
1. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
2. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
3. Title:	Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
4. Title:	☐ Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			
5. Title:	Yes	□ No	☐ Yes	□ Not Sure	□ No	
Author/Origin:	Why?		Why?			

# **MODULE 4: DECISIONS AND DILEMMAS**

## ★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX: INSTRUCTIONS

#### 1. RESEARCH THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE BY GATHERING AND ANALYZING RELEVANT INFORMATION

As the president's key advisors, create a plan for processing the information provided. Make sure that you share and discuss your strategies for analyzing information that will assist your advisory group in developing recommendations for resolving the problem.

#### 2. ANALYZE THE PROBLEM AND DETERMINE THE SOLUTION CRITERIA

The major difference between expert and novice problem solvers is that experts spend time analyzing the problem while novices tend to jump to solutions. Before thinking of possible solutions, your group must analyze the problem and decide what criteria any solution must meet. This is an essential step in problem solving and one that is often overlooked.

Working as a group, discuss and write answers to the following questions:

#### a. What is the ideal result?

Look at the problem to be solved. What would you consider the most desired outcome?

#### b. What will NOT be compromised or given up?

If and when we must negotiate or compromise in order to achieve the desired outcome, what would we advise the president not to give up or compromise? What is too important to let go?

#### c. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?

If the president must settle for less than the optimum outcome, what is still acceptable? What would be sacrificed from the optimum outcome?

#### d. What is an unacceptable outcome?

What would we not advise, under any circumstances, be allowed to

#### e. How will we know when we meet our desired outcome?

What does success look like? How will we know when the problem has been resolved?

f. Who else needs to be involved in developing advice for the outcome? In order to meet the outcome, what other advisors need to be involved?

#### 3. PROPOSE AND ASSESS THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

As a group, think of three possible solutions. Determine three negative and positive consequences of each.

#### 4. COMMIT, CHOOSE, AND COMMUNICATE A FINAL RECOMMENDATION

Take time for your group to look at the options along with the pros and cons of each. Your group will need to debate and decide what solution to recommend to the president. Your selected solution may be a combination of ideas from several possibilities. Write out your final selection, and make sure all group members fully understand which solution has been chosen for recommendation and why. Next, report your recommendation to the president.



66 You get all the facts and you make up your mind.

- HARRY S. TRUMAN

# **★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – SCHOOL BASED ★**

**Your Role:** You just volunteered to serve on a student representative group to monitor the issues of safety and security in your school.

**Situation:** A group of 30 to 40 students is very aggressive during lunch shifts. They shout insults and threats to other students. The group occupies different tables each day and forces other students to move. Rumors indicate that some students are ready to fight.

Research Plan	
How you would gather and analyze information about this problem?	
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.	
1. What is the ideal result?	
2. What will not be compromised?	
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?	
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?	
5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?	
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?	

Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.		
	Positive	Negative
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.		

	★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – HISTORICAL ★
Your WHDC Role:	

**Situation:** The time is 1947-1951. The United States must consider its national security in a global context as communism threatens to undermine democratic structures and U.S. efforts to rebuild war-torn Europe. The U.S. National Security Council is disorganized and at risk. It lacks a central policy and, as a result, fails to adequately advise the president on national security issues.

Research Plan  How you would gather and analyze information about this problem?		
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.		
1. What is the ideal result?		
2. What will not be compromised?		
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?		
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?		
5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?		
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?		

Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.	Positive	Negative
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.		

	★ DECISION MAKING MATRIX – BLANK ★
Your Role:	
Situation:	
Research Plan	
How you would gather and analyze information about this problem?	
Analyze the problem and determine a possible solution.	
1. What is the ideal result?	
2. What will not be compromised?	
3. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?	
4. What is not an acceptable outcome?	
5. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?	
6. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?	

Determine and assess three possible recommendations with risks, consequences and benefits.	Positive	Negative
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Recommendation		
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final recommendation to the appropriate authority.		

# WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER



66 It is clear that no settlement of the Palestine problem can be achieved which will be fully satisfactory to all of the parties concerned and that if this problem is to be solved in a manner which will bring peace and prosperity to Palestine, it must be approached in a spirit of conciliation.

- WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, AUGUST 16, 1946

# **★ WHAT MUST YOU CONSIDER REGARDING U.S.** POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1948?



### PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

You must consider the effect of the Palestinian crisis on the overall foreign policy of the United States as a part of the U.S. effort to contain Soviet expansion and counter Soviet aggression in the Middle East. Particularly, you must weigh the implications of the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern Bloc voting for the Partition Plan proposed by the United Nations.



### PRESS SECRETARY CHARLIE G. ROSS

The president's public image is of utmost importance to you, especially in this election year. You must consider the opinions from the critics and constituents who have sent 48,000 letters to the White House and how this decision might influence their vote.



### SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL

You must consider the effect of the Palestinian crisis on U.S. foreign policy with particular attention to the views of the foreign policy experts in the State Department who are concerned that Middle Eastern countries might turn to the Soviets and curtail U.S. access to oil. You believe that war will break out in the Middle East if a Jewish state is recognized.



### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES V. FORRESTAL

You must consider the effect of the Palestinian crisis on U.S. national security, especially with your increasing worry over Soviet expansion in the Middle East and the rest of the world. You find it disturbing that financial contributions from a block of voters could influence foreign policy.



### SPECIAL COUNSEL CLARK CLIFFORD

You must consider the interests of President Truman and the nation as a whole. Also, as President Truman's chief political advisor, you must be concerned with the political ramifications of any decision about Palestine in this election year and critics' accusation of using this crisis to gain votes.



### U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UN WARREN AUSTIN

You must consider the effect of the Palestinian crisis on U.S. foreign policy, with particular attention to the concerns of the foreign policy experts about potential Soviet influence in the Middle East.



### SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH

You must consider the effect of the Palestinian crisis on Saudi Arabia and the rest of Middle East, with particular attention to the ramifications of surrounding countries and those farther away making claims to the land in the region. Even though five Arab representatives are part of the United Nations, you feel the Arab case has not been successfully represented. Arab diplomats are not familiar with Western propaganda and feel that the Arab position is being judged by those who do not understand the Arab world or culture.



### **EDDIE JACOBSON**

You must consider the importance of the Palestinian crisis and its potential impact to the future of the Jewish people around the world.

## ★ WHAT PERSONAL FACTORS ARE IMPORTANT TO **YOU IN 1948?**

### PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN

You often draw upon your knowledge of history, the Bible, and personal experience when making difficult decisions. You are aware of President Roosevelt's promise to King Ibn Saud that the U.S. will make no policy in Palestine without consulting Arab leaders. You are also deeply concerned over the fate of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust. You are a candidate for reelection this year. Most observers give you little chance of winning.

### PRESS SECRETARY CHARLIE G. ROSS

President Truman's public image is of utmost importance to you. You are President Truman's longtime friend, and he often turns to you for common sense advice. You are concerned about the passionate protests from Americans interested in the Palestine situation. You are aware of the political consequences of his decisions, especially this year, an election year.

### SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL

You are a retired U.S. Army General with no previous diplomatic experience before becoming Secretary of State. Your reputation for wisdom and integrity commands near universal respect. You do not see U.S. involvement in the Middle East as necessary and are concerned that any involvement in the Middle East would offend the Arabs. You resent Clark Clifford's involvement in this situation because you do not believe that domestic politics should shape foreign policy.

### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES V. FORRESTAL

You are under a great deal of stress from continuing conflicts between the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. The national security impact of the rapid demobilization of the U.S. Armed Forces since the end of WWII also concerns you. If the U.S. military becomes involved in the Middle East, you worry that there might not be an end to that entanglement. You do not want to see a political structure imposed on the Middle East that would lead to conflict. On the other hand, you do not want to see the USSR replace Britain and the U.S. in the Middle East.

### SPECIAL COUNSEL CLARK CLIFFORD

You have a reputation as the bright young man on Truman's White House Staff. You are a skilled political strategist who also advises President Truman on military affairs and a variety of other matters. You feel strongly that the instability of the Middle East would allow the creation of a new democratic state committed to democratic principles.

### U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS WARREN AUSTIN

You are strongly anti-Communist and worry about Soviet influence in the Middle East. During the 1944 Republican Convention, you called for the international cooperation in winning peace. You feel that the new United Nations offers the greatest hope for peace in the Middle East.

SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ASAD MANSUR AL-FAQIH

You are concerned about the ramifications of any decision regarding Palestine on Saudi Arabia and surrounding countries. Leaders from this region can only agree that Palestine should not be divided because you fear that partition will lead to more war in the Middle East.

### **EDDIE JACOBSON**

You are concerned with the plight of Jewish people. Jewish leaders look to you to influence President Truman. The president's friendship is very important to you. You have access to the president and the White House that others do not.



**66** There is no indispensable [person] in a democracy.

### **★ ADVISORY GROUP MEETING INSTRUCTIONS**

### 1. SELECT AND PRIORITIZE

Acting in your role as a presidential advisor, ask yourself which documents you need to read to effectively advise President Truman on how to address the situation in Palestine. After you select which documents to read, prioritize them before you begin analyzing the primary sources.

### 2. READ THE DOCUMENTS

Read as many of the documents as you can and take notes that will help you advise President Truman on how the U.S. should address the situation in Palestine.

### 3. TAKE USEFUL NOTES

Please do not mark on any of the documents! You will not be able to bring any documents with you to the presidential meetings, so take good notes.

### Note the following:

- Vital background information on the situation from different perspectives that President Truman must consider before reaching his decision.
- Examples of different perspectives include military, economic, political, domestic, and foreign relations.
- Which U.S. actions you will encourage President Truman to pursue.

### 4. SUGGESTED SCHEDULE

Spend 75% of your time quietly reading documents and taking notes.

- In the remaining time, review your notes and circle what President Truman must know before making a decision. Then discuss as a group what information you will provide to the White House Press Corps and what advice you will give to President Truman.
- Note: Advisors do not have to agree when you leave this meeting.



As president,
I always insisted on
as complete a picture
as possible before
making a decision,
and I did not want
fuzzy statements that
concealed differences
of opinion.

# **★ ADVISORY GROUP NOTE TAKING PAGES ★**

TAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES:				

52 \* THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER | THE UNITED STATES AND THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, 1948

## AS AN ADVISOR, I WILL RECOMMEND THAT PRESIDENT TRUMAN TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

•		
•		
•		
•		
•		
•		
•		

The possible positive and negative consequences for each of my suggestions include:

Positive	Negative

# ★ CHARLIE ROSS' PRESS BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE, MAY 11, 1948

### **INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS**

Choose a news outlet from the list below to represent and compose three open-ended questions about the situation in Palestine. Remember to reflect the perspective of the readers and news organization you represent. Award-winning reporting earns you fame, prestige, and a higher salary, so do not share your questions with others and be prepared to adjust your questions in the briefing as needed.

	★ NEV	VS OUTLETS ★	
NEWS SERVICES			
Associated Press	United Press	Reuters News Agency	☐ International News Service
	NE	WSPAPERS	
Associated Press New York Times St. Louis Globe Democrat Chicago Daily Tribune San Francisco Examiner Los Angeles Examiner Fresno Bee	☐ United Press ☐ New York Post ☐ French News Agency ☐ Nashville Banner ☐ Winston-Salem Journal ☐ Portland Oregonian ☐ Baltimore Sun	Reuters News Agency London Daily Express Christian Science Monitor Toledo Blade Boston Globe Detroit News	<ul> <li>☐ International News Service</li> <li>☐ Times Herald (Washington D.C.)</li> <li>☐ Kansas City Star</li> <li>☐ Dallas Morning News</li> <li>☐ Negro Newspaper Publishers</li> <li>☐ Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph</li> </ul>
MAGAZINES			
☐ Newsweek ☐ Life	☐ Time ☐ Saturday Evening Post	☐ The Nation	☐ New Republic
		RADIO	
Mutual Broadcasting System	National Broadcasting Company (NBC)	American Broadcasting Company (ABC)	Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
	Т	ELEVISION	
WSB, Atlanta	WNBT, New York	WENR, Chicago	KOB, Albuquerque
Three Open-Ended Quest	ions		
1. This question is for:			
Question:			
2. This question is for:			
Question:			
3. This question is for:			
Question:			

### **Press Protocol**

- 1. Raise hand to be recognized.
- 2. When recognized, stand and state your name, the media you represent, and the advisor you wish to answer your question.
- 3. Ask your open-ended question (one follow-up question is allowed).
- 4. Correspondents may not argue with Charlie Ross, Truman's advisors, or other correspondents.

### **INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHARLIE ROSS**

In this press briefing you will inform the American people on the background and latest developments of the situation in Palestine, and initial U.S. actions in response. You should not try to resolve this issue at this time. Using the organizer below as a guide for what President Truman wants you to state in the press briefing, complete your speech below. When you finish your speech, introduce the panel of advisors appearing with you and call for questions from the press. Make sure all advisors participate in answering questions.

### PRESS BRIEFING ORGANIZER FOR CHARLIE ROSS

1. Introduction	Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, on behalf of President Truman, we are authorized to release the following information on the unfolding situation in Palestine.
2. Background Information	President Truman wants Americans to know the following background information concerning the situation in Palestine:
[What led to the influx of Jewish migrants to Palestine?]	·
	•
[Why is stability in the Middle East vital to U.S. interests?]	••
	•
3. Initial U.S. Action	The U.S. has taken the following actions:
[What has been the United States previous policy regarding Palestine?]	•
	•
4. Introduce Panel	President Truman's advisors will now brief you on the situation in Palestine. Secretary of State George Marshall will brief you first.

<sup>\*</sup>Do not invent facts! Instead use information from the video and background information on Palestine.

<sup>\*</sup>Consider all of the primary source documents you have read and been briefed on.

5. Secretary Marshall	
[Brief the press on the State Department's view of the situation.]	•
view of the stadtion.	•
	•
	•
	•
	•
	•
	•
[Yield to Secretary Forrestal.]	Secretary Forrestal will now brief you on the Defense Department's view of the situation in Palestine.
6. Secretary Forrestal	
[Discuss the Defense Department's	•
view of the situation.]	•
	•
	·
	•
	•
	•
	•
[Yield to Special Counsel Clifford.]	Special Counsel Clifford will now brief you on the perspectives of the
[Tieta to Special Courset Chilora.]	Jewish community at home and abroad.
7. Special Counsel Clifford	•
[Provide an overview of the varied perspectives	•
of the Jewish community at home and abroad on the situation]	•
0	·
	•
[Viold to Ambassadar Austin ]	Ambassador Austin will now brief you on the UN 's proposed plans for
[Yield to Ambassador Austin.]	Palestine.

Thank you for your reports. We will now take your questions.

## \* ADVISORS' MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN

1. Situation Reports: What must President Truman know? (refer to p. 51-52 in your notes.)	
	l

# 2. Define the boundaries of a solution

A. What is the ideal result?

Look at the problem to be solved. What would we consider the most desired outcome?

B. What will not be compromised?

If we must negotiate or compromise, what are you willing to give up?

C. What is an alternate outcome that would still be acceptable?

If the president must settle for less than the optimum outcome, what is still acceptable?

D. What is not an acceptable outcome?

What would we not advise be allowed to happen under any circumstances?

E. How will we know when we have reached our desired outcome?

What does success look like? How will we know when the problem has been resolved?

F. Who needs to be involved to meet the goal?

What advisors and agencies need to be involved to meet the optimum outcome?


## DEVELOPING THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN FOR ACTION

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN

Determine your preferred course and consider the possible consequences to your decision. Then use the response summary form on the following page and your advisors' expertise to determine the necessary steps to achieve your plan.

## YOU MUST CONSIDER POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR CHOSEN RESPONSE. **SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ARE:**

- 1. The inherently slow nature of the U.N. could compromise the effectiveness of the decision.
- 2. The gain or loss of U.N. credibility if violence erupts in the Middle East.
- 3. The Soviets might recognize Israel first; therefore, asserting their dominance in the Middle East.
- 4. U.S. Jewish population could funnel money into Truman's political opponents in the '48 election.
- 5. Oil from the Middle East is restricted or cut off.
- 6. Sending troops to Israel could spread our military too thin in the midst of a Soviet threat.
- 7. Takes money and manpower away from the rebuilding of Korea, Japan, and much of Western Europe.
- 8. Strain relations with our number one ally: Great Britain.





★ PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S RESPONSE SUMMARY TO THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE ★		
Commit, choose, and communicate as a group the final plan.		
Determine and assess at least three steps necessary		
to complete your plan and assess the positive and negative consequences of each step.	Positive	Negative
Step 1:		
Step 2:		
Step 3:		

### ★ PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE

### **INSTRUCTIONS**

Each President Truman should share their plan of action then present their plan to the White House Press Corps. (If an agreement cannot be reached on the final course of action because of significant differences in the plans, two presidents may be selected.) Work as a team to craft the final President Truman's speech to the White House Press Corps on page 62. Do not invent facts; use the information from the video, readings, and briefing.

**66** A president ought not to worry whether a decision he knows he has to make will prove to be popular. The question is not whether his actions are going to be popular at the time but whether what he does is right. And if it is right in the long run it will come out all right. The [person] who keeps his ear to the ground to find out what is popular will be in trouble. I usually say that a [person] whose heart is in the right place and who is informed is not likely to go very far wrong when he has to act.

# **★ PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S PRESS CONFERENCE: ANNOUNCING THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE**

### **INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN**

Using the organizer below as a guide complete your speech detailing the U.S. response to the situation in Palestine below. You will then present your plan to the White House Press Corps, and then take questions from the press.

### PRESS BRIEFING ORGANIZER FOR PRESIDENT TRUMAN

1. Greeting and Introduction	Ladies and gentlemen, I conferred with the Secretaries of State and the Defense Department, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to U.S. and the UN, and my advisors as to how to address the situation in Palestine.
2. Background Information	As you are aware, last December the British announced they would end their Mandate of Palestine on May 15, 1948. The situation in Palestine is very complex with many competing interests and perspectives. We must now decide how to address the void of power left by the British.
3. U.S. Response	Accordingly, I have ordered the following:  •  •
4. Reasons	My reasons for this course of action are:
5. Possible Consequences*	I know my actions may have some important consequences for my fellow Americans and the world including:
6. Closing Remarks	·
7. Take Questions	I will now take questions.  [Reporters must raise their hand and be recognized by you before asking a question. You may allow each reporter one follow-up question.]

<sup>\*</sup>Remember to consider domestic, diplomatic, and military consequences.

### **INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS**

Choose your News Agency (see p. 54):	—
Predict What You Think President Truman Will Announce:	
•	
•	
Three Open-Ended Questions Write three open-ended questions based on your prediction and knowledge of the topic to ask President Truman at his press conference. Remember to reflect the perspective of the area your news organization and readers you represent.	
1,	
2	
3	

### **Protocol**

- 1. Raise hand to be recognized.
- 2. When recognized, stand and state your name and the media you represent.
- 3. Address the president as Mr. or Madam President.
- 4. Ask your open-ended question.
- 5. One follow-up question is allowed.
- 6. Correspondents may not argue with President Truman.



If you have a free press, there's no way in the world for anyone to get by with the subversion of the government.



Decisions of tremendous import must be made by the men and women of your generation. You will be called upon to find the answers to the tangled problems of peace, [but] the opportunities of tomorrow are indeed infinite. Your country needs your ability, the strength of your convictions, and your youthful enthusiasm. The service required of your generation will be great. It demands a new era of leadership and an understanding of international affairs. It will be your most cherished opportunity to help build and maintain that common understanding among the peoples of the world. Have confidence in your ability to measure up to the opportunities and the demands of the future.



# THE WHITE HOUSE DECISION CENTER

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